Gambling on the circumplex of affect: An empirical investigation of incidental and anticipated emotional influences on risky choice. by Bard, David E.
  
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA 
GRADUATE COLLEGE 
 
 
GAMBLING ON THE CIRCUMPLEX OF AFFECT: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENTAL AND ANTICIPATED EMOTIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON RISKY CHOICE 
 
A DISSERTATION 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the  
degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
By 
DAVID E. BARD 
Norman, Oklahoma  
2007 
 
 
 
UMI Number: 3273882
3273882
2007
UMI Microform
Copyright
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
    unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
     Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 
 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
  
GAMBLING ON THE CIRCUMPLEX OF AFFECT: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENTAL AND ANTICIPATED EMOTIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON RISKY CHOICE 
 
A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
       ____________________________ 
       Joseph Lee Rodgers, Ph.D., Chair 
 
       ____________________________ 
       Kirby Gilliland, Ph.D. 
 
       ____________________________ 
       Scott D. Gronlund, Ph.D. 
  
 
       ____________________________ 
       Robert M. Hamm, Ph.D. 
  
 
       ____________________________ 
       Craig St. John, Ph.D.  
  
 
       ____________________________ 
       Robert Terry, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright by DAVID E. BARD 2007 
All Rights Reserved. 
   
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Where do I begin?  I guess I should start with the disclaimer that given the 
amount time it took to reach this goal, some of the names, places, and events that help 
shape, mold, and guide the completion of the degree are bound to be underestimated, 
distorted, or even forgotten.  For these impending errors, I sincerely apologize.   
I do, of course, wish thank my committee members for their patience with the 
manuscript, the area of interest (which was outside or, at least, peripheral to their own), 
and their individual contributions not only to the dissertation but also, and most 
importantly, to my higher education.  My criteria for member selection were based on 
three qualities: respect for the individual’s academic body of work, mentorship 
qualities, and critical thinking.  As a general rule of thumb, the decision-making 
algorithm implemented was most heavily weighted by the degree of envy felt toward 
each individual’s academic accomplishments.  For these reasons, I can truly say it is an 
honor to have each of their names placed on the final manuscript.    
As for the current body of work that follows, two individuals in particular 
deserve special mention.  First, I would like to acknowledge Rob Hamm, my first and 
only real formal mentor in decision-making.  Without his tutorship in the field and his 
passion for science, there is little doubt my academic career would have traveled a 
much different path; one that I anticipate (cognitive dissonance?☺) would have led to 
fewer twists and turns, but in kind, smaller peaks and valleys.  For these challenges and 
new perspectives, I am deeply grateful.  Without Rob, I would likely not know of the 
second major contributor to this dissertation work, Professor George Loewenstein.  
Although we have never been formally introduced, it still seems remiss not to repay his 
 iv
   
inspiring words on the research mine-field that is affective decision-making with some 
form of appreciation.  I would like to thank him not only for the seed he planted during 
a symposium heard many moons ago, but also for establishing a bar for researchers in 
this area that likely will never be reached but is all too tantalizing to ignore.       
There are so many other cast members behind the scenes that helped make this 
and many other projects in my academic life possible.   Of these individuals, I would 
like to first thank Joe Rodgers.  Joe has become a father-figure, friend, and colleague 
during my lengthy stay at the University.  He has provided an excellent example of how 
to balance both professional career and family life, which may be the most valuable 
lesson ever taught to any graduate student.  In general, Joe is simply a wonderful, well-
rounded and grounded person, which from near or far has been a marvel and inspiration 
to watch.  For your patience, friendship, wisdom, and understanding, I am eternally 
indebted.  I owe equal debts to another one of my life’s great role models, Henry 
Ashida.  It is hard to imagine a man more decent and loving as he, and I have been 
privileged to call him my friend now for so many years.  With his support and 
friendship, I have been and am still truly blessed.  To my parents, I would like to say 
that just thinking of you both makes me smile and that this smile continually grows 
larger the older I become.  As a child and adolescent, it was hard not to take for granted 
the life you helped build for me.  At that time, it was difficult to notice or even fathom 
how much small changes in environment affect development and behavior.  Yet, now 
older, I realize that because your endless love, your dedication and sacrifice to family, 
your kindness and tolerance toward others, and your openness to dialogue and 
experience, I am, thankfully, fortunately, and unabashedly, forever a product of my 
 v
   
early environment.  Thank you both so much!  The next person to thank, Elizabeth 
Altshuler, deserves her own paragraph and perhaps a gold-plated plaque.  Sadly, I can 
only afford the former.  (After all, until this is paragraph is written and printed in a 
library, I am still just a struggling student.)     
She came into my life at the exact right moment, just in time to save this 
struggling author and scientist from fleeing the continent.  Sadly for her, I must admit 
she did not know what she was getting into completely.  In retrospect, I made out like a 
bandit.  In return for all the late nights, lost sleep, and random acts of aggravation-
fraught silence and neglect, I received a backbone, sounding board, proof-reader, and 
unconditional love.  If it sounds like quite a bargain, that’s because it was.  Unless, of 
course, she has been keeping a tab?!  Regardless, payment is well overdue!  Thank you, 
Elizabeth, for all your patience, support, good-will, and love.  Above all else, though, 
thank you for being you.  When moments of despair, disappointment, and frustration 
emerged from this and other projects, you were always there to see the light at the end 
of the tunnel.  Even were you not to point it out, it was always hard to feel that way for 
long, just by knowing you were around.   
Finally, for all other friends and family that have helped endure these past few 
years, thank you as well for all your support and understanding.  A special thank you is 
owed to Will Beasley, without whom, data collection may not have made it off the 
ground.  Your programming skills are a thing of wonder.  When the time comes for 
your dissertation work, I hope I can provide an equally valuable service.  Although, 
with a Ph.D. now within reach, my fee may be a little loftier than was yours.  I am sure 
we can work something out☺   
 vi
   
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................... IV 
LIST OF TABLES.......................................................................................................... IX 
LIST OF FIGURES........................................................................................................ XI 
ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................XII 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW..............................1 
NORMATIVE THEORIES OF DECISION-MAKING.........................................................................................1 
AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES ON DECISION-MAKING ......................................................................................2 
IMMEDIATE EMOTIONAL INFLUENCES ON DECISION-MAKING .................................................................6 
Incidental affect: Mood-congruence and the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) ........................................6 
Affect-dependent processing and mood incongruence in the AIM......................................................7 
Principle propositions of the AIM Theory ........................................................................................10 
Criticisms of the AIM........................................................................................................................12 
Incidental affect: Emotion-, dimension-, and appraisal-specific effects ...........................................14 
Integral affect: The Risk as Feelings Hypothesis..............................................................................19 
Summary of immediate affect effects on decision-making.................................................................20 
EXPECTED AFFECT AND DECISION-MAKING ..........................................................................................22 
Risk-value GEU ................................................................................................................................22 
Decision Affect Theory and GEU......................................................................................................23 
A Generalized Disappointment Model (GDM) .................................................................................25 
GDM and the Allais Paradox, Reflection Effect, and Out-of-Sample Fit of GEU ............................31 
DIMENSIONALITY OF AFFECT AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO IMMEDIATE AND EXPECTED EMOTIONS ........33 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES ........................................................................36 
Summary of Literature and Its Relation to Proposed Investigations ................................................36 
Hypotheses: Incidental Affective Effects on Expected Emotion ........................................................37 
CHAPTER II: METHODS.............................................................................................39 
PARTICIPANTS ........................................................................................................................................39 
STIMULI..................................................................................................................................................39 
PROCEDURE............................................................................................................................................40 
MEASURES .............................................................................................................................................42 
Affect .................................................................................................................................................42 
Expected Payoff/Loss ........................................................................................................................43 
Perceived Risk...................................................................................................................................44 
DATA ANALYSIS.....................................................................................................................................44 
CHAPTER III: RESULTS .............................................................................................47 
DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION...................................................................................................................47 
AFFECT MEASUREMENT MODEL ............................................................................................................50 
HYPOTHESIS TESTING.............................................................................................................................51 
HYPOTHESIS 1.  CURRENT VALENCE AND AROUSAL WILL PREDICT INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN ...........52 
CERTAINTY EQUIVALENCY (CE) MEASURES OF CHOICE PREFERENCE ACROSS GAMBLES. .......................52 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS 1 RESULTS...................................................................................................62 
HYPOTHESIS 2.  CURRENT VALENCE AND AROUSAL WILL PREDICT INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN 
ANTICIPATED AFFECT. ............................................................................................................................64 
ANTICIPATED VALENCE/HAPPINESS FOR BEST GAMBLE OUTCOMES .....................................................70 
ANTICIPATED VALENCE/HAPPINESS FOR WORST GAMBLE OUTCOMES .................................................74 
ANTICIPATED AROUSAL/SURPRISE FOR BEST GAMBLE OUTCOMES .......................................................77 
ANTICIPATED AROUSAL/SURPRISE FOR WORST GAMBLE OUTCOMES....................................................81 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS 2 RESULTS...................................................................................................86 
 vii
   
HYPOTHESIS 3.  EXPECTED AFFECT WILL MEDIATE THE INFLUENCE OF CURRENT AFFECT ON CHOICE 
PREFERENCE. ..........................................................................................................................................89 
CE REGRESSED ON EXPECTED AFFECT MEASURES ................................................................................91 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS 3 RESULTS.................................................................................................101 
HYPOTHESIS 4.  THE INFLUENCE OF INCIDENTAL AFFECT ON EXPECTED AFFECT WILL BE MEDIATED 
THROUGH PERCEPTIONS OF RISK AND EXPECTED PAYOFF. ....................................................................102 
SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS 4 RESULTS.................................................................................................109 
CHAPTER IV: DISCUSSION .....................................................................................109 
INCIDENTAL AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES ON RISKY CHOICE .....................................................................110 
INCIDENTAL AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES ON ANTICIPATED AFFECT..........................................................111 
EXPECTED AFFECT AS A MEDIATOR OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INCIDENTAL AFFECT AND CE ..111 
STRUCTURAL FEATURES OF GAMBLES INFLUENCE EXPECTED AFFECT AND CE ..................................112 
LIMITATIONS ........................................................................................................................................116 
FUTURE RESEARCH ..............................................................................................................................119 
REFERENCES ..............................................................................................................122 
 
 
 viii
   
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Sample Distribution of Race/Ethnicity............................................................. 47 
Table 2. Descriptive Information for Bipolar Affect Adjective Pairs ............................ 47 
Table 3. Descriptive Information on Completion Time for Experimental Tasks........... 48 
Table 4. Number of Participants per Cubicle/Computer ................................................ 49 
Table 6. Estimates from Final 2-Dimension Incidental Affect Model ........................... 51 
Table 7. Male Descriptive Statistics for CEs and Affect Factor Scores......................... 54 
Table 8. Female Descriptive Statistics for CEs and Affect Factor Scores ..................... 54 
Table 9. Results from Model Selection Procedure for Positive Gamble Certainty 
Equivalents Regressed on Current Affect ...................................................................... 57 
Table 10. Results from Model Selection Procedure for Negative Gamble Certainty 
Equivalents Regressed on Current Affect ...................................................................... 61 
Table 11. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Best Gamble 
Outcome ......................................................................................................................... 66 
Table 12. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Worst Gamble 
Outcome ......................................................................................................................... 66 
Table 13. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Best Gamble Outcome
........................................................................................................................................ 67 
Table 14. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Worst Gamble 
Outcome ......................................................................................................................... 67 
Table 15. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Best Gamble ...... 68 
Table 16. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Worst Gamble 
Outcome ......................................................................................................................... 68 
Table 17. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Best Gamble 
Outcome ......................................................................................................................... 69 
Table 18. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Worst Gamble 
Outcome ......................................................................................................................... 69 
Table 19. Model Effects for Best Outcome Anticipated Valence .................................. 72 
Table 20. Model Effects for Worst Outcome Anticipated Valence ............................... 76 
Table 21. Model Effects for Best Outcome Anticipated Arousal .................................. 79 
Table 22. Model Effects for Worst Outcome Arousal ................................................... 84 
Table 23. Model Fit Comparison for Gamble-Specific versus Common Expected Affect 
Prediction........................................................................................................................ 92 
Table 24. Final Models of CE Responses Regressed on Expected Affect ..................... 93 
Table 25. Male Positive-Gamble Mediation Models ..................................................... 94 
Table 26. Female Positive-Gamble Mediation Models .................................................. 95 
Table 27. Male Negative-Gamble Mediation Models .................................................... 96 
Table 28. Tests of Significance for Total Indirect Effects within Mediating Models.... 99 
Table 29. Male Positive Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk. 103 
Table 30. Male Negative Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk 103 
Table 31. Female Positive Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk
...................................................................................................................................... 104 
Table 32. Female Negative Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk
...................................................................................................................................... 104 
Table 33. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Valence for Best Outcomes from Subjective Expected Value Responses ................... 105 
 ix
   
Table 34. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Valence for Worst Outcomes from Subjective Expected Value Responses ................ 106 
Table 35. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Arousal for Best Outcomes from Subjective Risk Responses...................................... 106 
Table 36. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Arousal for Worst Outcomes from Subjective Risk Responses ................................... 107 
Table 37. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of CE .... 108 
 x
   
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Panel A:  The Traditional Consequentialist Model; Panel B: Newer Dual 
Process Model with Anticipated and Anticipatory Affect ............................................... 3 
Figure 2. Results of laboratory studies with gambles showing outcome, comparison, and 
surprise effects................................................................................................................ 26 
Figure 3.  The shape of the decision weight curve which overweights small probabilities 
and underweights large probabilities.............................................................................. 29 
Figure 4. Possible decision weights from a reduced model [3] where the crossover point 
represents both surprise and disappointment effects ...................................................... 30 
Figure 5. Risk Premium Misfit Using Prospect Theory Weighting ............................... 32 
Figure 6. The Affect Circumplex ................................................................................... 33 
Figure 7.  Predictions from the Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis ....................................... 35 
Figure 8.  Probability Distributions for Gambling Task................................................. 40 
Figure 9. Expected Monetary Difference from Average Arousal and Valence [point 
(0,0)] Predicted Values in the Positive Gamble Models ................................................ 58 
Figure 10. Expected Monetary Difference from Average Arousal and Valence [point 
(0,0)] Predicted Values in the Negative Gamble Models............................................... 62 
Figure 11. Expected Latent-Response-Scale Difference between Anticipated Valence 
and Predicted Values for Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the 
Positive Best Outcome Gamble Models......................................................................... 73 
Figure 12.  Expected Latent-Response-Scale Difference between Anticipated Valence 
and Predicted Values for Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the 
Negative Best Outcome Gamble Models ....................................................................... 74 
Figure 13. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Positive Best Outcome 
Gamble Models .............................................................................................................. 80 
Figure 14. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Negative Best Outcome 
Gamble Models .............................................................................................................. 81 
Figure 15. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Positive Worst Outcome 
Gamble Models .............................................................................................................. 85 
Figure 16. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Negative Worst Outcome 
Gamble Models .............................................................................................................. 86 
Figure 17. Diagram of Mediating Model ..................................................................... 100 
 
 xi
   
ABSTRACT 
 
 Affective decision-making has begun to change the face of the traditional 
decision science paradigm (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), forcing 
researchers to consider direct influences of affect on both cognition and behavior, and 
no longer viewing affect as simple byproduct of each.  In what follows, this more 
modern view of decision-making has been chronicled and summarized, focusing the 
reader on two broad types of affective influences: those attributable to incidental and 
expected (or anticipatory) affect.  An attempt is made to combine these two types of 
affective influences into a more general theory of affective decision-making, one that 
incorporates aspects of the Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978) 
and the Circumplex of Affect (Russell & Barrett, 1999).  An empirical investigation of 
this theory was tested using self-report measures of both incidental and expected affect 
and a certainty equivalency gambling task.  Results suggested small direct influences of 
incidental and expected arousal and valence on gambling choices; yet, little support 
existed for an indirect effect of incidental affect on the gambling decision through 
mediating expected affect.  Conclusions highlight the promise of a general affective 
decision-making theory that might explain current paradoxes in risk seeking behaviors, 
particularly those that occur during adolescence.  Appeals were also made, however, for 
better measurement and methodology within this area of research so that empirically 
validated propositions can be generalized beyond the pen and well-controlled 
laboratories.     
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GAMBLING ON THE CIRCUMPLEX OF AFFECT: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF INCIDENTAL AND ANTICIPATED EMOTIONAL 
INFLUENCES ON RISKY CHOICE  
 
 
CHAPTER I: Introduction and Literature Review 
Normative Theories of Decision-Making 
 Traditional approaches to modeling decision-making have focused on two main 
variables: beliefs and preferences (Loewenstein & Furstenberg, 1991).  Results from 
these normative decision-making studies have been equivocal.  Not always do beliefs 
and preferences predict actual behavior.  One of the suspected leading causes for lack of 
consistency in findings relates to the nature of impulsivity.  Take for example, the 
continued problem of STDs and unwanted pregnancies among adolescents.  Evidence 
suggests that despite increased efforts to educate adolescents on probabilities and the 
severity of negative sexual outcomes and despite greater reported knowledge and safe 
behavioral intentions among youth, rates of risky sexual behavior remain high (Boyer, 
Tschann, &  Schafer, 1999; CDC, 2000).  Susceptibility to the negative consequences 
associated with this risky behavior begs the question, “Why do so many young people 
engage in behaviors that potentially compromise their self-interest?”  Impulsivity 
theorists argue that not unlike the allure of drug addiction, the fulfillment of sexual 
gratification can at times overwhelm any cognitive processing of normative decision 
criteria (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein & Furstenberg, 1991; Loewenstein, Nagin, & 
Paternoster, 1997; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).  If true, the question 
then becomes, “What is it about gratification that negates or attenuates normative 
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cognitive processing?”  The current thesis attempts to investigate one potential culprit, 
affect.   
Affective Influences on Decision-Making 
 There are two broad types of affective influences present in the literature.  
Expected emotions are the distant a priori derived expectations of experienced affect 
that follow a decision or behavior, whereas immediate emotions are the emotions active 
during an actual decision process.  Both types of affect have been shown to have a 
substantial influence on choice and behavior in laboratory experiments (Bell, 1985; 
Brandstätter, Kuhberger, & Schneider, 2002; Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997; Lerner & 
Keltner, 2001; Loomes & Sugden, 1982, 1986; Luce, 1998; Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & 
Ritov, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999; Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Schwarz 
& Clore, 1983).  Extrapolating these two types of findings to real world choice and 
behavior, however, lacks theoretical development and suffers from virtually no 
empirical investigation.  Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) were perhaps 
the first to suggest that models incorporating both of these influences could overcome 
many of the pitfalls of traditional normative consequentialist decision theories.  As 
Figure 1 depicts, the addition of emotions to anticipated outcomes (expected emotions 
are derived from the integration of anticipated emotions and their associated subjective 
probabilities of occurrence) and the inclusion of immediate emotions (feelings in Panel 
B) leads to a dual process influence on behavior. 
While this theoretical modification to traditional consequentialist decision 
theory is slowly permeating its way into recent decision science work, the idea of dual 
processes affecting behavior is not new.  Contemporaries like Damasio (1994), Epstein  
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Figure 1. Panel A:  The Traditional Consequentialist Model; Panel B: Newer Dual 
Process Model with Anticipated and Anticipatory Affect.1   
 
Anticipated 
outcomes 
Cognitive 
evaluation 
Decision Outcome 
Feelings 
Subjective 
probabilities 
Anticipated outcomes 
(including anticipated 
emotions) 
Cognitive 
evaluation 
Behavior 
Subjective 
probabilities 
Other factors, e.g., 
vividness, immediacy, 
background mood 
Feelings 
Panel B 
Outcomes 
(including 
emotions)
Panel A 
                                                 
1 From “Risk as Feelings,” by G. F. Loewenstein, E. U. Weber, C. K. Hsee, and N. Welch, 2006, 
Psychological Bulletin, 127(2), p. 268, 270.  © 2006 by the American Psycholoigcal Association.  
Adapted with permission from author. 
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(1994), Le Doux (1996), and Zajonc (1980) have long promulgated the idea that two 
parallel processes, with unique evolutionary origins, operate behind our decision-
making curtains.  As Schultheiss (2001) explains, the feelings component in Figure 2 
belongs to an evolutionarily older experiential system that is architecturally responsive 
to immediate stimuli that arouse one or more of the five bodily senses.  Learning in this 
system is suspected to involve either incentive or instrumental conditioning, but the key 
contrasting component distinguishing experiential processing is that it encodes stimuli 
as they are without the need for abstract cognitive restructuring.  This process of 
learning and subsequent decision-making need not involve consciousness either, and 
interestingly, has been suggested to develop much earlier in development than the 
analytic system (providing, perhaps, some link to findings suggesting underdeveloped 
abstract thinking in adolescence; see Boyer, 2006; Green, Johnson, & Kaplan, 1992; 
Johnson & Green, 1993; Speier et al., 1997).   The analytic system (borrowing Slovic et 
al. (2004) terminology), on the other hand, seems to be evolutionarily more complex 
and, therefore, newer to the species.  In fact, the birth of this system is suspected to 
correspond to the arrival of language acquisition.  This system operates through 
complex verbal encoding of stimuli into new representations that can be retrieved long 
after the initial experience.  The system is also capable of creating abstract concepts and 
representations that do not actually exist in the experiential world (e.g., moral beliefs, 
politics, etc.) and is responsible for complex memory processes that chunk large groups 
of stimuli into common categories, to enhance the informativeness and efficiency of 
subsequent retrieval.  Its architectural knowledge structure allows for decision-making 
that considers both immediate and long-term consequences simultaneously, 
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continuously updating beliefs and conceptions about the complexities of the 
environment from which it gathers information.     
 Loewenstein et al. (2001) argue that previous judgment and decision-making 
studies have all too often focused on the influence of expected emotion through the 
analytic system, and, yet, rarely, if ever, are real-world decisions devoid of any 
influences from expected and immediate emotions via the experiential system.  A 
similar argument is made by Schultheiss (2001) when contrasting the effects of implicit 
and explicit motivational influences on behavior.  Most real world experiences, he 
argues, are likely to trigger responses from both systems.  Take our earlier sexual 
behavior example.  One might expect that individuals who have, through incentive or 
instrumental processes, learned to associate sexual behavior with immediate pleasant 
feelings might be impulsively motivated to engage in unsafe sex.  These same 
individuals may, however, also have verbally learned and accepted normative motives 
for abstaining from sex or engaging in protected sex.  A competing influence model 
such as this may help explain the findings of Adler and Tschann (1993) and Miller 
(Miller, 1974; Miller & Pasta, 2000; 2002) who report substantial numbers of 
individuals experiencing conflicting implicit and explicit reactions toward unwanted 
pregnancies.   
Theories of affective influence in the decision sciences are relatively new and, 
therefore, rapidly expanding and evolving.  To date, most of the recent work in 
cognitive psychology has exclusively focused on the effects of incidental affect- a type 
of immediate affect that includes all background affect not specific to the decision task.  
While consistent terminology has yet to take hold, Forgas’ (1995, 2003) Affect Infusion 
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Model (AIM) has provided an overarching perspective that highlights two major 
pathways of incidental influence.  The text that follows will summarize his integrative 
approach and its more recent opponents before moving on to expected emotional 
influences.   
Immediate Emotional Influences on Decision-Making 
 Incidental affect: Mood-congruence and the Affect Infusion Model (AIM).  
Perhaps the most widely discussed affective influence on decision-making is the Affect 
as Information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Clore et al., 1994) pathway, which 
characterizes affect as an informative agent that can be summoned (either implicitly or 
explicitly) for advice before a behavioral choice or judgment is selected.  The proposed 
mechanism initially developed roots in classical conditioning with gradual adoption of 
the misattribution and self-attribution literature.  Initial formulations proposed 
misattributions of source for incidental affect often resulting in biased judgments and 
behavioral decisions based on learned affective stimulus-response associations.  For 
example, when deciding whether to purchase a pricy ice-cream cone, an incidentally 
experienced good mood might persuade one to consume the ice-cream no matter the 
excessive cost.  Note, the direction of influence is always predicted as mood-congruent 
(i.e., positive moods lead to approach-like behavior, whereas negative mood leads to 
avoidance).  As pointed out by Forgas (2000, 2001) and others (Schwarz, Strack, 
Kommer, & Wagner, 1987; Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994), the effect described is 
most evident when the participant is unfamiliar with the task, lacks strong existing 
motivational influences, or lacks resource capacity for more complex analysis of 
stimuli.  Other boundary condition searches (appearing as early as the seminal work of 
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Schwarz & Clore, 1983) have found that simply informing participants of the affect 
source was enough to prevent this heuristic cue from having much influence (Martin, 
Harlow, & Strack, 1992, Clore & Parrott, 1994; Berkowitz, Jaffee, Jo, & Troccoli, 
2000).  The ease of countering the affective information effects led researchers to coin 
the popular “How-do-I-feel-about-it?” heuristic label. 
The second pathway discussed by Forgas exerts its influence through memory 
and, not surprisingly then, has been labeled affect-priming, where the priming 
influences also adhere to the affect-congruence principle.  For example, before making 
judgments about a new acquaintance, an incidentally experienced good mood may 
prime positive memories of earlier acquaintances who share this new person’s ethnic 
background, gender, personality, etc.  These recollections then lead to an overall 
positive first impression of the acquaintance.  Early work with priming effects of affect 
showed modest success in predicting such congruence but also quickly developed 
opposing boundary conditions (see review by Fiedler, 1991).  The main boundary 
limitation appeared to involve the degree of constructive, elaborate processing 
necessary for problem-solving.  If the decision task was novel and required 
development of a new choice strategy (especially a memory-based search for preferred 
actions or judgment), current affect exhibited coloring effects.  However, if the task at 
hand was associated with previous experience, strong motivational influences, or well-
defined schemata, the evidence for mood and behavior/judgment congruence via affect 
priming was far less convincing.    
Affect-dependent processing and mood incongruence in the AIM.  Newer 
explorations of affect-dependent processing have uncovered more complex influences 
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underlying judgment and decision-making processes.  Seminal suppositions revolved 
around valence characteristics of existing affect.  Isen (1984, 1987) pioneered this 
development proposing an affect maintenance/mood repair mechanism that predicted 
behavioral and judgment responses that preferentially favored positive changes in 
valence.  In other words, those in a negative mood might tend to favor decisions that 
can potentially bring positive benefits (even if those benefits were only remotely 
possible), in an effort to repair the current state of mood.  On the other hand, those 
already in positive moods may shy away from risky ventures with sizeable potential 
losses in order to maintain a good mood.  Forgas (1995) adapted this mechanism for 
inclusion in his AIM theory suggesting that affect can produce motivational strategies 
that counter the earlier noted mood-congruent principle.  Subsequent work by Forgas 
and colleagues (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002; Ciarrochi & Forgas, 1999; Forgas, Johnson, 
& Ciarrochi, 1998; Forgas, Ciarrochi, & Moylan, 2000) argued that these types of 
motivational influences are more likely to surface when participants experience moods 
at greater intensity.  For example, individuals induced to experience happy and sad 
moods showed a strong tendency to reverse early mood-congruent choices on 
descriptive labeling of persons, word-completion, and self-description tasks.  Reversals 
to more mood-incongruent responses occurred toward the end of experimental sessions, 
when presumably the continual barrage of negative or positive thoughts and responses 
had raised induced affect to peak levels (Forgas & Ciarrochi, 2002).  Similarly, 
individuals who scored highly on a trait anxiety (a negative mood) measure exhibited 
fewer negative mood-congruent discriminating judgments about out-group members 
(Ciarrochi & Forgas, 1999) than did low trait anxious individuals.  This motivated 
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reversal has become a key concept in the so called Mood Management hypothesis, 
which claims individuals will switch from substantive processing colored by affect to a 
more consciously-controlled  processing strategy that attempts to manage the intensity 
of a particular mood.  This hypothesis diverges from Isen’s earlier mood 
repair/maintenance mechanism in that even happy moods will invoke self-regulatory 
mechanisms that search for negative information (e.g., negative self-descriptors or 
negatively-worded health risks) to counterbalance euphoric states.   
Propelled by his work in affect as information, Schwarz and colleagues 
(Schwarz, 1990; Bless & Schwarz, 1999; Schwarz, 2000) identified one of the most 
robust and well-accepted affect-dependent processing effects on social reasoning tasks 
(Bless, 2000; Fiedler, 2001).  They conceptualized this process as a cognitive tuning 
mechanism (Schwarz, 1990), whereby affect’s valence signals an appropriate 
processing strategy.  The tuning mechanism is informed (similar to the operation of the 
“How do I feel about it?” heuristic) by the alarms triggered from negative affect or the 
carefree bliss that often accompanies positive affect (a “happy-go-lucky” attitude).  In 
alarming situations, the decision-maker attunes his processing strategy toward a more 
detail-oriented, data-driven approach- the “bottom-up” perceptual, processing strategy.  
This type of processing provides an opportunity for the individual to reassess his or her 
prior beliefs and schema which may have been partly responsible for the current 
(unhappy) circumstances.  In more calming situations, the individual is cued to invoke a 
more heuristic, schema-driven processing approach- the “top-down” perceptual 
strategy.  This approach reinforces the usefulness of prior established beliefs and 
schemata and encourages continued reliance on this information.  Forgas (1995) 
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acknowledges this distinction in his theory and claims that this functional processing 
mechanism can also serve to explain certain mood-incongruent affective effects.  For 
example, in studies on stereotyping, Forgas and Fiedler (1996) found that positive affect 
individuals relied more on stereotypic information and gave faster (presumably more 
heuristic) judgments about reward allocations than did negative affect individuals.  
Importantly, however, this effect reversed (mood-congruence reemerged) when the 
judged groups evoked personal relevance for the individual.   This moderating effect of 
relevance along with the earlier reviewed boundary conditions of mood-congruent 
influences led to the eventual formulation of the AIM, an overarching theory intended 
to capture and explain previously observed complexities and idiosyncrasies of affective 
decision-making influences. 
Principle propositions of the AIM Theory.  Although the theory was developed 
to predict effects of affect on decision-making, the AIM is equally descriptive about 
situations where affect is not influential.  In short, the theory divides information 
processing into four main strategies: direct access, motivated, heuristic, and substantive 
processing.  Direct access strategies are usually automatic implicit retrievals of 
preexisting responses for familiar situations.  This type of processing does not allow for 
peripheral interference from other sources of information, including affect.  Similarly, 
highly motivated processing strategies are not open for inclusion of outside sources of 
influence.  The theory states that motivational pressures (like self-evaluation 
maintenance, ego enhancement, and achievement motivation) evoke a reliance on 
“selective and targeted information search strategies” (Forgas & East, 2003) tailored to 
efficiently and effectively attain goal satisfaction.  It is important to note, however, that 
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affect itself may provide a motivational incentive as described earlier in the mood 
management hypothesis.  Affect maintenance or repair may motivate an individual to 
act in mood-congruent or incongruent ways.   
 The last two processing strategies do invite affective influences into behavioral 
decisions and judgments.  The heuristic processing strategy provides an explicit route 
for affect inclusion through susceptibility to the How-do-I-feel-about heuristic.  The 
theory purports that when situations are highly familiar but judgments or decisions lack 
strong personal relevance or motives for accuracy, mood-congruent influence may 
occur whereby responses are triggered by an immediate global assessment of feelings.  
When circumstances require more substantive processing of information and no 
preexisting preferential outcome motive persists, implicit affect infusion may occur 
through affect-priming mechanisms.  In this processing context, ideas, memories, and 
evaluations pertaining to the situation are more easily summoned in a mood-congruent 
fashion.  These thoughts then increase the probability of a mood-congruent behavior, 
choice, or judgment.  Interestingly, the AIM actually predicts that as processing of 
information becomes more complex, due to difficulty of problem or presence of 
ambiguity, the effect of affect-priming infusion strengthens.   
 In addition to the four main types of processing that determine the degree of 
affect-infusion, the AIM also pinpoints several factors that promote the use of these 
various strategies.  The most influential factors can be summarized as features of the 
target, judge, and situation.  Target features include familiarity, complexity, and 
typicality.  The theory hypothesizes that familiarity will often lead to a direct access 
strategy given that future exposure to similar circumstances should elicit more and more 
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prescribed, rote responses.  Complexity and typicality have an influence due to the 
extensive processing required.  This feature is often indicative of unusual or ambiguous 
stimuli and events that lend themselves to the substantive processing strategy, opening 
the door for affective influences.  Judge features include personal relevance, 
motivational goals, affective state, and cognitive capacity.  Forgas (1995) claimed that 
as personal relevance increases, substantive processing will increase, provided 
motivational goals do not exist.  As personal relevance decreases, direct access (if 
situation is familiar or typical) or heuristic processing takes over.  As stated earlier, in 
the presence of strong motivational goals, motivated processing dominates decision-
making.  When cognitive capacity is reduced by affective preoccupation or other 
attentional demands, the theory argues for increased likelihood of heuristic processing 
due to lack of available resources for substantive or creative thinking.  Finally, 
situational features include predominantly a need for accuracy, availability of criteria, 
and social desirability.  These types of influences appear to help determine whether 
motivated and substantive processing or direct access and heuristic processing are 
summoned.  As these variables increase in importance, the likelihood of the former 
strategies’ use increases, while decreased importance more likely leads to the latter 
forms of processing.   
Criticisms of the AIM.  Although the AIM purports to provide a multiprocess 
integrative theory of affective influences on social judgments and behavior, most of its 
critics argue that in doing so, Forgas diminishes the importance of the informational 
value (or signal) provided by affect.  Similarly, others argue that although the priming 
effects may be real, there is evidence suggesting that a third mediating variable (e.g., 
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positive concepts or moral intuitions) explains the correlation between affect and 
memory/thought congruence (Clore & Tamir, 2002; Haidt, 2002).  As Haidt (2002) 
commented, “[I]f somebody asks us to explain our judgment we search for reasons why 
our judgment is correct … [R]easoning works like a lawyer seeking evidence, not a like 
a judge seeking truth” (p. 54).  These opponents of AIM claim that most judgments 
begin heuristically (often based on the informative value of affect) and that memory or 
thoughts are subsequently summoned to support the initial heuristic notion.  Other 
problems pinpointed with the priming influence of affect include the asymmetric 
effectiveness of positive and negative retrieval cues (Isen 1984, 1985), the effects of 
stimuli or task-related affect on retrieval (Kahn & Isen, 1993; Isen & Geva, 1987; Isen, 
Johnson, Mertz, & Robinson, 1985; Isen & Patrick, 1983; Schiffenbauer, 1977), and the 
primary focus on only a single dimension of affect, valence (Keltner, Anderson, & 
Gonzaga, 2002; Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Schwarz, 2000).  Another faction of opponents 
takes issue with the robustness of the processing influences of positive and negative 
affect (Fiedler, 2002; Manstead & van der Pligt, 2002).  As Fiedler (2002) observes, 
“granting that the mediator assumption is correct, an interesting implication is that any 
comprehensive satisfactory theory of affect and cognition has to speak to both major 
sets of empirical findings, congruency effects and affective influences on cognitive 
style” (p. 51).  In the body of work presented and discussed by Forgas, a comprehensive 
and satisfactory explanation for both effects is seriously lacking.   
Perhaps the most devastating criticism of the AIM involves the above alluded 
lack of specificity in prediction.  Seemingly, the model could overcome most of the 
major criticisms above if only the interaction of all AIM-defined variables was better 
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clarified.  This clarification would involve specification of circumstances where, for 
example, motivation may override affectively-infused substantive processing (Isen, 
2002), thresholds for affect-incongruent effects are met, and positive and negative 
valence lead to top-down or bottom-up processing (Manstead & van der Pligt, 2002).   
Incidental affect: Emotion-, dimension-, and appraisal-specific effects.  Contrary 
to the AIM focus on valence of affect, other researchers interested in exploring the 
effects of incidental affect on behavior and judgment have taken broader approaches to 
its study.  Some of these approaches have systematically varied multiple dimensions of 
affect and observed reliable changes in processing strategies and perceptions of risk.  
Mano (1990, 1992, 1994), for example, adopted the Russell (1980, 1991) circumplex2 
of affect, consisting of arousal and valence dimensions, to help explain processing 
differences in choice tasks.  Lewinsohn and Mano (1993) argue that previous studies 
concluding positive relationships between top-down, heuristic processing and valence 
were compromised by ignoring any effects due to arousal.  The real villain behind 
reduced processing, according to Mano and colleagues, is arousal.  Mano (1990, 1992, 
1994) suggests that incidental affective influences operate through two pathways: (1) a 
mood congruency pathway brought on by experienced valence; and (2) an attentional 
depletion pathway that leads to more heuristic processing as arousal increases.  A more 
recent use of this two-dimensional view of affect has led theorists to believe arousal 
influences the level of processing, while valence affects the nature of processing 
(Shapiro, MacInnis, & Park, 2002).  This formulation expects less devotion of 
attentional resources as arousal increases, and more schema-driven, as opposed to data-
                                                 
2 Describes a 2-dimensional space where polar coordinates define meaningful changes in the construct 
measured.  Notice in Figure 6, for example, how discrete emotions are captured at equal intervals on the 
perimeter of the plane.     
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driven, processing as valence becomes more positive.  Furthermore, these dimension 
effects appear to operate independently.   
Others have adopted the same affect paradigm to explore differences in risk 
perception across various emotions.  Eisenberg, Baron, and Seligman (1996) found that 
a combined measure of state and trait anxiety and a general measure of depression were 
positively correlated with risk aversion.  Interestingly, though, the correlation between 
depression and aversion was almost completely mediated by the anxiety effect.  Hence, 
two negatively-valenced affects, differing in their level of arousal (treated later in this 
document;  see the Russell circumplex of affect, Figure 6), appear to have different 
relationships with risk perception.  Those high on arousal (anxious), showed strong 
unique positive relationships with risk aversion, while effects of depression on aversion 
were nonexistent after controlling for the level of anxiety.  Similar results appeared in a 
Raghunathan and Pham (1999) study looking at negative affective influences on 
gambling and job selection decisions.  As in the Eisenberg et al. (1996) study, they 
found that manipulated anxiety predicted more low-risk/low-reward choices (i.e., risk 
aversion).  In addition, they discovered that induced sadness was related to more high-
risk/high-reward choices for these decisions.  This work was recently replicated 
(Raghunathan, Pham, & Corfman, 2006), and the researchers found the effects to be 
present when either the source of the incidental affect was not salient, or when salient, 
the source was perceived to be related to the decision task.  Proffered theoretical 
explanations of the findings centered on an Affect-as-Information-like mechanism; 
however, the affect providing the information was evoked by the outcomes of the risky 
choice.  These explanations suggested that high anxiety and sadness create different 
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perceptions of risk and reward.  Anxious individuals may focus more attention toward 
the potential risk and, thus, select lower-risk options in an effort to decrease heightened 
arousal.  Likewise, feelings of sadness may trigger a focus on the size of the reward, 
regardless of risk, in an effort to restore positive valence as quickly as possible.  
Interestingly, this supposition implies that incidental affect has an effect on preference 
for expected affect (the affect one expects to experience after the decision).  As 
developed more completely in the sections that follow, this places expected affect in the 
role of a mediator, whereby incidental affective influences on choice are partially 
promulgated through influences on anticipated affect.   
Still others argue that a two-dimensional view of affect does not sufficiently 
explain all incidental effects on processing or choice.  Based on appraisal theorists 
predictions that emotions carry multiple cognitive components (e.g., see Smith & 
Ellsworth, 1985), Tiedens and Linton (2001) predicted that the degree of certainty 
associated with induced affect will determine certainty of judgments and use of 
heuristic versus systematic processing.  Results showed that certainty of emotions not 
only correlated positively with confidence in judgments, but that higher certainty, and 
not positive valence, led to more reliance on less persuasive source cues (e.g., nonexpert 
versus expert opinion) and stereotypes (i.e., a reliance on more heuristic methods of 
processing).  Lerner and Keltner (2000) proposed that this effect of certainty may also 
act independently of arousal.  Their studies have shown that both experimentally-
induced and naturally-occurring anger and fear, emotions of similar valence and arousal 
but different certainty and control (situational or individual), produced different 
assessments of risk perception and preferences (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; 2001).  Both of 
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these contrasted appraisals, certainty and control, were also shown to moderate the 
effect of emotion on risk perception.  When risky situations were easily classified 
(majority of prescreening participants agreed) as either extremely certain/uncertain or 
controllable/uncontrollable, there were no significant differences in optimism between 
the fear and anger emotion conditions.  Only when presented situations where certainty 
and control showed greater variability did the differential impact of fear and anger 
appear.  Notably, the opposite pattern emerged between effects of happiness and anger, 
two emotions that share control and certainty appraisal tendencies but differ on valence.  
When risk situations were ambiguously labeled certain or controllable, no differences 
appeared between emotions.  Yet, when situations were unambiguous (easily 
classified), happy individuals showed greater optimism than did angry participants. 
 Another approach to incidental affect has focused on the often-negative visceral 
impact of drives, pain, and addictions.  Loewenstein (1996) was among the first to 
propose a theory of visceral influences to help explain why people’s behavior often 
knowingly disregards self-interests.  Loewenstein described these actions as “out of 
control” behaviors.  His argument hinges on the presumption of a visceral influence 
component within a traditional decision-making utility function (although the exact 
functional form has yet to be specified or developed).  The affect created can be brought 
on by any number of factors, e.g., sexual desire, pain, hunger, craving, even strong 
emotion or mood, and will have a direct effect on the desirableness of future outcomes.  
Once sexual desire, for example, is triggered (e.g., after viewing erotic photographs), 
the resulting emotions of elation or even the negative affect from sexual frustration can 
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subsequently diminish the value of any outcome relative to that of sexual gratification.  
The full theory involves the seven propositions listed below: 
1.  As intensity of a visceral factor increases (e.g., getting more aroused or even 
feeling sexually deprived), the difference between the actual and desired utility 
increases; 
2.  Future experienced visceral intensity is underweighted in distant utility 
calculations; 
3.  As intensity of a visceral factor increases (e.g., getting more aroused or 
sexual deprivation) short time delays before consumption becomes more 
valuable; 
4.  Current visceral factors can have an effect on decisions about the future, even 
though these factors may not be active in the future (e.g., buying more groceries 
on empty stomach); 
5.  The influence of visceral factors on later behavior (as opposed to utility- see 
proposition 2) is underweighted. 
6.  Over time, people will forget how influential visceral factors were for 
previous behaviors. 
7.  The first six propositions describe both interpersonal and intrapersonal 
decisions and behaviors; for interpersonal situations, other people become 
analogous to the delayed self (e.g., proposition 1: actual altruism declines 
relative to desired altruism as a visceral influence intensifies). 
As with the previous stances on incidental affect effects, this approach 
acknowledges cognitive components of affect.  Together, the propositions above imply 
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an attention-narrowing and motivational influence of visceral intensity.  As intensity 
increases, attention narrows and motivation increases toward consumption of goods 
associated with the factor, immediacy of consumption, and a preference of self-
indulgence over altruism.  Therefore, performance on all tasks or decisions not 
associated with the visceral factor is diminished due the preoccupation with immediate 
self-gratification.  While never tested directly, the above propositions potentially 
account for the growing number of impulsive behavior findings that have been 
previously unpredictable using volitional, consequentialist decision-making theories. 
Integral affect: The Risk as Feelings Hypothesis.  According to Loewenstein and 
Lerner (2003), immediate emotions can be partitioned into incidental and integral (or 
anticipatory using their terminology) affect.  Integral affect represents the immediate 
emotions triggered by the task at hand.  The AIM has little to say about the effects of 
task-related or, the otherwise termed, integral affect on decision-making.  Garg, Inman, 
and Mittal (2005) tested the effects of integral affect while investigating a potential 
moderating influence of the appraisal-tendencies that distinguish anger and sadness 
(Lerner and Keltner, 2000).  Results replicated an earlier integral affect finding (Luce, 
1998) showing that negative affect produced from difficult decision tasks tends to 
increase the use of avoidance strategies (e.g., selection of status quo over a perceived 
risky option).  Results also found support for incidental affect moderation of this effect, 
suggesting less avoidance among emotions characterized by less certainty (sadness).  
These findings indicate that both types of affect may act interdependently.   
The earlier noted Loewenstein (1996) theory of visceral affective influences 
obviously also applies in the case of integral affect.  If an experienced task involves 
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features that trigger an increase in a visceral factor (e.g., sexual petting triggers sexual 
desire, smelling food triggers hunger, etc.), the propositions above suggest that the 
utility for consumption behavior related to the visceral factor will increase.  This 
suggests a direct influence of affect on the cognitive valuation of the consumable good.   
Summary of immediate affect effects on decision-making.  Immediate emotions 
can act both directly and indirectly on the decision process.  Directly, the intensity of 
emotion will determine the degree of influence.  When high, emotions can consume the 
individual’s decision-making process and lead to impulsive behaviors, while at low 
intensity, emotion serves more as a consultant through mechanisms like the Affect-as-
information processes.  Indirectly, emotions can influence the perceived likelihood of 
an outcome, the value of an outcome, cognitive evaluations, the nature of processing, 
and the depth of processing.  Changes in likelihoods were noted earlier in the work of 
Lerner and Keltner (2001).  Likewise, immediate emotion has been shown to exhibit the 
so called “hot/cold empathy gaps” (Loewenstein, 1996), whereby current feelings are 
projected onto future outcomes (Loewenstein, Prelec, & Shatto, 1996; Loewenstein et 
al., 2001).  This type of projection tends to falter when predictions of the future are 
made while in a passionate or dispassionate state.  When passionate, the expected 
reward (i.e., experienced affect) may seem much greater than when evaluated in a 
dispassionate state (Lowenstein & Schkade, 1999).  Changes in processing were also 
noted earlier when discussing incidental affective influences.  These effects suggest that 
components of affect like valence, arousal, and certainty can influence the cognitive 
evaluation of risk and value (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Vastfjall & Garling, 2002),  
the amount of data-driven versus abstract processing (Shapiro, MacInnis, & Park, 2002) 
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and/or heuristic versus deep processing (Mano, 1990, 1992, 1994; Schwarz, 1990; 
Tiedens & Linton, 2001).   
An interesting distinction is stressed between immediate affect and expected 
affect (see below).  Although expected emotions represent cognitive evaluations of 
future behavior (e.g., the emotional utility of a behavior or choice), immediate affect 
reflects both the feeling state carried over into a decision task (incidental affect) and the 
feeling state experience from being placed in a decision task (integral affect).  The idea 
of reliance on the current feelings as opposed to cognitive evaluations for decision-
making is what led Loewenstein et al. (2001) to propose the Risk as Feelings 
hypothesis.  As with the earlier work on intense emotions (e.g., drives, pain, etc.; 
Loewenstein, 1996), this hypothesis provides an explanation for the paradoxical 
divergence of behavior and self-interest highlighted in the opening paragraphs of this 
review.  The culprit behind divergence can be found in the various determinants of 
immediate affect and expected emotions.  Whereas expected affect represents, in theory, 
some formal integrative processing of probabilistic information and perceived hedonic 
value of outcomes, immediate affect may be relatively insensitive to changes in 
probabilities, especially as intensity of affect increases (Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001).  
Immediate affect, unlike expected affect, may be more responsive to outcome delays 
(Loewenstein, 1987; Roth, Breivik, Jorgensen, & Hofmann, 1996) and perceived 
control (Seligman & Maier, 1967; Sanderson, Rapee, & Barlow, 1988).  And finally, 
there may even be evolutionary determinants of immediate affective reactions (integral 
affect) to stimuli (e.g., instinctual fear of snakes) that completely bypass any use of 
cognitive evaluation (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003).  The defined distinction between 
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these two, however, should not imply completely independent pathways of influence on 
decision-making.  To the contrary, as Panel B of Figure 1 attempts to convey, 
influences of immediate affect need not preclude cognitive evaluation of future 
consequences, be they affective or otherwise.  As this study attempts to address, 
estimation of expected affect is likely to depend greatly on an individual’s profile of 
immediate affect.     
Expected Affect and Decision-Making 
Decisions involving known risk.  Traditional prescriptive models of decision-
making in finance and psychology have been dominated by the axioms of expected 
utility (EU) theory (von-Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947).  Recent approaches to 
decision-making under risk, however, have begun to focus more attention on axioms 
that more descriptively model actual behavior (Fishburn 1988, 1989; Luce, 2000).  
Many of these descriptive models have abandoned the older EU approach in favor of 
more generalized theories of expected utility (GEU).  The section that follows will 
describe one particular classification of GEU models, the risk-value models, and their 
potential usefulness in explaining effects of affect on choice behavior.   
Risk-value GEU.  EU theory assumes that perceived risk is defined by the shape 
of the utility function (Weber & Milliman, 1997).  For example, risk aversion (seeking) 
from this perspective is observed when choices of certain amounts are favored 
(disfavored) over gambles with equal expected payoff.  One class of GEU models, the 
risk-value (or risk-return) models, have reconceptualized perceived risk as an integral 
determinant of choice preference, rather than simply a descriptor.  As the name implies, 
preference in the risk-value models depends on two components: one based on the 
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perception of expected return and the other on a measure of perceived riskiness.  From 
this perspective, the EU-specified roles reverse, and risk perception is thought to help 
define the utility function (e.g., preference partially depends on how much an individual 
values risk).  One general form of the risk-value model described in Butler, Dyer, and 
Jia (BDJ; 2005; see also Jia, Dyer, & Butler, 2001) defines an evaluation of a gamble as  
 )]0()'()[()()',( RXRXXVXXf ++= φ          [1] 
where )(XV is monotonically increasing value function of the expected outcome, )(Xφ  
is a tradeoff coefficient (>0) that may be a function of the mean outcome, XXX −=' , 
R( 'X ) is the negative expectation of u0( 'X ),  and R(0) is the constant –u0(0), where 
u0(·) represents a utility function describing preference for all zero-expectation lotteries.  
Risk and return are represented in this model by the terms )]0()'()[( RXRX +φ  and 
)(XV , respectively.  Interestingly, this framework is general enough to capture many 
common forms of EU but can also be used to derive newer GEU models that better 
correspond to actual choice behavior and satisfy major assumptions underlying risk-
value axiomatic theory (Butler, Dyer, & Jia, 2005; Weber & Bottom, 1989, 1990).   
Decision Affect Theory and GEU.  Mellers and colleagues (Mellers, Schwartz, 
Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999) alongside Inman, Dyer, and Jia 
(1997) developed models of generalized expected utility of post-choice valuation 
(PCV), where PCV (Decision Affect in Mellers et al. models) represents the affect 
experienced after a choice is made (i.e., the satisfaction or subjective pleasure that 
follows a decision).  The prediction equations developed generalized choice models that 
were created more than a decade earlier by Bell (1985) and Loomes and Sugden (1986).  
In most of these models (save Loomes & Sugden), two forms of affect share the stage, 
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disappointment and regret.  Both represent bipolar dimensions of affect which range 
from either disappointment to elation or regret to joy.   
Effects of disappointment and regret on PCV are best described in equation form 
for experimental gambling choice tasks (e.g., which of the two gambles do you prefer).  
For example, imagine a choice between two 2-outcome gambles, denoted {Xi, pi, Yi}, 
where the better outcomes are represented by Xi, the worse outcomes by Yi, and pi 
represents the probability of winning Xi.  In all but the Mellers et al. (1997;1999) 
models, disappointment effects are represented by a parameter that weights the 
influence of a function of the difference between the outcome won and the outcome 
expected from a particular choice, df( ii ZZ − ).  Typically, the influence of receiving X 
as opposed to Y, results in differential weighting of f( ii ZZ − ).  For this reason, most 
models allow two weights to be estimated, a d effect for when y occurs and an e effect 
for when X occurs.  The d and e are commonly used to symbolically describe the 
influence of disappointment over the worst possible outcome and elation evoked from 
the best possible outcome.  Regret effects are written in a similar manner except that the 
difference function now describes magnitude differences between the outcome obtained 
and the outcome expected from the gamble not chosen, ckf( ji ZZ − ).  The k subscript 
on c denotes again that different weights may be applied for regret and rejoice (joyful) 
effects.  Here regret is the low end of the affect dimension and is active when the 
outcome obtained is worse than that expected from gamble 2, 2Z .  The complement 
comparison describes the rejoice effect.  For both disappointment and regret estimates, 
the lower end of each dimension tends to receive the higher weight (d and the regret c 
are larger than e and rejoice c, respectively). 
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Fitting of these models to post-choice affect elicited during gambling tasks has 
been very successful (Inman et al., 1997; Mellers et al., 1997, 1999) both at the group 
and individual level.  Moreover, these models of PCV have predicted actual choice 
behavior as well as some GEU models which were fit to the actual choices (Inman et 
al., 1997), and markedly better than other simplified models of emotion-based choice 
(Mellers, 1997, 1999).  Other notable characteristics of the model fits have been 
summarized by Mellers (2000; Mellers & McGraw, 2001).  Figure 2 highlights fours 
types of results.  Panel A displays the monotonic relationship evident between an 
imagined obtained outcome and subjective pleasure (or PCV).  Panel B depicts an 
example of disappointment effects where the pleasure derived from the gamble depends 
on the unattained outcome.  Similarly, Panel C describes subjective pleasure dependent 
on the outcome of an unselected gamble.  Finally, the surprise effects in Panel D 
suggest that pleasure is also dependent on the probability of obtained outcomes.  When 
the probability is low for an outcome, receipt of a rewarding outcome registers larger 
pleasure than when the same outcome is obtained with a higher probability.  
Conversely, the receipt of an unlikely, negative outcome registers lower subjective 
pleasure compared to the same negative outcome whose receipt is more likely (more 
expected).  As described in detail below, it is the effects of Panels B and D that drive 
the hypotheses tested in this study.   
A Generalized Disappointment Model (GDM).  As mentioned above, the models of 
Mellers et al. (1997, 1999) and Inman et al.  (1997) leveraged off earlier work on choice  
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Figure 2. Results of laboratory studies with gambles showing outcome, comparison, and 
surprise effects.3   
 
models that included regret and/or disappointment effects (Bell, 1985; Loomes & 
Sugden, 1986).  The generalization of these models did not end with PCV prediction.   
Brandstätter, Kuhberger, and Schneider (2002) and Jia, Dyer, and Butler (2001), for 
example, have each developed similar forms of a generalized disappointment model 
(GDM) that are intended to be fit to actual choices/preferences.  For ease of exposition, 
I will focus on the Jia, Dyer, and Butler (2001) version (henceforth referred to as GDM) 
but will later discuss alternative formulations that equate these two approaches. 
The GDM model can be represented in terms of equation [1] above, and so, 
therefore, it was fundamentally derived to fall under the classification of risk-value 
modeling.  Assuming a linear value function, V(·), the model can be written in general 
form as follows: 
( ) ( )])[()',( 12 θθφ XXeXXdXXXXf −Ε−−Ε+= +−    [2]    
                                                 
3 From “Anticipated Emotions as Guides to Choice,” by B. A. Mellers and A. P. McGraw, 2001, Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 10(6), p. 211.  © 2001 by Blackwell Publishing.  Reprinted with 
permission of the publisher.  
 26
   
where d is the disappointment weight, e is the elation weight, and 2θ and 1θ  represent 
the shape of the utility functions for the positive (E+)and negative (E-) expectations of 
the standard risk measure.  Several interesting characteristics of this equation deserve 
elaboration.  First, notice the )(Xφ  coefficient which weights the risk portion of the 
model (i.e., ( ) ( )12)'()0()'( θθ XXeXXdXRRXR −Ε−−Ε==+ +− ).  This coefficient 
determines the relative amount of importance an individual places on the perceived risk 
of a gamble/decision compared to the value or actual expected outcome of the 
gamble/decision.  When )(Xφ >1, risk is more important, and when )(Xφ < 1, value is 
more of a determining factor in the overall evaluation of the gamble/decision.  The 
second aspect to highlight concerns the d and e parameters.  These are the same d and e 
effects discussed earlier, except now they are fitted to actual choice data.  These are the 
effects that explain differences shown in Panel B of Figure 2.  Lastly, the two θ ’s can 
be shown to affect the surprise effects evident in Panel D of Figure 2.  When combined 
with the d and e effects, these parameters can determine the degree of discrimination 
between probability values and the relative attractiveness of a gamble/decision’s 
associated outcomes.  This occurs due to the mixing of probabilities and outcomes for 
the expected outcome calculation in the standard risk measure.  It is this mixing of 
probabilities and outcomes that provides a link to the Brandstätter et al. (2002) model 
which generalizes a version of Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992).   
 Tversky and Kahneman’s (1992) CPT proposed the idea of diminishing 
sensitivity whereby changes in probabilities closer to the extremes (0 and 1) are 
weighted more heavily than changes near the middle of the distribution.  For example, 
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the absolute difference between a probability of .01 and .001 might seem larger than the 
same absolute difference occurring around the middle of the probability distribution, 
say between .4 and .389.  Gonzalez and Wu (1999) called this difference in weighting, 
discriminability.  They also added a second descriptor, attractiveness, which explained 
how this discriminability could have different meanings in terms of preference as one 
moves from one extreme end of the scale to the other.  This second descriptor helped 
explain a common phenomenon in the data- an overweighting of small probabilities and 
an underweighting of large probabilities.  Combined, these two features of probability 
weighting often produce graphs like that shown in Figure 3.  The depiction reveals 
discrimination in the slope of the curve and attractiveness effects are evident in the 
comparison of the straight line, EU weighting, to the curve.  This comparison reveals 
that the CPT weighting places more value on small probability outcomes than does EU, 
whereas the opposite is true for large probability outcomes.  The intersection of the 
curve and line, where CPT attractiveness becomes worse than EU, is referred to as the 
crossover point.   
Both Brandstätter et al. (2002) and Jia, Dyer, and Butler (JDB; 2001) have 
generalized  weighting functions like that shown in Figure 3 to incorporate 
disappointment and elation effects.  In the latter generalization, the previous GDM 
model [2] can be rewritten (as shown in JDB, 2001), for 2-outcome gambles, (X,p,Y), 
as: 
( ) [ ]
))(,,(
))1(())1()(1(1 12
YXYpXYf
yppxXepYYppXpdYppXf
−+=
−−−−−−+−−−+=
π
θθ
  [3] 
where 1)( =Xφ , ),,( YpXπ = , and f 11 1122 )()1()()1( −− −−+−−− θθθθ YXpepYXppdp
represents an early formulation of prospect theory with linear value functions on 
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Figure 3.  The shape of the decision weight curve which overweights small probabilities 
and underweights large probabilities. 
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outcomes X andY.  As mentioned earlier, the θ ’s and d and e effects allow the model to 
capture the Panel D surprise effects shown in Figure 2, which in CPT terms is another 
way of describing the over- and underweighting of extreme probabilities.  For a 
common θ , 21 θθ = , ),,( YpXπ  reduces to: 
[ ] 111 ))(1()1( −−− −−−−− θθθ YXpppedpp .           [4] 
In this model, the effects of surprise are now represented by the magnitude difference of 
d and e.  Moreover, when d=e and θ >1, the crossover point can be shown to be 0.5, and 
when d>e (as expected for most individuals), the crossover point is < 0.5.  Figure 4 
from JDB (2001) gives a visual display of possible decision weights fit using this 
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reduced model.  In these curves, the crossover point provides information about both 
the degree of surprise, and the amount of disappointment (Panels D & B from Figure 2).   
The Brandstätter et al. (2002) weighting function, for the same two outcome 
gambles, can easily be linked to equation [3] by dropping the  components 
and adding power value functions (as opposed to JDB’s linear estimates) to prospects X 
and Y (as shown in JDB, 2001).  Brandstätter et al. provide a direct test of fitting 
1)( −− iYX θ
Figure 4. Possible decision weights from a reduced model [3] where the crossover point 
represents both surprise and disappointment effects.4   
 
disappointment and elation components in this fashion to the more modern versions of 
prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).  In doing so, Brandstätter et al. 
commented on the communalities between this approach and that of Lopes (1987, 1995;  
                                                 
4 From “Generalized Disappointment Models,” by J. Jia, J. S. Butler, and J. C. Dyer, 2001, Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty, 22(1), p. 74.  © 2001 by Springer Science + Business Media (formerly Kluwer 
Academic Publishers).  Reprinted with permission of the publisher.  
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Lopes & Oden, 1999) Security-Potential/Aspiration theory.  Lopes’ model is unique in 
that it is a dual criterion model allowing both a calculated utility and a psychological 
aspiration level to compete for choice decisions.  The model predicts that when both 
criteria favor the same option, the choice is simple, whereas, when both disagree, 
conflict ensues, and one criterion overrules the other.  The Security-Potential (SP) 
portion of the model describes utility calculations that weigh both security concerns 
(avoidance of the worst outcomes) and potential desires (achieving maximum payoffs in 
the gain domain and minimum losses in the loss domain).  Ignoring the influence of 
Aspiration level for the time being, Lopes’ SP portion of the model can be rewritten in 
the form of equation [3], for 2-outcome gambles, where  
( )[ ] [ ][ ] ).1()1)(1(*                  )1()1)(1()1(1)1(),,( 11
11
12
1212
pppwwpp
pppwwppwwpYpX
−−−−−=
−−−−−−−−+=
−−
−−
θθ
θθθθπ
    [5] 
The weights w and (1-w) in equation [5] represent constrained estimates of security and 
potential influences, respectively, and after recognizing p* as a weighted estimate of p, 
also appear to analogously correspond to estimates of d and e from equation [3].  The 
similarities among these three separate theoretical and empirically derived models 
seems promising for further explorations of disappointment and elation effects.    
GDM and the Allais Paradox, Reflection Effect, and Out-of-Sample Fit of GEU.  
As Figure 4 depicts, theoretically, the GDM and its cousins (e.g., Brandstätter et  
al., 2002; Lopes, 1987, 1995; Lopes & Oden, 1999; Mellers et al., 1997, 1999) are very 
appealing because of their modeling flexibility.  This flexibility can describe a wide-
array of choice behavior, not the least of which includes violations of expected utility 
theory like the Allais Paradox (see Lopes, 1994; JDB, 2001) and the reflection effect 
(see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; JDB, 2001; BDJ, 2005).  Furthermore, allowing both 
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1θ  and 2θ , where 21 θθ ≠ , into estimation can help explain previous models’ badness of 
fit, as shown in Figure 5 below from Neilson and Stowe (2002).  Figure 5 displays loss 
risk premiums below the horizontal axis for low probabilities and above it for moderate 
to high probabilities.  The opposite is true for gain risk premiums.  As depicted, the 
modern Prospect Theory model (Cumulative PT; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992) and 
those akin to it (e.g., Prelec, 1998) have a hard time accounting for risk premiums at 
both low and high probabilities using only a single weighting parameter.   As evidenced 
below, changes in this single parameter (γ ) can only improve fit for one (e.g., low 
probabilities) by sacrificing fit for the other.  This is not so for the models presented 
above, where differences in d, e, and iθ  allow for different trajectory shapes on each 
side of the horizontal axis.   
Figure 5. Risk Premium Misfit Using Prospect Theory Weighting.5   
 
                                                 
5 From “A Further Examination of Cumulative Prospect Theory Parameterizations,” by W. Neilson and J. 
Stowe, 2002, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 22(1), p. 74.  © 2002 by Springer Science + Business 
Media (formerly Kluwer Academic Publishers).  Reprinted with permission of the publisher.  
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Dimensionality of Affect and Its Relationship to Immediate and Expected Emotions 
 Whereas the earlier summarized studies investigated effects of incidental affect 
dimensions (e.g., valence and arousal) on future behavior, Vastfjall and colleagues 
(Vastfjall & Garling, 2002; Vastfjall, Garling, & Kleiner, 2004) have begun to 
investigate the preference for feeling particular dimensions of affect.  Using a more 
direct approach than that of Mellers et al. (1997, 1999) and Inman et al. (1997), 
Vastfjall et al. (2002, 2004) have assessed whether self-reported preference for 
incidental, experienced (post- decision or behavior), and expected emotional reactions 
can be described by Russell and Barrett (1999) circumplex of affect (RBCA; depicted in 
Figure 6) using self-reported perceptions of valence and arousal dimensions.         
Figure 6. The Affect Circumplex.6  
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6 From “Independence and Bipolarity in the Structure of Current Affect” by L. F. Barrett and J. A. 
Russell, 1998, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(4), p. 970.  © 1998 by American 
Psychological Association.  Adapted with permission of the author. 
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Adopting the Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis from Russell and Mehrabian (1978), 
Vastfjall et al. (2002, 2004) predicted that preference for feeling a particular affect is 
dependent on three characteristics of the relationship between preference and the 
RBCA: (1) the marginal distribution of preference over arousal is linear with valence; 
(2) the marginal distribution of preference over valence is an inverted U-shaped curve 
along arousal; and (3) the maximum point of preference on the U-shaped distribution of 
preference by arousal increases with valence.  This relationship can be captured in an 
equation that includes terms for a positive linear valence effect, a negative quadratic 
arousal effect, and a positive linear interaction between valence and arousal: 
 P = B0 + wvV + waA – wa2A2 +wva (A*V).                    [6] 
Example predictions of preference from the Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis across various 
degrees of arousal and valence are graphically displayed in Figure 7 below.   The 
picture shows quite clearly the most defining characteristic of the Pleasure-Arousal 
Hypothesis as the interaction between valence and arousal.  Notably, the model predicts 
that individuals experiencing low valence will prefer to feel less arousal, whereas for 
individuals experiencing high valence, preference will favor emotions that are 
associated with high arousal.   
In their most recent work, Vastfjall et al. (2004) have shown that after 
controlling for expected/anticipated valence and arousal (or activation in Figure 6), 
current valence and arousal does not predict preference for the expected/anticipated 
emotional experience.  The result was also true when predicting future experienced 
affect from previous valence and arousal.  However, in both situations, while not noted 
by the authors, there were signs of a mediated effect, whereby current valence acted  
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Figure 7.  Predictions from the Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis. 
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indirectly on preference via its influence on anticipated valence.  These findings suggest 
that preference for various affects may depend on current valence.  For the purposes of 
this study, two major implications from the Vastfjall et al. (2002, 2004) findings need to 
be highlighted.  First, the relationship between a two-dimensional view of affect and 
affect preference suggests that Decision Affect Theory might be improved upon by 
considering both expected/anticipated7 valence and arousal, as opposed to just a single-
dimension measure (as used in Mellers et al. ,1997, 1999, & Inman et al. ,1997).  
Second, the mediating influence of current valence on preference for anticipated affect, 
combined with the coloring effects of affect on gambling decisions like those observed 
in Eisenberg, Baron, and Seligman (1996) and Raghunathan and Pham (1999), 
suggested that when outcomes are uncertain, current mood might indirectly influence 
choice through its effect on expectations of affect.  In GDM terms, this suggests 
                                                 
7 Anticipated affect is sometimes used to distinguish the affect perceived to be associated with the 
imminent receipt of a particular outcome, whereas, expected affect represents the global integrated 
estimate of future affect informed by anticipated affect for and the associated likelihood of all possible 
outcomes.    
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coloring effects of affect on the disappointment and elation weighting curves shown in 
Figure 4, that if supported, could potentially explain findings of hot and cold empathy 
gaps (Loewenstein, 1996; Lowenstein & Schkade, 1999), impulsivity, and ultimately, 
divergence of behavioral intentions and actual behavior.   
Statement of Purpose and Research Hypotheses 
Summary of Literature and Its Relation to Proposed Investigations.  As shown 
in Panel B of Figure 1, current decision-making findings suggest that emotions play 
both a direct and indirect role in determining behavior.  Indirectly, they appear to 
influence both processing of information and weighting of information during the 
cognitive evaluation of a situation and selection of appropriate action.  Directly, they 
may compete against cognitive evaluation through the impact of visceral influences 
(Loewenstein, 1996).  The research study that follows focused on the former type of 
influence, investigating coloring effects related to the dimensions of affect.   
 Three major findings from previous research on affective decision-making 
guided hypothesis generation and study design.  First, given the large body of evidence 
suggesting that various coloring and processing effects of emotion can be explained by 
opposing dimensions of affect, the current study chose to adopt the Russell and Barrett 
(1999) 2-dimensional affect structure to investigate valence and arousal influences on 
risky choices.  Second, the work by Mellers et al. (1997, 1999) and Inman et al. (1997) 
suggesting experienced emotions (i.e., post-choice valuation) are influenced by both 
probabilities and outcomes, led to questions about specific effects of risk (e.g., 
probabilities) and reward (e.g., outcomes) on choice behavior and also expected 
emotions.  Finally, borrowing from the work of Russell and Mehrabian (1978) and, 
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more recently, Vastfjall and colleagues (Vastfjall & Garling, 2002; Vastfjall, Garling, & 
Kleiner, 2004) this proposal will attempt to unite the first and second major findings by 
exploring the influence of multiplicative effects of valence and arousal on expected 
emotions and choice (see Section 5).  If the previous work on this third finding 
(Vastfjall, Garling, & Kleiner, 2004) suggesting immediate affect (e.g., current valence) 
indirectly influences preference for subsequent affect (expected emotion) is valid, the 
first (dimensional coloring effects) and second (effects of expected emotion on choice) 
predictive relationships might imply that the effects of immediate affect on choice are 
mediated by expected affect.     
Hypotheses: Incidental Affective Effects on Expected Emotion.  This study 
sought to explore the influences of 2-dimensional affect on anticipated emotions and 
choice preference on a standard gambling task.  Hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Current valence and arousal will predict individual differences in 
certainty equivalency measures of choice preference across gambles.  
Hypothesis 2: Current valence and arousal will predict individual differences in 
anticipated affect.    
Hypothesis 3: Expected affect will mediate the influence of current affect on 
choice preference. 
Hypothesis 4: The influence of incidental affect on expected affect will be 
mediated through perceptions of risk and expected payoff. 
 Assuming the Null hypotheses inherent above were false, appropriate tests for 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 required gambles that would elicit variation in both expected 
arousal and valence.  Based on the earlier presented surprise effects (Panel D of Figure 
 37
   
2), an assumption was derived that changing levels of expected arousal, an affect at 
least partially indicated by surprise, would most closely align with changes in extreme 
outcome probabilities, while changes in expected valence would more closely align 
with changes in actual outcome values (amounts of money).  So, attempting to 
incorporate the desired variation in expected affect, the current study manipulated both 
the probability distribution of outcomes and the expected values of several presented 
gambles.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 are essentially replications of the Vastfjall et al. (2004) 
analyses, extended to gambling preference tasks.  If Hypothesis 1 is upheld, one might 
expect the utility of gambles, differing in surprise by outcome combinations, to vary 
systematically across combinations of incidental valence and arousal.  For example, an 
individual currently feeling both negative valence and high arousal (Unpleasant 
Activation in Figure 6) might place a lower utility on gambles with low probabilities for 
below average outcomes than would an individual who incidentally experiences high 
valence (pleasant deactivation or activation) or even low valence but low arousal 
(unpleasant deactivation).  Such an effect might implicate an Unpleasant Activation 
signal that overemphasizes the possibility of more unpleasant activation (a larger GDM 
disappointment influence).  Likewise, an individual experiencing high valence and low 
arousal (Pleasant Deactivation) might overemphasize the possibility of pleasant 
activation (a stronger elation effect) compared to individuals already experiencing high 
arousal and high valence.  This type of finding might implicate maintenance of mood 
signals from high valence/high arousal combinations which then lead to risk-avoidant 
behavior, and a potentiation signal from high valence/low arousal emotions which focus 
attention on the possibility of unlikely rewards and lead to more risk-seeking behavior.  
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If Hypothesis 2 is also upheld, it is possible that the systematic differences in choice due 
to incidental valence may be related to the mediating effect of anticipated valence and 
arousal.  Hypothesis 3 is designed to explore this unifying causal mechanism 
simultaneously.  Finally, Hypothesis 4 investigates whether prediction of expected 
affect constructs from perceived risk and value, both measured through self-report, 
empirically substantiate the conceptual links identified between risk value GEU and 
Decision Affect Theory or PCV, and whether these perceived characteristics of gamble 
structure differ based on the incidental 2-dimensional affect space.    
Chapter II: Methods 
Participants 
Ninety-nine undergraduate students from summer, lower-level psychology 
courses were recruited for participation.  For participating, each student was rewarded 
with extra credit units as arranged by the faculty of psychology as part of the 
department’s experimental system.   
Stimuli 
All hypotheses were tested using outcomes generated from a brief structured 
gambling task.  The task involved twelve 5-outcome gambles that paired 3 probability 
distributions used in BDJ (2005; shown here in Figure 8 as s = /, \, and ^) with 4 payoff 
distributions (where X = $150, $200, -$150, or -$200).  Notice that the probability 
distributions associate surprise with outcomes that are either below the mean (s = /), 
above the mean (s = \), or both (s = ^).  These aspects will be key for testing differences 
in gamble preference among various valence and arousal combinations.   
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Procedure 
The entire data collection procedure was conducted using Microsoft Access software 
for desktop PCs that were situated inside private cubicles.  Participation began with 
informed consent to participate in a study advancing the development of a newly 
designed gambling task.  After agreeing to participate, the procedure continued with 
demographic inquiries (age, gender, and ethnicity) and then current affect elicitation  
Figure 8.  Probability Distributions for Gambling Task. 
 
 
                  s = /                                s = ^                               s = \ 
using an abbreviated version of the valence and arousal scales developed by Mehrabian 
and Russell (1974).  Upon completion of these scales, participants were briefly 
introduced to the gambling task with two example outcomes that used distributions not 
shown in Figure 8 (a uniform distribution and a U-shaped distribution).  The 
computerized interview explained that these distributions represented hypothetical 
lotteries and that the goal of this task was to determine which of two options they 
preferred: pocketing a certain amount of money or playing a visible lottery, i.e., 
gambling.  The computerized tradeoff procedure was set-up like most other tradeoff 
equivalency tasks, where certainty amounts ping-pong back-and forth across the range 
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of payoffs until a stopping point is reached (where certainty amounts bounding a five 
dollar interval reflect opposing choices- i.e., gamble below and settle for cash above).  
Certainty equivalents are then determined by averaging the boundaries of the stopping 
interval.  The procedure deviates from others (e.g., PEST procedure; see Luce, 2000), 
however, in that participants saw the same lottery over a series of consecutive choices, 
until a stopping interval was found, with the order of lottery presentation randomly 
determined.  This unique aspect was incorporated in an effort to prevent participant 
fatigue which might have compromised the validity of subsequent choices.  In addition, 
the method did not allow elicited certainty equivalents to violate stochastic dominance8 
(the computer explains the logical error, and the gamble is presented again). If CE 
estimation took more than 20 iterations, an error window appeared requesting the 
participant contact the research administrator.  When summoned, the administrator re-
explained the concept of the task and oversaw the next few choices, verifying verbally 
the participant’s understanding.   
After the certainty equivalency task was completed, participants were shown a 
series of questions about each of the 12 presented gambles, as well as questions about 
each individual lottery amount and probability (data to be used in a separate study).  
Participants were randomly assigned the order in which they viewed these two broad 
categories of questions.  When viewing each gamble (which were, themselves, 
presented in random order), participants were asked to record the mean expected payoff 
and the perceived risk involved.  Following these responses, participants once again 
                                                 
8 Occurs when the probability of winning (losing) at least (most) x amount of dollars is higher for all 
possible x (gamble outcomes) for one of the choice options (gamble or sure-thing).  In the choice task 
presented, the gamble stochastically dominates a sure-thing equaling the lowest (highest) gamble payoff 
(loss) and is stochastically dominated by a sure-thing equal to the highest (lowest) gamble payoff (loss).  
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viewed each gamble separately, in random order, and answered expected affect 
questions (how happy and surprised they felt by the outcome) concerning receipt of the 
best and worst lottery outcomes, under the hypothetical condition that the individual 
choose the lottery instead of a sure-thing amount that equaled the lottery mean (-200,     
-150, 150, or 200).  Responses for the best outcome across all 12 lotteries were elicited 
first.  The gambles were then randomly presented again, and affect questions were 
restated for the worst outcome.  When viewing the lottery amounts alone (i.e., no lottery 
distribution visible), participants were asked to record the degree of happiness (using 
the Affect scale item Happy/Unhappy described below) they would feel were the 
amount either added (in the case of positive sure amounts) or deducted (for negative 
amounts) from their current status quo.  Once all questions had been answered, 
participants viewed a debriefing summary of the research aims before leaving the 
laboratory.   
Measures 
 Affect.  An adapted short-form version of the Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 2-
dimensional affect scales was administered to assess incidental mood over the past 
week.  This adaptation retained the 6 items from each scale garnering the highest factor 
loadings during seminal development, except for the arousal scale’s Jittery/Dull item 
which was replaced with the dichotomy Surprised/Unsurprised.  Adapted instructions 
for the task were as follows: 
Each pair of words below describes a feeling dimension.  Some of the pairs 
might seem unusual, but you may generally feel more one way than the other.  
So, for each pair, move the sliding scale toward the adjective that best describes 
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how you IN GENERAL (that is, most of the time) felt during the PAST 
WEEK.  As the slider moves closer to an adjective, it should indicate stronger 
feelings of that type.  The numbers below the scale are presented to help you 
judge the appropriate distance of each slider move.  Please take your time so as 
to arrive at a real characteristic description of your feelings.   
Instructions were immediately followed by two examples and then the valence and 
arousal items.  One item from the valence scale, Happy/Unhappy, and the new item, 
Surprised/Unsurprised, were used to measure both valence and arousal, respectively, 
during the anticipated affect elicitation procedure.  Two Happy/Unhappy and 
Surprised/Unsurprised responses were elicited for every gamble, one each for best and 
worst possible outcomes.  These items were prefaced with the phrase:  
Imagine you chose to play the lottery shown instead of accepting a sure win/loss 
of [lottery mean].  Now for each pair of descriptors below, use the slider to 
describe how you would feel if the lottery performs BETTER/WORSE than the 
sure thing and you win/lose [best/worst lottery outcome]. 
For all affect items, instructions indicated that the extreme polar opposites (e.g., Happy 
and Unhappy) anchoring each rating scale were meant to represent the ultimate level of 
that feeling state (e.g., extreme happiness or extreme unhappiness).   
 Expected Payoff/Loss.  To measure these perceptions, participants were asked to 
consider taking each gamble 10 times in succession.  They were then asked to elicit the 
expected average outcome received per gamble.  Wording was as follows: 
For the lottery above, answer the following question.  Imagine you were to play 
this lottery 10 times in succession (in a row).  In your opinion, how much 
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money, ON AVERAGE, do you expect to win/lose PER PLAY?  [The value 
entered can fall between the lottery amounts shown.] 
 Perceived Risk.  These judgments were elicited using a scale from 0 (not at all 
risky) to 100 (extremely risky).  As in previous investigations of subjective risk 
perception (Holtgrave & Weber, 1993; Weber & Milliman, 1997), the term “risk” was 
left undefined.  Responses were designed to convey the risk of each lottery play versus 
a sure-thing amount that equaled the lottery’s mean.  Phrasing was as follows: 
Imagine you play the lottery above. Use the scale below to express how risky 
this play would feel knowing you passed up a sure win/loss of [lottery mean]. 
Data Analysis 
 Descriptive statistics and data manipulation were conducted in the base package 
of SPSS version 14.0.2 (SPSS, Inc., Chicago, IL); all other analyses were accomplished 
within Mplus version 4.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2006).  Before conducting any 
hypothesis testing, models were constructed to explore both the severity of unintended 
effects from varying testing conditions (variation due to different cubicles, computers, 
and application software) and the fit of the proposed 2-dimensional factor solution to 
the measures of incidental affect.  In the hypothesis testing that followed, separate 
models for all gender by outcome-sign (payoffs or losses- hereafter referred to as 
positive and negative gambles) levels were assessed.  Outcome-type (anticipated 
valence for best gamble outcome, certainty equivalency responses, etc.) was assessed 
both univariately and multivariately, depending on whether direct effects or mediation 
were of interest.  For greater efficiency, the structural changes across gambles were 
considered simultaneously, resulting in a 2 by 3 within-subject factorial (expected value 
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by probability distribution) embedded within each model.  Hypothesis testing began 
with the often-cited progression of direct effect tests that lead up to multivariate 
outcome models that include terms for partial mediation (Judd & Kenny, 1981; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986).  Ignoring the within-subject factorials, we can describe the direct tests 
found in Hypothesis 1 as linear multiple regression equations, where the incidental 
affect dimensions predict CE.  These equations can be written as: 
 CE = β0 + β1VI + β2AI + β3AI2 + β4AVI + e,         [7] 
where VI and AI represent centered values of incidental valence and arousal, 
respectively.  The tests found in Hypothesis 2 are identical to equation [7] except that 
the incidental affect dimensions are replaced with expected valence (VE) and arousal 
(AE).  Finally, mediation models can be constructed that assess both types of 
regressions, simultaneously, and include separate regressions of expected valence and 
arousal on the incidental affect.  Tests for mediation can be accomplished by comparing 
the significance of products of regression coefficients involved in indirect paths that 
lead from an incidental affect term to CE responses by way of a direct effect on 
expected valence and/or arousal (MacKinnon et al., 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & 
Williams, 2004).  Because the indirect effect may pass through higher order effects 
involving the mediators (quadratic arousal or interaction between arousal and valence), 
newly developed techniques for testing “moderated mediation” were adapted to handle 
this particular situation (Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, in 
press).  More detail on these testing procedures are provided under the Results section 
for Hypothesis 3.     
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 The CE estimates generated represent a choice between a risky gamble (playing 
the lottery) and a degenerate gamble (the sure-thing CE estimate).  More specifically, a 
CE represents an individual’s breaking point, above which an individual will choose 
sure-things and below which they choose to risk their chances on the gamble.  Plugging 
these estimates in as dependent variables of the models described in the previous 
paragraph allows for tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2.  Since multiple gambles are presented 
to each participant, potentially, we could assess six different tests of these direct effect 
hypotheses (and for that matter, the mediation hypotheses, too), were each gamble-
structure (expected value by probability distribution) considered independently.  
However, meaningful differences that can be explained by features of the manipulated 
gambles are likely to exist across these various CE estimates.  Under the assumption 
that a monotonic-increasing function underlies the relation between a CE and gamble 
utility, differences in CEs across the presented gambles represent ordered changes in 
preference for sets of gambles.  For example, comparison of CEs=/, 150=X  and CEs=\, 200=X  
provides information about which lottery an individual will favor when choosing 
between the (s=/, 150=X ) and the (s=\, 200=X ) gambles.  The within-subject effects 
mentioned above will investigate these differences by predicting CE profile changes 
related to gamble structure (fixed effects for expected value and probability distribution 
factors).  Moreover, models will consider differential prediction from each set of 
independent variables across gamble structure (i.e., assessing interactions between 
gamble structure and predictor performance).  
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Chapter III: Results 
Descriptive Information 
Forty-three males and 53 females participated.  Ages ranged from 18 to 28 with 
an average of 19.3 (SD = 1.8).   The majority (75 individuals) of the sample classified 
their primary ethnicity as “White, not Hispanic.”  Tallies of other ethnic categories as 
well as mean responses to all other study questions can be found in Tables 1-3.  One 
individual’s information was discarded from subsequent analyses due to outlier status 
on all 12 certainty equivalent (CE) responses.  
Table 1. Sample Distribution of Race/Ethnicity.  
Freq. Percent
Black 7 7.1
American Indian 7 7
Asian 4 4.0
Hispanic 2 2.0
White 75 75.8
Other 4 4.0
Total 99 100.0
.1
 
Table 2. Descriptive Information for Bipolar Affect Adjective Pairs. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Happy 98 0 90 28.66 22.18
Pleased 98 0 90 35.64 22.40
Satisfy 98 0 83 34.20 20.93
Content 98 0 90 35.62 22.39
Hopeful 98 0 93 30.87 20.15
Relaxed 98 0 91 41.81 21.55
Stimulated 98 0 100 45.91 23.41
Excited 98 2 100 44.35 22.23
Frenzied 98 0 95 49.58 20.15
Surprised 98 10 100 52.77 19.69
Awake 98 0 100 52.52 26.48
Arouse 98 0 90 45.36 19.56  
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Table 3. Descriptive Information on Completion Time for Experimental Tasks.  
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Time to complete Demographic Q in seconds 98 8 41 19.59 6.99
Time to complete Affect Q in seconds 98 37 236 112.81 41.88
Time to complete TradeOff Q in seconds 98 435 2463 991.22 356.86
Time to complete Amount Valence Q in seconds 97 33 148 64.01 18.06
Time to complete Probability Arousal Q in seconds 97 19 88 38.15 13.27
Time to complete Expected Payoff Q in seconds 98 75 833 211.38 113.51
Time to complete Riskiness Q in seconds 98 51 429 163.73 53.04
Time to complete Best Outcome Affect Q in seconds 98 76 341 201.84 54.84
Time to complete Worst Outcome Affect Q in seconds 98 49 840 163.05 87.61
Time to complete Entire Q in minutes 98 15 61.38 32.75 8.01
 
Assessing Cubicle/Computer Induced Non-Independence 
 As Table 4 indicates below, a total of 12 private interview cubicles were used in 
this study, each with separate desktop computers.  In order to optimize data collection 
numbers, two different desktop models with varying processors (Pentium2 and 4), 
operating systems (Windows 98 and Windows XP), monitor sizes (15 and 17 inches), 
and software (Microsoft Access 2000 for Pentium 2 processors and Access 2003 for 
Pentium 4) were utilized.  Despite the variations in computer specifications, very little 
evidence emerged for clustering effects.  As shown in Table 5, estimated intraclass 
correlations for both the Affect scale indicators and the CE outcomes showed little 
cluster-level influence on variation in responses.  Unfortunately, the small number of 
clusters (= 12) and small average cluster size (= 8.2) preclude any reliable statistical 
adjustment, using available Mplus latent variable modeling procedures, for such non-
independence in observations (Muthén, L., 2006, Muthen, B., 2005).  However, the 
combination of these factors (i.e., small intraclass correlations, number of clusters, and 
average cluster size), produce approximate design effects far below 2, a suggested 
benchmark for cluster-level control necessity in previous simulation work (Muthén & 
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Satorra, 1995; Muthén, L., 1999).  For these reasons, the latent variable models that 
follow ignored cubicle/computer design effects.   
Table 4. Number of Participants per Cubicle/Computer. 
PC Freq. Percent
1 10 10.2
2 18 18.4
3 10 10.2
4 8
5 10 10.2
6 7
7 3
8 11 11.2
9 6
10 10 10.2
11 4 4.1
12 1 1.0
8.2
7.1
3.1
6.1
 
Table 5. Intraclass Correlations and Approximate Design Effects for Affect and CE. 
ICC
Approximate 
Design Effect
Affect
Happy/Unhappy 0.001 1.007
Pleased/Annoyed 0.001 1.007
Satisfy/Unsatisfied 0.001 1.007
Contented/Depressed 0.001 1.007
Hopeful/Despairing 0.001 1.007
Peaceful/Bored 0.001 1.007
Simulated/Relaxed 0.019 1.136
Excited/Calm 0.024 1.172
Frenzied/Sluggish 0.002 1.014
Surprised/Unsurprised 0.064 1.459
Awake/Sleepy 0.001 1.007
Aroused/Unaroused 0.001 1.007
Certainty Equivalents
Lottery [\,-150] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [^,-150] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [/,-150] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [\,-200] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [^,-200] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [/,-200] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [\,150] 0.002 1.014
Lottery [^,150] 0.054 1.387
Lottery [/,150] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [\,200] 0.001 1.007
Lottery [^,200] 0.006 1.043
Lottery [/,200] 0.022 1.158  
Note.  Approximate Design Effect = 1 + ( -1)ρ; = average cluster size, ρ = ICC. 
~
m
~
m
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Affect Measurement Model 
Preliminary analyses began with inspection of the measurement of the adapted 
Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 2-dimensional affect scales.  The model was originally 
specified as an orthogonal (valence and arousal uncorrelated), congeneric (requiring one 
factor loading per item; see Jöreskog, 1971) 2-dimensional structure, with six items per 
factor.  Estimation was performed using maximum likelihood (ML) in Mplus version 
4.2 (Muthén, 1998-2004; Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2006), fixing the latent variances 
equal to one.   
The estimated Satorra-Bentler (SB) mean-adjusted chi-square statistic (Satorra 
& Bentler, 1994) suggested poor overall fit, χ2(54) = 106.7, p < .01.  Inspection of the 
bivariate Pearson correlation matrix revealed significant relationships between 
Arousal’s Awake/Sleepy item and all six Valence items.  This was nearly true for 
Arousal’s Aroused/Unaroused item as well, where only the bivariate relationship with 
the Pleased/Annoyed item lacked significance.  In light of these observations, both 
Awake/Sleepy and Aroused/Unaroused items were allowed to load on Valence and 
Arousal in a subsequent model run.  This new model appeared to fit adequately with a 
calculated SB χ2(52) = 62.6, p < .15, a root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA; see Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Steiger & Lind, 1980) = 0.046, and a weighted 
root mean square error (WRMR; see Yu, 2002) of 0.92.  [A nonsignificant chi-square 
value, an RMSEA of 0.06 or less (see Hu & Bentler, 1999), and WRMR of 0.90 or less 
(see Yu, 2002) are all suggestive of good fit.]  The resulting loading matrix from this 
new model is shown in Table 6.  All models assessing the predictive relationship of 
valence and arousal latent constructs utilized this factor pattern structure.  
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Table 6. Estimates from Final 2-Dimension Incidental Affect Model. 
Estimates S.E. Estimates S.E.
Happy 20.68 1.72 Stimul 15.74 2.27
Pleased 19.31 1.68 Excite 16.7 1.99
Satisfied 18.64 1.27 Frenzy 13.85 2.02
Content 19.48 1.57 Surprise 13.3 1.94
Hopeful 15.7 1.87 Awake 6.72 2.46
Relax 11.17 1.9 Arouse 8.14 2.43
Awake 14.55 2.27
Arouse 3.6 1.96
Variances
VALENCE 1 ----
AROUSAL 1 ----
Happy 59.32 12.17 Happy 0.88
Pleased 123.72 20.8 Pleased 0.75
Satisfied 86.05 15.5 Satisfied 0.8
Content 116.93 18.22 Content 0.76
Hopeful 155.27 25.66 Hopeful 0.61
Relax 334.91 49.22 Relax 0.27
Stimul 294.85 63.32 Stimul 0.46
Excite 210.24 43.93 Excite 0.57
Frenzy 210.14 37.03 Frenzy 0.48
Surprise 206.61 30.59 Surprise 0.46
Awake 414.52 49.45 Awake 0.38
Arouse 292.83 47.18 Arouse 0.21
Valence  Factor Loadings Arousal Factor Loadings
Residual Variances Observed Variable  R-Square
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypotheses 1 through 4, restated below, are tested using a repeated measures 
regression approach with fixed coefficients for all main effects and interactions 
involved in the manipulated gambling structure (expected value by probability 
distribution).  The \ probability distribution and the 150 expected value levels were 
chosen as referent categories for all main effects and interactions (i.e., coded as 0 in all 
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the relevant effect dummy variables).  All models estimated unstructured error 
covariance matrices.  These analyses were run as structural equation models.  Models 
were run separately for both positive and negative gambles and males and females.  
Each main effect was allowed to interact with the incidental affect measures.  Model 
reduction was accomplished through a backward elimination selection procedure with 
removal criterion set at p-values greater than 0.10 for Wald test statistics using robust 
(to non-normality) standard errors.  Terms were eligible for elimination only if higher-
order terms involving each variable were either nonexistent or already eliminated9.  The 
affect measures were created using the latent variable score formulas of Anderson and 
Rubin (1956) as described in Jöreskog (2000).  The factor scores used in all analyses 
below were created from the Lisrel student version 8.7 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2004).  
Notably, unlike other factor scoring techniques, this procedure results in scores that 
reproduce the latent factor covariance matrix.  In this case, the procedure produced 
uncorrelated factor scores for Valence and Arousal that near perfectly reproduce the 
factor communalities.    
Hypothesis 1.  Current valence and arousal will predict individual differences in  
certainty equivalency (CE) measures of choice preference across gambles.   
 Before examining the gamble structure and affect model effects, Tables 7 and 8 
show the mean estimates, ranges, and standard deviations by gender for each individual 
gamble.  Notice that for negative gambles, the usual pattern of the means (the only 
                                                 
9 Note. Tests involving the dummy variables for the categorical gambling structure main effects and 
interactions, i.e., expected value by probability distribution, were assessed individually and not in 
omnibus fashion; e.g., the omnibus test of probability distribution by valence was not assessed, but 
instead a test of the ^ distribution by valence and the / distribution by valence were assessed as separate 
interaction effects. 
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exception is the -150 mean for the female /,-150 gamble) reflect risk aversion, 
indicating CE estimates that are below the lotteries’ expected values.  For males, the 
positive gamble means are fairly risk neutral among $150 gambles and risk averse 
among the $200 gambles.  Females, on the other hand, showed risk seeking for \ 
gambles, risk aversion for / gambles, and a reversal from risk seeking to aversion as ^ 
gambles’ EV increases.  Also notice that in both genders and within all EVs, the pattern 
of inequalities \ ≥ ^ ≥ / is fairly consistent, possibly lending credence to the notion of 
risk partly informing preference (the only difference between gambles that shared an 
EV is the probability distribution shape- an objective measure of risk).  Yet, this general 
pattern, across both positive and negative gambles, would appear to contradict the well-
known reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), where preference order 
(inferring higher CEs are associated with greater preference) for positive gamble 
structures with the same EV reverses when the gains are replaced with losses (the 
negative gambles- where lower CEs, i.e., those more negative, are suggestive of 
preferred choice).  In this study, such a finding would be supported were the order of 
preferences in the positive gambles opposite the order observed in the negative 
gambles.  This contradiction may be tied to the order of the losses on each negative 
gamble display, where losses decreased from left to right (e.g.,  -250, -200, -150, -100, -
50) so as to increase saliency of changes from gains to losses (see Figure 8).  (Note: at a 
fixed EV, flipping the monetary axis of the / negative gambles produces the same 
structure as the \ positive gambles, except gains are replaced with losses; the same is 
true of \ negative and / positive gambles).  This, somewhat unique, presentation style 
may have prevented this preference reversal tendency.    
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Table 7. Male Descriptive Statistics for CEs and Affect Factor Scores. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] CE 43 -162.5 -87.5 -140.87 15.34
Lottery [^,-150] CE 43 -187.5 -52.5 -140.06 25.81
Lottery [/,-150] CE 43 -177.5 -102.5 -143.31 18.32
Lottery [\,-200] CE 43 -217.5 -102.5 -182.97 24.54
Lottery [^,-200] CE 43 -222.5 -102.5 -191.34 25.21
Lottery [/,-200] CE 43 -247.5 -152.5 -191.69 20.41
Lottery [\,150] CE 43 102.5 197.5 152.15 17.97
Lottery [^,150] CE 43 112.5 197.5 150.99 17.88
Lottery [/,150] CE 43 102.5 192.5 149.48 17.53
Lottery [\,200] CE 43 152.5 247.5 197.97 19.82
Lottery [^,200] CE 43 142.5 252.5 197.97 20.32
Lottery [/,200] CE 43 102.5 237.5 189.36 24.47
Valence Factor Scores 43 -2.81 1.79 -0.17 1.06
Arousal Factor Scores 43 -2.53 2.68 -0.08 1.04  
Table 8. Female Descriptive Statistics for CEs and Affect Factor Scores. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] CE 55 -197.5 -52.5 -140.77 27.89
Lottery [^,-150] CE 55 -177.5 -52.5 -133.95 29.73
Lottery [/,-150] CE 55 -202.5 -102.5 -150.23 19.76
Lottery [\,-200] CE 55 -247.5 -102.5 -180.14 36.25
Lottery [^,-200] CE 55 -227.5 -102.5 -187.14 26.00
Lottery [/,-200] CE 55 -247.5 -152.5 -192.95 21.59
Lottery [\,150] CE 55 102.5 247.5 156.86 30.57
Lottery [^,150] CE 55 97.5 247.5 155.05 25.42
Lottery [/,150] CE 55 52.5 197.5 145.14 26.42
Lottery [\,200] CE 55 152.5 297.5 205.68 28.19
Lottery [^,200] CE 55 102.5 297.5 197.05 36.10
Lottery [/,200] CE 55 107.5 247.5 188.77 25.93
Valence Factor Scores 55 -1.97 1.47 0.13 0.94
Arousal Factor Scores 55 -2.09 2.11 0.06 0.97  
Among males, for the positive gamble responses, the backward selection 
procedure described above resulted in a final model that included mean effects for the / 
distribution, the EV main effect, and the interaction between these two.  There was no 
significant difference between the mean elicited responses from the \ and ^ distributions 
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at either EV ($150 or $200).  The model estimates, as shown in Table 9, suggest an 
increase in elicited CEs of approximately $46.25 as the EV of gambles changed from 
$150 to $200, replicating the usual downward concavity of CEs for positive gambles.  
The estimates for the / distribution suggest an average CE approximately $2.17 less than 
those for \ and ^ distributions at an EV of $150; this estimated difference at an EV of 
$200 declined further to approximately $8.71 (-2.17 + -6.54).  The model also included 
the quadratic and linear arousal effects, but these effects did not interact with the 
various gamble structure conditions.  Therefore, one can interpret the influence of 
arousal as fairly stable across each gambling condition.  From the Table 9 estimates, 
one notices that the linear effect is nearly zero.  Ignoring this linear effect, one is left 
with a very simple description of the arousal influence, whereby CEs tend to increase 
approximately $2 for every standardized unit squared increase in arousal (Note: arousal 
and valence in all models are standardized factor scores based on the entire sample; 
mean and standard deviation estimates of arousal and valence differ only slightly across 
males (mean valence = -0.08, s = 1.04; mean arousal = -0.17, s = 1.06) and females 
(mean valence = 0.13, s = 0.94; mean arousal = 0.061, s = 0.97)).  Panel C of Figure 9 
depicts the implications of this arousal effect by plotting the predicted monetary 
differences from average valence and arousal individuals at 1 and 2 standard deviation 
intervals on each dimension’s axis.  Negative and positive monetary differences 
represent more risk-seeking and more risk- averse responses, respectively, relative to 
individuals at the sample averages of arousal and valence.  Because in the male model 
the only practical affect effect present is quadratic, all individuals above and below the 
valence axis (where arousal = 0) are predicted to be more risk seeking relative to 
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individuals experiencing average levels of arousal.  Importantly, this quadratic arousal 
effect was only marginally significant (at a conventional α=0.05 level) and did not 
account for a substantial amount of variation (only 2-4%) in the individual CE 
responses. 
 As for females, the final positive gamble model left both gamble structure main 
effects, but no interactions.  The probability structure model estimates (Table 9) 
suggested an approximate $4.60 and $13.52 lower CEs in the ^ and / distributions, 
respectively, relative to the \ distribution.  The estimates are comparable to those found 
for males, when considering the marginally significant / by $200 interaction in the male 
model and the marginally significant ^ main effect in the female model.  The female 
estimate for the EV effect suggested $46.10 increase in CEs, very consistent with the 
$46.25 estimate produced in the male model.  In addition to the gamble structural 
effects, the female model included an overall linear and quadratic arousal effect and 
linear valence effect.  Unlike the males, the female arousal effects suggested lower CEs 
as arousal deviated from the mean.  The overall valence effect was positive, implicating 
higher CEs as valence increased.  However, there was also a significant interaction 
between the EV main effect and valence.  This effect essentially canceled out the 
positive influence of valence found in the $150 gambles when assessing responses to 
the $200 gambles.  Panels A and B of Figure 9 display the relative differences in CEs 
across the affect circumplex.  The overall quadratic arousal and linear valence effects 
accounted for roughly 5-7% of the variance in the $150 gambles, while the influence of 
these effects alongside the EV by valence interaction explained roughly 2-4% of the 
variance in $200 gambles.    
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Table 9. Results from Model Selection Procedure for Positive Gamble Certainty 
Equivalents Regressed on Current Affect. 
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 149.43 2.37 0.00 163.38 3.96 0.00
Valence  0a 5.88 3.19 0.07
Arousal -0.03 1.66 0.98 -0.13 2.33 0.95
Arousal by 
Arousal 1.96 1.03 0.06 -4.55 1.28 0.00
^ Prob Dist. 0a -4.60 2.30 0.05
by Valence  0a 0a
by Arousal 0a 0a
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a 0a
/ Prob Dist. -2.17 2.64 0.41 -13.52 2.98 0.00
by Valence  0a 0a
by Arousal 0a 0a
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a 0a
$200 EV 46.25 2.17 0.00 46.10 2.20 0.00
by Valence  0a -6.32 2.05 0.00
by Arousal 0a 0a
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a 0a
^ by $200 0a 0a
/ by $200 -6.54 3.88 0.09 0a
Males Females
 
Note. All valence by arousal interaction terms were nonsignificant and, therefore, 
constrained to equal 0 in the final models.  To conserve space, this constraint does not 
appear in the table. 
a Indicates nonsignificant effects constrained to 0 in the final model.   
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Figure 9. Expected Monetary Difference from Average Arousal and Valence [point 
(0,0)] Predicted Values in the Positive Gamble Models. 
 
 Table 10 contains the model results for the negative gamble models.  All 
negative gamble structure main effects were significant among both genders.  The sole 
significant interaction remaining involved ^ and $200 structures, but this effect only 
appeared in the female model.  The probability structure main effect terms for males 
suggested lower CEs for both ^ and / distributions relative to the referent \ distributions 
 58
   
(roughly a $5.00 difference for both comparisons).  Interestingly, while the direction of 
the / distribution effect is similar across positive and negative gambles (i.e., lower CEs 
compared to referent), the implications are opposing.  Lower CEs for positive gambles 
reflect more risk averse (or less risk seeking) behavior, while for negative gambles they 
indicate more risk seeking (less risk aversion).   
As for the affect effects, it was the valence by arousal interaction terms that 
predicted CE estimates this time, and not the quadratic arousal term that was evident in 
the positive gambles.  In the male model, this, marginally significant, overall valence by 
arousal interaction was the only affect effect present at the end of model reduction.  The 
simple effects of valence and arousal that help define this interaction were both 
negative.  The interaction term, itself, was also negative, suggesting lower slopes for 
each dimension as the other dimension increased.  Panel D of Figure 10 displays the 
totality of the interaction predictions in terms of relative (to the mean affect vector) 
monetary differences.  There, it is evident that below the valence axis (arousal low) the 
valence effect is positive, while above the axis (arousal high) the valence effect is 
negative.  This interaction accounted for a very small amount of variation (roughly 1-
2%) in the individual CE responses. 
For females, the overall valence by arousal interaction term was included 
because of a significant 3-way interaction involving the ^ distribution and both affect 
dimensions.  This 3-way interaction term was strongly negative, suggesting lower slope 
estimates for each dimension as the other dimension decreased for ^ gambles, 
counteracting the slightly positive overall valence by arousal interaction.  The 
configuration of CEs across the affect circumplex was also affected by an interaction 
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between the / distribution and valence, in essence, changing the valence simple effect 
term for / gambles.  Panels A, B, and C of Figure 10 best display the predictive 
implications of these affect effects.  Notice that for the \ distribution, the main influence 
appears to be a positive valence effect which happened to account for roughly 12 and 
7% of the variation in the \$150 and \$200 CE responses, respectively.  In the ^ 
distribution, below an arousal score of 1 (1 standard deviation above the mean), one 
notices an increasingly positive relationship between valence and CE estimates, while 
above an arousal score of 1, this relationship becomes negative.  The 3-way interaction 
and the overall effects combined to account for roughly 5 and 7% of the variance in the 
^$150 and ^$200 gambles, respectively.  Finally, in the / distribution one will find 
comparable competing influences (in terms of magnitude) from valence and arousal: 
one positive (valence) and the other negative (arousal).  This adjustment to the valence 
simple effect, combined with the overall effects, explained roughly 2 and 1% of the 
/$150 and /$200 gamble responses, respectively.   
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Table 10. Results from Model Selection Procedure for Negative Gamble Certainty 
Equivalents Regressed on Current Affect. 
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept -140.30 2.28 0.00 -141.60 3.29 0.00
Valence  -0.84 1.56 0.59 10.92 4.18 0.01
Arousal -1.26 1.50 0.40 -2.30 2.05 0.26
Valence by 
Arousal -1.19 0.66 0.07 0.66 1.74 0.70
^ Prob Dist. -5.16 2.11 0.01 7.27 3.22 0.02
by Valence  0a -5.13 2.74 0.06
by Arousal 0a 2.36 1.98 0.23
by Valence by 
Arousal 0a -5.00 1.92 0.01
/ Prob Dist. -5.98 2.41 0.01 -9.70 3.37 0.00
by Valence  0a -8.92 3.82 0.02
by Arousal 0a 0a
by Valence by 
Arousal 0a 0a
$200 EV -47.59 1.78 0.00 -41.93 2.66 0.00
by Valence  0a 0a
by Arousal 0a 0a
by Valence by 
Arousal 0a 0a
^ by $200 0a -10.41 4.74 0.03
/ by $200 0a 0a
Males Females
 
Note. All quadratic arousal terms were nonsignificant and, therefore, constrained to 
equal 0 in the final models.  To conserve space, this constraint does not appear in the 
table. 
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a Indicates nonsignificant effects constrained to 0 in the final model.   
Figure 10. Expected Monetary Difference from Average Arousal and Valence [point 
(0,0)] Predicted Values in the Negative Gamble Models. 
 
Summary of Hypothesis 1 Results 
 The observed pattern of means suggested risk aversion in the negative domain, 
while in the positive domain, evidence for both risk aversion and risk seeking was 
found.  Interestingly, in both male and female samples and negative and positive 
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domains, the size of the CEs across the probability structures followed the pattern \ ≥ ^ 
≥ /, a finding counter to the reflection effect.  Importantly, however, only the main 
effect contrast between the \ and / distributions was both consistently negative and 
statistical significant, reaching the conventional α=0.05 level in all ±$200 gambles and 
in all but the three male -$150 gambles.  Not surprisingly, the EV main effect contrast 
was highly significant in all gambles, with raw effects ranging from absolute values of 
approximately $42 to $48.   
 The incidental affect measures never accounted for more than 12% of variance 
in any of the individual CE responses.  For males, only marginally significant affect 
effects remained after model reduction.  For positive gambles, the overall quadratic 
arousal effect suggested somewhat riskier CE estimates for low and high arousal 
individuals, relative to mean arousal participants.  For negative gambles, the overall 
valence by arousal interaction suggested a slight positive relationship between valence 
and CEs for those low on arousal, and an even smaller negative relationship between 
valence and CE for those high on arousal.  In the female sample, again terms involving 
quadratic arousal influences for positive gambles and valence by arousal interactions for 
negative gambles make appearances in the final models, this time reaching levels of 
significance.  In the positive domain, the quadratic arousal effect suggested, unlike for 
males, more risk averse behaviors for those low and high on arousal, relative to mean 
arousal.  A positive valence main effect was also present among the $150 gambles.  In 
the negative domain, the valence by arousal interaction was mostly evident in the ^ 
distributed gambles.  Similar to males, in these ^ negative gambles, positive valence 
effects are found for individuals at or below mean levels of arousal and negative 
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valence effects begin to appear for those extremely high on arousal.  In the \ 
distribution, a strong positive valence effect overweighed all other effects, while in the / 
distribution, small and approximately equal, but opposite directional main effects for 
valence (positive relationship) and arousal (negative relationship) explained the female 
model predictions.  In sum, the strongest affective effects found in the positive gambles 
appeared to influence all gambling structures (i.e., overall effects), but did not account 
for large proportions of variance.  This was also true for males in the negative domain, 
but for females, affect effects mostly explained changes in CE responses across the 
probability structures (i.e., \, ^, and /).  Finally, relative to arousal influences, valence 
took a backseat in all but the female $150 gambles in the positive domain.  For the 
negative gambles, both valence and arousal appeared to play a role, albeit diminutive.   
Hypothesis 2.  Current valence and arousal will predict individual differences in 
anticipated affect.   
 To begin, descriptive information for each type of anticipated affect (happiness- 
the proxy for anticipated valence- and surprise- a proxy for arousal) for both the best 
and worst gamble outcomes were inspected.  This information is provided in Tables 11-
18 below.  For comparative purposes, it may be helpful to revisit the components of 
each gamble associated with the best and worst outcomes.  In terms of monetary 
outcomes, the \, ^, and / distributions list best outcomes as μ+$100, μ+$100, and μ+$50, 
respectively.  Worst outcomes, in respective order, are μ-$50, μ-$100, and μ-$100.  
Notice that for a given expected value (μ), the best outcomes of \ and ^ are identical, 
while the worst outcomes for / and ^ and identical.  These similarities in outcomes seem 
to be apparent in the mean estimates of happiness (e.g., the best happiness responses for 
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/ and ^ gambles are always very similar).  Unfortunately, the design manipulation 
closely confounds these outcome values with the probabilities associated with best and 
worst outcomes.  The probability of the best and worst outcome for \, ^, and / 
distributions are 0.10, 0.05, and 0.40 and 0.40, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  Not 
surprisingly then, we see the same pattern noted for happiness appear in the surprise 
responses with similar mean estimates for best \ and ^ outcomes and worst / and ^ 
outcomes.  The patterns observed in the means should appear in the estimates of the 
gamble structure effects.  For example, there should be little need for the effect 
describing mean differences between the ^ gamble structure and the referent \ structure 
when assessing happiness and surprise for best outcomes.    
 Finally, before leaving these descriptive data for the incidental-affect predictive 
modeling, notice the range of the anticipated valence responses often suggest floor and 
ceiling effects.  In fact, for happiness responses, distributions for all best outcomes 
exhibited strong ceiling effects, while those for worst outcomes displayed strong floor 
effects.  For surprise responses, ceiling and floor effects were less evident, but the 
distributions were negatively skewed when probabilities of the extreme outcomes (both 
best and worst) were lower than 0.40 (the / distributions in the best domain and \ 
distributions in the worst domain seemed to be unaffected).  To account for the 
distributional censoring in the happiness responses, the models analyzed Probit latent 
response variables that were associated with categorized outcomes.  As with the 
previous modeling exercise, the error covariance matrix of the new categorical 
outcomes was unrestrictive.  Within each analytic block of happiness outcomes, cutoffs 
to the original scale were identical (e.g., when analyzing positive best valence, cutpoints 
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Table 11. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Best Gamble 
Outcome. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Best Valence 43 19 100 77.30 21.83
Lottery [^,-150] Best Valence 43 23 100 80.74 19.45
Lottery [/,-150] Best Valence 43 26 100 68.88 21.06
Lottery [\,-200] Best Valence 43 25 100 75.33 23.28
Lottery [^,-200] Best Valence 43 20 100 76.09 21.51
Lottery [/,-200] Best Valence 43 27 100 70.02 21.83
Lottery [\,150] Best Valence 43 50 100 87.05 12.64
Lottery [^,150] Best Valence 43 56 100 88.02 13.27
Lottery [/,150] Best Valence 43 57 100 81.16 13.94
Lottery [\,200] Best Valence 43 17 100 85.93 17.27
Lottery [^,200] Best Valence 43 66 100 91.79 10.10
Lottery [/,200] Best Valence 43 57 100 80.30 15.22  
Table 12. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Worst Gamble 
Outcome. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Worst Valence 43 0 45 22.74 14.78
Lottery [^,-150] Worst Valence 43 0 38 12.81 11.97
Lottery [/,-150] Worst Valence 43 0 50 13.88 13.02
Lottery [\,-200] Worst Valence 43 0 44 22.77 14.41
Lottery [^,-200] Worst Valence 43 0 48 12.95 12.78
Lottery [/,-200] Worst Valence 43 0 70 15.09 15.78
Lottery [\,150] Worst Valence 43 0 85 36.58 23.51
Lottery [^,150] Worst Valence 43 0 100 28.70 24.72
Lottery [/,150] Worst Valence 43 0 100 28.07 22.92
Lottery [\,200] Worst Valence 43 0 100 37.05 24.78
Lottery [^,200] Worst Valence 43 0 80 29.44 23.70
Lottery [/,200] Worst Valence 43 0 100 31.00 23.72  
for the 6 outcomes were set at scores of 85 and 99), and estimates of the associated 
latent thresholds were equated across outcomes (e.g., the estimated latent threshold 
marking scores at or below 85 for the \,$150 best valence outcome was identical to the 
threshold marking scores at or below 85 for the remaining positive best valence  
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Table 13. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Best Gamble 
Outcome. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Best Arousal 43 21 100 76.23 19.63
Lottery [^,-150] Best Arousal 43 25 100 78.02 19.23
Lottery [/,-150] Best Arousal 43 21 100 56.23 19.49
Lottery [\,-200] Best Arousal 43 30 100 76.42 18.07
Lottery [^,-200] Best Arousal 43 0 100 76.88 21.85
Lottery [/,-200] Best Arousal 43 14 100 53.98 20.49
Lottery [\,150] Best Arousal 43 47 100 79.05 15.73
Lottery [^,150] Best Arousal 43 40 100 81.47 17.57
Lottery [/,150] Best Arousal 43 0 100 59.47 21.77
Lottery [\,200] Best Arousal 43 16 100 80.95 18.14
Lottery [^,200] Best Arousal 43 50 100 87.88 13.57
Lottery [/,200] Best Arousal 43 29 100 59.74 18.68  
Table 14. Male Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Worst Gamble 
Outcome. 
 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Worst Arousal 43 0 76 43.67 17.30
Lottery [^,-150] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 66.09 31.48
Lottery [/,-150] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 61.74 28.72
Lottery [\,-200] Worst Arousal 43 0 94 44.70 21.86
Lottery [^,-200] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 64.09 30.16
Lottery [/,-200] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 63.93 29.64
Lottery [\,150] Worst Arousal 43 0 72 46.67 17.49
Lottery [^,150] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 63.81 30.20
Lottery [/,150] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 61.16 26.66
Lottery [\,200] Worst Arousal 43 0 71 46.12 17.19
Lottery [^,200] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 61.77 26.79
Lottery [/,200] Worst Arousal 43 0 100 59.49 26.00  
outcomes).  Fixing thresholds to be equal and allowing all but one latent response 
residual and mean to be free produced a more meaningful interpretation of mean 
differences in the latent response variables (preserving the integrity of a common 
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Table 15. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Best Gamble. 
Outcome  
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Best Valence 55 0 100 77.15 23.30
Lottery [^,-150] Best Valence 55 0 100 74.75 25.59
Lottery [/,-150] Best Valence 55 13 100 70.13 23.73
Lottery [\,-200] Best Valence 55 21 100 76.05 22.24
Lottery [^,-200] Best Valence 55 15 100 72.65 25.31
Lottery [/,-200] Best Valence 55 4 100 73.55 22.62
Lottery [\,150] Best Valence 55 2 100 88.20 16.63
Lottery [^,150] Best Valence 55 56 100 90.96 11.82
Lottery [/,150] Best Valence 55 54 100 83.78 14.63
Lottery [\,200] Best Valence 55 15 100 90.65 14.71
Lottery [^,200] Best Valence 55 59 100 90.78 12.18
Lottery [/,200] Best Valence 55 22 100 80.76 18.24  
Table 16. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Valence for Worst Gamble 
Outcome.  
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Worst Valence 55 0 74 23.82 17.10
Lottery [^,-150] Worst Valence 55 0 100 17.75 19.32
Lottery [/,-150] Worst Valence 55 0 73 17.42 14.97
Lottery [\,-200] Worst Valence 55 0 73 24.42 18.30
Lottery [^,-200] Worst Valence 55 0 84 13.04 15.67
Lottery [/,-200] Worst Valence 55 0 91 12.53 16.37
Lottery [\,150] Worst Valence 55 0 100 43.29 22.83
Lottery [^,150] Worst Valence 55 0 96 32.55 22.51
Lottery [/,150] Worst Valence 55 0 100 36.22 23.29
Lottery [\,200] Worst Valence 55 0 100 41.93 23.65
Lottery [^,200] Worst Valence 55 0 100 37.29 24.75
Lottery [/,200] Worst Valence 55 0 100 38.62 24.11  
 
original scale; see Mehta, Neale, & Flay, 2004).  Restricting the number of thresholds to 
two ensures that the estimated univariate and bivariate proportions equal their observed 
counterparts (Chi-square fit statistic = 0).  Anticipated surprise outcomes were modeled  
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Table 17. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Best Gamble 
Outcome.  
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Best Arousal 55 26 100 78.45 20.01
Lottery [^,-150] Best Arousal 55 0 100 74.13 22.72
Lottery [/,-150] Best Arousal 55 16 100 58.31 19.79
Lottery [\,-200] Best Arousal 55 32 100 76.22 16.58
Lottery [^,-200] Best Arousal 55 18 100 73.95 20.88
Lottery [/,-200] Best Arousal 55 5 91 57.58 20.26
Lottery [\,150] Best Arousal 55 20 100 81.91 16.69
Lottery [^,150] Best Arousal 55 25 100 83.82 17.42
Lottery [/,150] Best Arousal 55 21 100 63.93 17.95
Lottery [\,200] Best Arousal 55 30 100 84.75 15.66
Lottery [^,200] Best Arousal 55 7 100 80.93 21.45
Lottery [/,200] Best Arousal 55 4 100 61.22 21.34  
Table 18. Female Descriptive Statistics for Anticipated Arousal for Worst Gamble 
Outcome.  
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,-150] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 40.35 20.83
Lottery [^,-150] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 64.05 31.94
Lottery [/,-150] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 65.24 27.60
Lottery [\,-200] Worst Arousal 55 0 92 38.09 18.94
Lottery [^,-200] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 64.05 32.38
Lottery [/,-200] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 62.00 29.54
Lottery [\,150] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 37.82 20.23
Lottery [^,150] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 59.27 29.56
Lottery [/,150] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 63.24 25.71
Lottery [\,200] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 40.55 20.59
Lottery [^,200] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 63.25 29.20
Lottery [/,200] Worst Arousal 55 0 100 63.18 25.90  
 
as continuous variables, but as with the earlier CE models, the standard errors used for 
coefficient testing were robust to non-normality.   
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Anticipated Valence/Happiness for Best Gamble Outcomes 
 Model testing and reduction results for anticipated valence given best outcomes 
are listed in Table 19.  Overall, there is little evidence to suggest strong associations 
between the incidental affect dimensions and the anticipated valence item, yet, in all but 
the Male positive gamble model, marginally significant effects were present.  For 
males, the negative gamble model did find a marginally significant overall quadratic 
arousal effect.  The effect suggested an increased probability for higher anticipated 
valence responses as incidental arousal deviated farther from its mean (the mean of the 
latent Normal response distribution approaches or exceeds the threshold for the highest 
ordered category), and, combined, these effects accounted for between 16% (for \150) 
and 37% (for /150) of the latent response variable variance.  Panel A of Figure 11 
describes the impact of these effects by plotting the predicted difference in the latent 
response at various points on the 2-dimensional circumplex of affect.  These are relative 
differences, indicating latent response change as incidental affect moves outward from 
the origin (i.e., away from average incidental valence and arousal).  As the plotted 
values increase, the probability for the lowest category (<= 85) declines, relative to 
those at the origin, while the probability of the highest category (right censored scores 
of 100) rises.  (Note: the probability of the middle category, 85 < x < 100, will increase 
as the latent response mean rises to the mid-point of the thresholds, but then decrease 
once the latent mean exceeds this mid-point.)  A marginally significant quadratic 
arousal effect was also found among positive / gambles for females.  Again, the effect 
suggested an increased probability of higher reported anticipated valence as incidental 
arousal deviated farther from the mean, accounting for 7% of the \150 and 9% of the 
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\200 latent response variance (see Figure 11 for visual depiction).   In the negative 
domain, females exhibited a marginally significant 3-way EV by valence by arousal 
interaction.  The simple effects for valence and arousal in the EV $200 gambles were in 
opposite directions (positive for valence and negative for arousal).  The interaction term 
was positive suggesting higher slope estimates for each dimension as the other 
dimension increases.  A visual summary of these incidental affect effects is presented in 
Figure 12 below.  Combined, the 3-way interaction and its associated lower order terms 
accounted for 9, 19, and 18% of the latent response variance for the respective \, ^, and / 
$200 gambles.  
 As anticipated in the introduction to this hypothesis, very few significant gamble 
structure effects were found.  Aside from the necessary inclusion of the nonsignificant 
simple EV $200 effect in the Female model (left in the model because of the EV by 
valence by arousal interaction), the negative gamble structure effects were not strong 
enough to warrant model inclusion.  In these ordered categorical models, only latent 
residual effects were needed to effectively model the observed probability response 
distributions.  In the positive gambles, the change in expected value did not seem to 
matter much, while the change in the gamble’s payoff distribution was statistically 
significant for both genders.  Both males and females reported higher probabilities of 
low anticipated valence for the / distribution relative to the referent \ distribution.  These 
effects accounted for a male -0.46 (/150) and -0.41 (/200) and a female -0.56 (/150) and 
-0.64 (/200) standard deviation shift in the latent response means.  Males also reported 
higher probabilities of high anticipated valence in the ^ distribution relative to the \ 
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distribution, an effect accounting for 0.25 (^150) and 0.28 (^200) standard deviation 
shifts in the latent response means.   
Table 19. Model Effects for Best Outcome Anticipated Valence.  
Valence: Best Outcome for Positive Gambles
Males Females
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 0a 0a
Arousal 0b -0.13 0.13 0.3
Arousal by 
Arousal 0b 0.09 0.11 0.42
^ Prob Dist. 0.28 0.13 0.03 0b
/ Prob Dist. -0.87 0.45 0.05 -0.65 0.20 0.00
by Arousal 0b -0.11 0.09 0.2
Arousal by 
Arousal 0b 0.12 0.07 0.06
Thresholds
<= 85 -0.27 0.22 0.21 -0.44 0.17 0.01
> 99 0.58 0.22 0.01 0.25 0.16 0.12
Valence: Best Outcome for Negative Gambles
Males Females
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 0b 0b
Valence  0b 0.17 0.13 0.21
Arousal 0.22 0.15 0.14 -0.10 0.13 0.46
Valence by 
Arousal 0b 0.02 0.12 0.87
Arousal by 
Arousal 0.25 0.14 0.08 0b
$200 EV 0b -0.07 0.11 0.5
by Valence  0b 0.08 0.08 0.35
by Arousal 0b -0.15 0.09 0.0
Valence by 
Arousal 0b 0.12 0.07 0.08
Thresholds
<= 85 0.52 0.19 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.16
> 99 0.95 0.27 0.00 0.68 0.22 0.00
1
3
0
9
Note. Effects that were dropped from both male and female models are not shown. 
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a Intercept terms were constrained equal to 0 for identification purposes. 
b Constrained equal to zero. 
Figure 11. Expected Latent-Response-Scale Difference between Anticipated Valence 
and Predicted Values for Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the 
Positive Best Outcome Gamble Models. 
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Figure 12.  Expected Latent-Response-Scale Difference between Anticipated Valence 
and Predicted Values for Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the 
Negative Best Outcome Gamble Models. 
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Anticipated Valence/Happiness for Worst Gamble Outcomes 
 Reports of valence for the worst outcome of each presented gamble did not 
show support for incidental affective influences.  All affect predictors were dropped 
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from the final models described in Table 20.  The structural features of the gambles did 
play a role, however, verifying the visually noted patterns in the earlier descriptive 
tables (Tables 12 & 16).  As with the positive gambles, the anticipated valence did not 
seem to depend as much on the change in EV as it did changes in the payoff/loss 
distributions.  The EV factor was only significant in the negative Female gambles, 
where the probability for low valence responses increased as gambles changed from -
$150 to -$200 expected losses.  This effect accounted for a -0.26, -0.37, and -0.39 
standard deviation shift in the latent response means for the \, ^, and / -$200 gambles, 
respectively.  Lower probabilities for low valence responses were also evident when 
comparing the ^ and / distributions to the \ distribution.  Within each gender by 
outcome-sign (positive versus negative) grouping, the size of the ^ and / effects were 
very similar across gambles, accounting for anywhere from a -0.43 (female ^150) to -
3.08 (male ^150) standard deviation shift in the latent response mean.   
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Table 20. Model Effects for Worst Outcome Anticipated Valence. 
Valence: Worst Outcome for Positive Gambles
Males Females
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 0a 0a
^ Prob Dist. -0.73 0.18 0.00 -0.48 0.21 0.02
/ Prob Dist. -0.48 0.17 0.01 -0.45 0.25 0.07
Thresholds
= 0 -0.96 0.24 0.00 -1.62 0.26 0.00
> 25 -0.72 0.19 0.00 -0.89 0.19 0.00
Valence: Worst Outcome for Negative Gambles
Males Females
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 0a 0a
^ Prob Dist. -0.48 0.13 0.00 -0.53 0.12 0.00
/ Prob Dist. -0.48 0.12 0.00 -0.53 0.12 0.00
$200 EV 0b -0.23 0.06 0.00
Thresholds
= 0 -0.74 0.19 0.00 -0.95 0.20 0.00
> 25 -0.10 0.27 0.70 -0.24 0.14 0.08
Note. Effects that were dropped from both male and female models are not shown. 
a Intercept terms were constrained equal to 0 for identification purposes. 
b Constrained equal to 0. 
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Anticipated Arousal/Surprise for Best Gamble Outcomes 
 Incidental affect appeared to have a wide range of influences on anticipated 
arousal as shown in Table 21.  Among males, incidental arousal was most important in 
both positive and negative gambles, with an overall quadratic effect suggesting higher 
anticipated surprise as incidental arousal deviated farther from the mean.  This quadratic 
effect was tempered, however, in the ^ gambles.  Negative gamble arousal effects for 
males were also accompanied by a positive overall incidental valence effect.  Panels A-
B from Figures 13 and 14 visually depict this mixture of incidental affect influences 
relative to the average of each dimension.  For females, both types of higher-order 
affect effects, quadratic arousal and the valence by arousal interaction, remained in the 
final models.   In the positive domain, an overall negative valence by arousal interaction 
and positive quadratic arousal effect reversed directions in the / distribution.  For 
negative gambles, a small overall positive interaction and negative quadratic effect 
became a large negative interaction and positive quadratic effect for ^ gambles.  Panels 
C and D of Figures 13 and 14 below summarize these effects.  Despite the number of 
affect predictors kept in the final models, the amount of anticipated arousal variation 
explained was relatively small, accounting for 4-14% and 10-17% in male positive and 
negative outcomes, respectively, and 2-6% and 1-9% in females, respectively.   
 Much like the anticipated valence models above, these models required few 
gamble structure effects when estimating mean responses.  Only the male responses to 
positive gambles required more than an intercept and the two probability distributions 
effects (^ and /).  Even in the male positive gamble instance, the additional EV main 
effect (Cohen d = 0.23, 0.32, and 0.24 in the \, ^, and / distributions, respectively) and 
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EV by / interaction were relatively small; moreover, the interaction mostly canceled out 
the main effect for the / $200 distribution (leaving a Cohen d = 0.01).  As with the best 
outcome valence responses, the differences due to probability structure were most 
evident in the / effect.  The / distribution accounted for an approximate 14 to 21 unit 
decrease in anticipated surprise when compared to the \ distribution, effects that were 
highly significant (Cohen d ranging from -0.70 to -1.11).  The ^ comparison to \ 
distribution was only significant in the male positive gamble model, where an 
approximate 7 unit increase in anticipated surprise was predicted (Cohen d = 0.39 for 
^150 and d = 0.49 for ^200).  Other ^ effects were included because of their association 
with higher order interaction terms.     
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 Table 21. Model Effects for Best Outcome Anticipated Arousal. 
Anticipated Arousal: Best Outcome for Positive Gambles
Males Females
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 75.72 2.52 0.00 81.47 2.50 0.00
Valence  0a 0.31 2.03 0.88
Arousal 4.28 2.03 0.04 -1.68 1.68 0.32
Valence by 
Arousal 0a -3.15 2.03 0.12
Arousal by 
Arousal 2.72 1.23 0.03 3.23 1.44 0.02
^ Prob Dist. 6.75 1.58 0.00 0a
by Arousal -1.11 1.40 0.43 0a
Arousal by 
Arousal -2.11 0.78 0.01 0a
/ Prob Dist. -18.71 2.98 0.00 -14.80 2.53 0.00
by Valence  0a 1.75 2.36 0.46
by Arousal 0a 1.04 2.11 0.62
Valence by 
Arousal 0a 5.60 2.26 0.01
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a -6.76 1.78 0.00
$200 EV 4.33 1.64 0.01 0a
^ by $200 0a 0a
/ by $200 -4.11 2.26 0.07 0a
Anticipated Arousal: Best Outcome for Negative Gambles
Males Females
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 73.22 2.73 0.00 77.11 2.57 0.00
Valence  3.34 1.62 0.04 0.17 2.40 0.94
Arousal 5.99 1.81 0.00 -2.45 2.07 0.24
Valence by 
Arousal 0a 1.48 2.54 0.56
Arousal by 
Arousal 3.81 1.29 0.00 -0.80 1.86 0.67
^ Prob Dist. 2.87 2.16 0.18 -4.94 2.69 0.07
by Valence  0a -2.16 2.12 0.31
by Arousal 0.51 2.05 0.80 -0.17 1.59 0.92
Valence by 
Arousal 0a -7.48 2.24 0.00
Arousal by 
Arousal -1.45 0.74 0.05 4.67 1.70 0.0
/ Prob Dist. -21.04 2.84 0.00 -18.56 2.81 0.00
1
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 Note. Effects dropped from both male and female models not shown.  a Constrained = 
0. 
Figure 13. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Positive Best Outcome 
Gamble Models. 
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Figure 14. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Negative Best Outcome 
Gamble Models. 
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Anticipated Arousal/Surprise for Worst Gamble Outcomes 
 Incidental affect effects on anticipated arousal for worst outcomes were similar 
to those observed for best outcome arousal (see Table 22).  Male responses again 
showed stronger relationships with arousal than valence.  In the positive domain, a 
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marginally significant overall quadratic arousal effect suggested lower surprise as 
incidental arousal deviated farther from the mean.  This effect was accompanied by a 
significant and positive overall main effect for valence.  Combined, these incidental 
affect influences accounted for anywhere from 5 to 15% of the response variance.  
Panel A of Figure 15 displays the expected anticipated surprise in relation to average 
levels of incidental valence and arousal for these positive gambles.  In the negative 
domain, another negative quadratic arousal effect survived model reduction, but took 
shape mostly in the ^ distribution.  An overall positive valence effect was also present 
in this model.  Unlike the positive domain, though, this effect heightened in the \ 
distribution.  Combined these effects accounted for 5 to 12% of the variance in 
responses.  Panels A-C of Figure 16 exhibit the anticipated affect predictions relative to 
mean incidental affect.  On the female side of Table 22, both higher order incidental 
affect terms make an appearance.  In the positive gambles, the quadratic arousal effect 
becomes noticeably positive in the ^ and / distributions.  The valence by arousal 
interaction, however, becomes significantly negative in the \ distribution, while 
somewhat nonexistent elsewhere.  Lastly, evidence for a fairly substantial simple effect 
due to arousal was essentially erased in the $200 gambles.  Combined, these effects 
accounted for 4 to 11% of the total variance in worst outcome surprise responses.  
Panels B-G of Figure 15 provide a visual depiction of these effects.  In the negative 
domain, the higher order effects had the same pattern with positive quadratic arousal 
influences in ^ and / gambles alongside a negative valence by arousal interaction in the / 
distribution.  These effects accounted for 3 to 9% of the response variation.  Panels D-E 
of Figure 16 depict these influences relative to the mean levels of incidental affect.   
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 As with the best outcome arousal, worst outcome arousal was least affected by 
the change in EV and most affected by the probability changes.  This time, however, ^ 
and / distributions both differed significantly from the \ distribution and in the same 
direction.  In line with the earlier descriptive table comments (see Tables 14 and 18), 
the ^ and / responses were very similar to one another and on average were 
approximately 13 to 24 units higher on anticipated arousal (Cohen d ranged from 0.45 
to 0.81).  This same pattern was noted for the worst outcome valence responses.   
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Table 22. Model Effects for Worst Outcome Arousal. 
Anticipated Arousal: Worst Outcome for Positive Gambles
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 46.49 2.90 0.00 39.68 2.80 0.00
Valence  3.71 1.55 0.02 0.46 1.72 0.79
Arousal -2.22 2.70 0.41 4.80 2.40 0.05
Valence by 
Arousal 0a 0.46 2.27 0.84
Arousal by 
Arousal -2.81 1.64 0.09 -2.41 2.38 0.31
^ Prob Dist. 15.76 3.61 0.00 16.09 6.05 0.01
by Arousal 0a -4.74 4.37 0.2
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a 7.29 4.36 0.09
/ Prob Dist. 13.18 3.05 0.00 16.07 4.80 0.00
by Valence  0a 2.40 1.76 0.17
by Arousal 0a -2.16 3.55 0.5
Valence by 
Arousal 0a -5.56 2.00 0.0
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a 9.99 3.28 0.00
0a
$200 EV 0a 2.47 1.73 0.15
by Arousal 0a -4.85 2.01 0.0
Anticipated Arousal: Worst Outcome for Negative Gambles
Main Effects
Interactions 
with Main 
Effects Est SD P-Val Est SD P-Val
Intercept 46.49 2.90 0.00 39.36 2.43 0.00
Valence  3.40 1.71 0.05 -1.94 2.45 0.43
Arousal -0.51 3.04 0.87 5.77 2.74 0.04
Valence by 
Arousal 0a -0.52 2.89 0.8
Arousal by 
Arousal -1.68 2.03 0.41 -0.37 1.90 0.85
^ Prob Dist. 24.47 4.07 0.00 20.60 5.27 0.00
by Arousal -0.84 2.42 0.73 -3.91 3.75 0.30
Arousal by 
Arousal -4.24 1.39 0.00 5.74 3.24 0.0
/ Prob Dist. 18.24 2.95 0.00 19.49 4.76 0.00
by Valence  3.75 1.63 0.02 -0.10 2.34 0.97
by Arousal 0a 1.05 3.14 0.74
Valence by 
Arousal 0a -4.55 1.76 0.0
Arousal by 
Arousal 0a 7.46 2.99 0.01
Males Females
Males Females
8
4
1
2
6
8
1
 
Note. Effects that were dropped from both male and female models are not shown. 
a Constrained equal to 0. 
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Figure 15. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Positive Worst Outcome 
Gamble Models. 
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Figure 16. Expected Difference between Anticipated Arousal and Predicted Values for 
Average Incidental Arousal and Valence [point (0,0)] in the Negative Worst Outcome 
Gamble Models. 
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Summary of Hypothesis 2 Results 
 As noted in the descriptive introduction to this section, average responses of 
expected (anticipated) valence and arousal were similar in the best and worst outcome 
conditions.  In the best condition, responses to the \ and ^ distributed gambles were 
closely related, while in the worst condition, the ^ and / distributed gambles elicited 
more similar feelings.  No strong differences were visible in the means of the $150 and 
$200 expected value gambles independent of the probability distribution changes.  
These patterns played out in the modeling exercises that followed, with strong 
influences evident for the / gamble compared to the \ gambles in the positive domain, 
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and strong reasonably similar differences between the referent \ gamble and both the ^ 
and / gambles in the negative domain.  EV effects were rarely included as more than 
simple effects accompanying higher order interactions.  Only female worst outcome 
valence and male best outcome arousal (for \ and ^ distributed gambles) appeared to be 
influenced strongly by this manipulation.   Consideration of the patterns of expected 
affect across the gamble structures is covered in more depth under Hypothesis 3.   
 As for the regression of expected affect on incidental affect, much like the 
regression of CE on incidental affect, effects were small and diverse across gender.  
Males tended to have less complex final models.  For expected valence, only one 
incidental affect effect surfaced, an overall quadratic arousal influence for negative best 
outcomes.  The implication of the effect was greater expected valence among those 
extremely high or low on arousal.  Quadratic arousal effects also dominated the males’ 
expected arousal models.  For best outcomes, an overall quadratic arousal suggested 
greater arousal for those high on arousal, an effect tempered somewhat in the ^ 
gambles.  For worst outcomes, overall quadratic arousal effects suggested less expected 
arousal for those on the extreme ends of incidental arousal, but particularly for those 
high on incidental arousal.  This effect was exacerbated in the negative gambles.  There 
were also positive incidental valence main effects in the male models for negative best 
expected arousal and both positive and negative worst expected arousal.   The quadratic 
arousal effects are intriguing, particularly for the expected arousal models.  Combined, 
they suggest that those high on incidental arousal tend to anticipate greater arousal after 
receipt of best outcomes and lower arousal after receipt of worst outcomes.   
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 Among females, quadratic arousal again played a key role for best outcome 
expected valence, but this time in the positive models.  The effect suggested greater 
valence among those on the extreme end of incidental arousal, but particularly those 
low on incidental arousal and primarily for the / gambles.  For negative best expected 
valence, an incidental valence by arousal interaction was observed for the EV $200 
gambles.  The overriding result of this interaction was lower expected valence for those 
low on both incidental arousal and valence (those in the upper left quadrant of Figure 
12).  As with males, no incidental affect effects were present in the worst expected 
valence models.  In the best outcome expected arousal models, both quadratic arousal 
and the valence by arousal interactions took center stage.  In the positive gambles, these 
overall higher order effects resulted in greater expected arousal for those either high in 
both incidental arousal and valence or low in both.  This effect reversed, however, in the 
/ gambles, with those high or low in both reporting lower expected arousal.  In the 
negative gambles, the higher order effects took shape mostly in the ^ gambles, with 
strong positive valence effects for those low on incidental arousal and strong negative 
valence effects for those high on incidental arousal.  These effects led to much higher 
expected arousal among those either high on both arousal and valence or low on both.  
Among the worst outcome expected arousal models, again higher order effects were the 
story.  However, the implications of the effects were tremendously diversified across 
the 6 types of positive and negative gambles, producing different effects in nearly all 
gambles (see Figures 15 and 16 for visual depictions).   
 In sum, as with the CE regression exercise, the incidental affect effects for males 
were largely overall effects, whereas for females, they tended to be specific to particular 
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types of gamble structures.  For males, incidental arousal was the more predictive of the 
two affect dimensions, whereas for females, a complex interplay between incidental 
arousal and valence was more often the case.  Finally, very few incidental affect effects 
were found in the expected valence models, compared to those of expected arousal; in 
fact, no effects were found for expected valence of worst outcomes.  Yet, importantly, 
expected valence was categorized for the analysis in order to accommodate obvious 
signs of ceiling and floor effects.  Expected arousal models, on the other hand, used all 
observed intervals to determine predictive models.  The lack of measurement precision 
induced from the categorization process for expected valence may have much to do 
with the smaller number of observed incidental affect effects.   
Hypothesis 3.  Expected affect will mediate the influence of current affect on choice 
preference. 
Before analysis, responses were inspected for obvious outliers, and several were 
found among the valence responses to the 12 monetary amounts presented.  In all but 
one situation, responses to adjacent monetary values suggested either an accidental 
miscoding on the wrong end of the scale or misidentified losses or gains (e.g., scores of 
0=Happy for a loss of $300 may have been intended to be 100=Unhappy or the word 
“loss” may have been overlooked and the listed amount assumed a gain).  Because it 
was impossible to decipher the source of these errors, these outliers were simply 
recoded as missing.   For one individual, all adjacent monetary responses actually 
corresponded, implicating the error was most likely an inadvertent use of the response 
scale.  For this individual, the responses were recoded as 100 minus the original 
response.   
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Implicitly, Hypothesis 3 implicates a direct relationship between expected affect 
and the CE responses investigated under Hypothesis 1.  Before considering the linkage 
between incidental affect effects on CE and expected affect, one may first wish to 
broadly explore the implicated direct relationship between the two dependent variables 
from Hypotheses 1 and 2.  Theoretically, expected affect represents a function of, not 
only the extreme outcomes (best and worst) explored in the previous hypothesis, but 
also those in between.  Unfortunately, due the existing demands of the study 
questionnaire, direct elicitation of expected affect was only deemed feasible for two 
outcomes per gamble.  Therefore, the regression of CE estimates on these measures of 
expected affect undoubtedly represents an under-specified model, a limitation more 
thoroughly discussed in the summary section below.  Aside from underspecification, in 
order to the make the models more tractable, a method for creating weighted estimates 
of overall expected valence and arousal was desired to avoid the perils of fitting an 
inordinate number of higher order effects.  Without a weighting gold-standard to follow, 
the decision was made to use the available probability structure from each gamble 
(analogous to Expected Utility Theory calculations), so that, for example, overall 
expected valence for a /$150 gamble equaled: best expected valence times the 
probability for the best outcome plus the worst expected valence times the probability 
of the worst outcome.  This resulted in single measures of expected valence and arousal 
for each gamble, which could easily be transformed into single measures of valence by 
arousal and arousal by arousal products (i.e., the interaction and quadratic terms under 
investigation).  Note, the expected valence calculations used the full reported scale of 
best and worst outcome valence without adjustment for ceiling or floor effects.  Below 
 90
   
are the results of a model using these overall expected affect measures to predict the CE 
responses.  
CE Regressed on Expected Affect Measures 
 Anticipating the next step in the mediation model (i.e. the inclusion of incidental 
affect), the expected affect composites were actually derived within the SEM models.  
Overall expected valence and arousal were constructed as “phantom variables” 
(Rindskopf, 1984), whose total variance emanated from the a priori determined 
functions (i.e., weighted by associated payoff/loss probabilities) of the observed best 
and worst outcome variables (the observed measures were formative indicators of these 
overall expected affect composites- see Diamantopoulos & Siguaw, 2006; MacCallum 
& Browne, 1993).  Higher order terms were then constructed using the full-information 
maximum likelihood approach of Klein and Moosbrugger (2000; see also Muthén & 
Asparouhov, 2003).  This somewhat unconventional approach properly channels the 
indirect effect of incidental affect on CE responses through both the mediated expected 
affect main and higher order effect terms.   
Before constructing these higher order mediation models, it is sensible to first 
test the necessity of higher order expected affect terms.  To do so, the model described 
in the previous paragraph was built for prediction of the four groups of CE responses 
investigated under Hypothesis 1 (male and female positive and negative gambles).  
Since both expected affect and CEs were elicited on every gamble, the model reduction 
began with a comparison of fit between gamble-specific (affect influences were allowed 
to vary across all gambles) versus common (affect influences were fixed to be the same 
for all gambles) prediction (this is analogous to the distinction between time-varying 
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and time-invariant prediction commonly tested for in longitudinal modeling).  Three 
indicators of model fit were utilized to determine the necessity of gamble-specific 
prediction: a robust Chi-square difference test (Satorra & Bentler, 1999), the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC).   Lower 
values of the latter two indicate better fit.  Results from these model comparisons are 
displayed in Table 23 below.  Notice that all AIC and BIC statistics favor the common 
prediction model, and all but the Male positive CE Chi-square tests favor this model.  
For reasons of parsimony and the fit indicated, all models that follow specified a 
constant expected affect effect across all gambles. 
Table 23. Model Fit Comparison for Gamble-Specific versus Common Expected Affect 
Prediction. 
Outcome Model LL #Free Parms S-B Chisq p-value AIC BIC
Male Pos Alt -1080.55 51 2263.09 2352.91
Null -1097.31 31 38.18 0.01 2256.62 2311.22
Female Pos Alt -1473.66 51 3049.33 3151.70
Null -1482.22 31 18.60 0.55 3026.45 3088.67
Male Neg Alt -1078.89 51 2259.78 2349.60
Null -1087.32 31 22.85 0.30 2236.63 2291.23
Female Neg Alt -1477.74 51 3057.49 3159.86
Null -1488.92 31 15.42 0.75 3039.83 3102.06
Note. Alt = Gamble-Specific; Null = Common. 
Model reduction resumed by examining the significance of the common 
predictors in the same manner as performed under previous hypotheses (eliminating 
higher order terms before embedded lower order terms).  The final models are presented 
in Table 24.  Notice that only expected arousal survived the complete model reduction 
and that no effects met inclusion criteria for the female negative gamble outcomes.  Of 
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course, the lack of predictive power among expected valence terms may be related to 
ceiling and floor effects noted under Hypothesis 2.  Despite the significance of the 
expected arousal terms in two of the models, no effect ever accounted for more than 2% 
of the variance in any of the CE responses. 
Table 24. Final Models of CE Responses Regressed on Expected Affect.  
Outcome Effects Est SD Est/Sd P-Val Est SD Est/Sd P-Val
Positive Arousal -1.58 0.90 -1.77 0.08 0.36 0.16 2.25 0.02
Arousal by 
Arousal 0.03 0.02 1.73 0.08 0a
Negative Arousal -0.34 0.14 -2.45 0.01 0a
Males Females
 
a These terms were dropped (constrained to 0) from the final model.   
Using the output above to guide the mediation models, focus shifted to tests of 
indirect effects emanating from incidental affect, down through mediating expected 
affect, eventually impacting the CE outcomes.  The diagram in Figure 17 demonstrates 
the structure of these models, including the direct effects remaining from the male 
$150-positive-gamble models of Hypotheses 1-3 (similar effects exist in the model for 
the $200 gambles).  Indirect effects involve the product of arrows that connect 
incidental affect to the CE responses via the paths that predict expected affect.   
Estimates for the mediation models are shown in Tables 25-27.  Note, female negative 
gamble models were deemed unnecessary due to the exclusion of all direct expected 
affect effects on CE.   
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Table 25. Male Positive-Gamble Mediation Models. 
Gambles Outcome Predictor Est SD Est/Sd P-Val
All Valence_i 2.86 1.88 1.52 0.13
Arouse_i 6.43 1.93 3.33 0.00
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i 3.90 1.14 3.43 0.00
Arouse_i 6.84 2.91 2.35 0.02
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i 2.47 1.55 1.59 0.11
\ & ^ Valence_i 4.62 1.71 2.70 0.01
Arouse_i -1.71 2.70 -0.63 0.53
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -1.99 1.61 -1.24 0.22
/ Valence_i 6.31 2.54 2.49 0.01
Arouse_i -2.56 3.35 -0.76 0.44
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -5.93 1.57 -3.77 0.00
Valence_i 6.31 2.539 2.49 0.01
Arouse_i -1.71 2.70 -0.63 0.53
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -1.99 1.61 -1.24 0.22
All CE Arouse_e -0.33 0.16 -2.13 0.03
\ & /
Best 
Arouse_e
All CE
\ & /
Worst 
Arouse_e
^ Best Arouse_e
Worst 
Arouse_e
^
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Table 26. Female Positive-Gamble Mediation Models. 
Gambles Outcome Predictor Est SD Est/Sd P-Val
Valence_i 0.90 1.85 0.49 0.63
Arouse_i -1.78 1.73 -1.03 0.30
Valence_i by 
Arouse_i -3.37 1.66 -2.03 0.04
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i 3.78 1.58 2.38 0.02
Valence_i 1.89 2.35 0.80 0.42
Arouse_i -0.44 2.60 -0.17 0.87
Valence_i by 
Arouse_i 1.78 2.59 0.69 0.49
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -2.59 2.04 -1.27 0.20
\ & ^ Valence_i 0.19 1.87 0.10 0.92
\$150 Arouse_i 4.94 2.47 2.00 0.05
\ & ^
Valence_i by 
Arouse_i 0.51 2.41 0.21 0.83
\
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -2.69 2.42 -1.11 0.27
^$150 Arouse_i -0.21 3.83 -0.06 0.96
^ Arouse_i by Arouse_i 4.30 3.33 1.29 0.20
/ Valence_i 1.96 1.97 0.99 0.32
/$150 Arouse_i 1.79 3.09 0.58 0.56
/
Valence_i by 
Arouse_i -4.80 2.62 -1.83 0.07
/
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i 6.95 2.29 3.03 0.00
\$200 Arouse_i -0.10 2.65 -0.04 0.97
^$200 Arouse_i -5.56 3.94 -1.41 0.16
/$200 Arouse_i -2.97 3.50 -0.85 0.40
$150 Valence_i 5.71 3.17 1.80 0.07
Arouse_i 0.01 2.20 0.00 1.00
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -4.15 1.37 -3.03 0.00
$200 CE Valence_i -0.41 3.92 -0.10 0.92
All CE Arouse_e 0.29 0.20 1.47 0.14
\ & ^ Best Arouse_e
 / Best Arouse_e
All
Worst 
Arouse_e
Worst 
Arouse_e
Worst 
Arouse_e
Worst 
Arouse_e
CE
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Table 27. Male Negative-Gamble Mediation Models. 
Gambles Outcome Predictor Est SD Est/Sd P-Val
All Valence_i 2.86 1.88 1.52 0.13
Arouse_i 6.43 1.93 3.33 0.00
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i 3.90 1.14 3.43 0.00
Arouse_i 6.84 2.91 2.35 0.02
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i 2.47 1.55 1.59 0.11
\ & ^ Valence_i 4.62 1.71 2.70 0.01
Arouse_i -1.71 2.70 -0.63 0.53
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -1.99 1.61 -1.24 0.22
/ Valence_i 6.31 2.54 2.49 0.01
Arouse_i -2.56 3.35 -0.76 0.44
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -5.93 1.57 -3.77 0.00
Valence_i 6.31 2.539 2.49 0.01
Arouse_i -1.71 2.70 -0.63 0.53
Arouse_i by 
Arouse_i -1.99 1.61 -1.24 0.22
All CE Arouse_e -0.33 0.16 -2.13 0.03
\ & /
Best 
Arouse_e
All CE
\ & /
Worst 
Arouse_e
^ Best Arouse_e
Worst 
Arouse_e
^
 
In the SEM models constructed to fit these terms for female positive and male 
negative outcomes, statistical significance of the multivariate indirect incidental affect 
effects can be estimated through model constraints on the sum of involved coefficient 
products (see MacKinnon et al., 2002; MacKinnon, Lockwood, & Williams, 2004).  For 
the male positive outcome model, statistical significance of the indirect paths is 
complicated by the higher order effect relation between the mediator (expected arousal) 
and the CE outcomes.  As shown below, the size of the indirect paths is conditional on 
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the latent mediator residual, i.e., the unique portion of expected arousal that is not 
predicted by incidental valence or arousal.  The system of equations below 
demonstrates this dependency for \ and / positive gambles: 
EBIIiBestE eABABBA EBEBEB +++= 2210,         [8] 
EWIIIiWorstE eVBABABBA EWEWEWEW ++++= 32210,         [9] 
WorstEBestE AAEA ,, 4.01.0 ⋅+⋅=         [10] 
CEIIi eEABEABABABBCE CECECECECE +++++= 232210     [11] 
where incidental arousal and valence are AI and VI, expected arousal for best and worst 
outcomes are AE,Best and AE,Worst, and the “phantom” expected affect variable is EA.  
Substitution of equations 8-10 into 11 provides a clearer picture of the total indirect 
effect of interest, revealing a complex function of incidental arousal and valence 
product coefficients and expected arousal residuals:  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ). 
4.01.02
4.01.0
4.01.0
00
3
2
21
2
214
2
3
2
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2
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213
EWEBii
IIIII
IIIII
IIIII
eeBB
VBABABABABB
VBABABABABB
VBABABABABBIndEff
EWEB
EWEWEWEBEBCE
EWEWEWEBEBCE
EWEWEWEBEBCE
+++⋅
++⋅++⋅+
++⋅++⋅+
++⋅++⋅=
   [12] 
Because of the dependence on the expected arousal residuals, the usual product 
coefficient tests carry limited meaning.  We can, however, assess the size and 
significance of various indirect effects at specified values of these two residuals 
adapting the newly proposed methods of Edwards and Lambert (2007) and Preacher, 
Rucker, and Hayes (in press).  These tests are essentially extensions of the simple slope 
tests of Aiken and West (1991) applied to the conditional indirect effects.  Both types of 
tests (usual and conditional) were run for the 3 models shown in Tables 25-27 using 
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first-order derivative Delta estimation of standard errors (SE) for constraint estimates.  
These statistics alongside Normal distribution p-values (2-tailed) for the ratio of the 
indirect effect over the Delta SE are shown in Table 28.  Notice estimated indirect 
effects for positive male outcomes are given for -1, 0, and 1 standard deviation units 
above the mean for the two residuals (labeled eBest and eWorst) shown in equation 1210.  
Not surprisingly, given the small direct effects displayed in the Tables 25-27, these 
results indicate no statistically significant mediation within any of the models.   
                                                 
10 This tests requires a non-obvious adaptation to the Edwards and Lambert (2007) and Preacher et al. (in 
press) techniques.  In addition to the constraints on the indirect effect in equation [12], constraints are 
required for new parameter estimates that equal the standard deviation of the eBest and eWorst residual 
terms.  These estimates are used to calculate the indirect affect at 1 standard deviation above and below 
each residual mean. 
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Table 28. Tests of Significance for Total Indirect Effects within Mediating Models. 
Outcome Set Dist.
$150 Σ of 
Products 
(SE*) P-Val
$200 Σ of 
Products 
(SE*) P-Val
Male Neg \ -0.56(0.59) 0.34
^ -0.09(0.10) 0.35
/ -1.84(0.99) 0.06
Female Pos \ 0.42(0.74) 0.57 -0.17(0.63) 0.78
^ 0.12(0.16) 0.45 0.04(0.13) 0.73
/ 0.46(0.66) 0.49 0.95(0.86) 0.27
Outcome Set Dist.
$150 Σ of 
Products 
(SE*) P-Val
$200 Σ of 
Products 
(SE*) P-Val eBest eWorst
Male Pos \ 2.27(13.53) 0.87 2.66(20.49) 0.90 -1 -1
0(0) 1.00 2.53(15.49) 0.87 -1 0
3.01(18.77) 0.87 3.05(18.44) 0.87 -1 1
2.76(16.78) 0.87 2.54(15.20) 0.87 0 -1
3.01(18.14) 0.87 3.12(18.80) 0.87 0 0
3.54(21.20) 0.87 3.60(21.65) 0.87 0 1
3.00(18.22) 0.87 1.83(18.03) 0.92 1 -1
3.52(20.89) 0.87 3.56(21.52) 0.87 1 0
3.77(23.08) 0.87 4.09(24.10) 0.87 1 1
^ 1.54(3.03) 0.61 1.84(3.50) 0.60 -1 -1
2.02(4.04) 0.62 2.29(4.47) 0.61 -1 0
2.56(5.16) 0.62 2.78(5.39) 0.61 -1 1
1.94(3.76) 0.61 2.01(3.91) 0.61 0 -1
2.48(4.83) 0.61 2.40(4.82) 0.62 0 0
2.95(5.82) 0.61 3.12(5.99) 0.60 0 1
2.17(4.28) 0.61 2.30(4.48) 0.61 1 -1
2.74(5.42) 0.61 2.77(5.74) 0.63 1 0
2.76(5.51) 0.62 3.13(6.35) 0.62 1 1
/ 18.51(27.04) 0.49 18.39(28.47) 0.52 -1 -1
26.06(39.96) 0.51 27.13(41.44) 0.51 -1 0
33.87(52.75) 0.52 34.43(54.06) 0.52 -1 1
25.99(37.99) 0.49 25.06(37.75) 0.51 0 -1
32.30(50.81) 0.52 31.76(50.37) 0.53 0 0
41.49(64.95) 0.52 40.42(62.83) 0.52 0 1
32.86(49.06) 0.50 30.91(46.52) 0.51 1 -1
40.30(62.43) 0.52 38.96(59.34) 0.51 1 0
48.64(75.05) 0.52 45.50(71.87) 0.53 1 1  
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Figure 17. Diagram of Mediating Model. 
Incidental 
Arousal 
Incidental 
Valence 
Incidental 
Valence x 
Arousal
Expected 
Arousal \150 
Expected Best 
Arousal \$150 
Expected Worst 
Arousal \$150 
Expected Best 
Arousal ^$150 
Expected Worst 
Arousal ^$150 
Expected Best 
Arousal /$150 
Expected Worst 
Arousal /$150 
p=0.4 
Expected 
Arousal ^150 
p=0.05 
p=0.05 
Expected 
Arousal /150 
p=0.1 
p=0.4 
CE \$150 
CE ^$150 
CE /$150 
B1+B2EA2
B1+B2EA2
B1+B2EA2
p=0.1 
Incidental 
Arousal  x 
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Note. Correlated residuals for observed (boxed) sets of Expected Arousal and CE 
outcomes not shown.  The coefficients for the regression of expected worst and best 
arousal on incidental affect not labeled.  The ‘p = x’ labels indicate the fixed formative 
(causal) effects (= probability of best or worst outcome) that define the Expected 
Arousal “phantom” composites (ovals).  The ‘B1+B2EA2’ labels indicate the quadratic 
and linear terms in the regression of CE on Expected Arousal.  Incidental influences on 
CE are not labeled.   
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Summary of Hypothesis 3 Results 
 Inspection of the direct effects of expected affect on CE responses revealed only 
small influences from expected arousal.  Expected valence had no effect in any of the 
models, and none of the expected affect measures influenced the negative gamble, 
female CE responses.  Evidence for indirect effects of incidental affect on CE, via 
mediating expected affect influences, were also nonexistent.  Limitations abound, 
however, for these particular effects.  For example, the lack of impact from expected 
valence may in part be due to the lack of measurement precision at one end of the scale, 
where previously (Hypothesis 2), strong ceiling and floor were noted.  The single 
indictor measurement of both expected arousal and valence also likely contributed to a 
dampening of effects.  This latter limitation could, theoretically, have been accounted 
for by constraining the ratio of “true score” to unique variance in each measure to an a 
priori estimate of reliability (such as the ratio estimated for the incidental “Happy” and 
“Surprise” items in Table 6).  Unfortunately, attempts to model this more constant 
influence of measurement error failed to produce reliable estimates in the full higher 
order mediating models, nullifying any real practical benefit.  Finally, due to constraints 
on the length of the participant questionnaire, only expected affect for extreme 
payoffs/losses were elicited.  To the extent that outcomes in between these extremes add 
unique predictive variance to the models and to the extent that the expected outcome 
responses are aggregated in a manner inconsistent with associated gamble probabilities, 
the impact of expected affect on CE is underestimated.  For these reasons, effects of 
expected affect on CE responses can safely be assumed conservative and far from 
definitive.   
 101
   
Hypothesis 4.  The influence of incidental affect on expected affect will be mediated 
through perceptions of risk and expected payoff. 
 The final hypothesis under investigation concerned subjective estimates of the 
various gambles’ expected values and “risk.”  Based on the premise that valence more 
directly relates to actual value of an expected outcome and arousal to the odds of an 
expected outcome, one might anticipate strong correspondence between subjective 
measures of risk and value and expected affect.  In what follows, these possible 
relationships were explored, as well as the relationship of subjective value and risk to 
the CE outcomes.  The size of these direct effects were hypothesized to explain some of 
the previously observed relations between incidental affect and both expected affect and 
CE responses.   
 Tables 29-32 provide descriptive information for the subjective value and risk 
responses in each of the four outcome groups found in Hypotheses 1 and 3.  As with 
Hypothesis 3, analysis began with comparisons of fit between models that allowed for 
differential and common prediction.  For the regression of expected valence on 
expected value, we see in Tables 33 and 34 moderate support for common predictive 
weighting across the sample of gambles (all AIC and BIC values favor the common 
model, except for male positive AIC; Similarly, only the male positive S-B Chi-squares 
are significant (p<0.05)).  The common prediction estimates are also included in these 
Tables in the bottom left corner.  Interestingly, the only significant relationships 
identified are for worst outcome gambles among males, and these effects only 
accounted for between <1 to 2% of the variance in the outcomes.  The model fit 
statistics and estimates shown correspond to models treating expected valence as a  
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Table 29. Male Positive Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk. 
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,150] Expected Value 43 100 250 140.70 26.24
Lottery [^,150] Expected Value 43 75 175 145.00 18.48
Lottery [/,150] Expected Value 43 100 200 153.60 20.94
Lottery [\,200] Expected Value 43 150 225 186.63 21.23
Lottery [^,200] Expected Value 43 100 250 188.60 26.58
Lottery [/,200] Expected Value 43 100 250 196.05 33.25
Lottery [\,150] Riskiness 43 0 80 48.70 21.07
Lottery [^,150] Riskiness 43 0 82 44.19 18.13
Lottery [/,150] Riskiness 43 0 96 48.14 22.16
Lottery [\,200] Riskiness 43 0 100 51.91 21.82
Lottery [^,200] Riskiness 43 0 81 51.14 18.88
Lottery [/,200] Riskiness 43 0 90 47.67 20.22  
Table 30. Male Negative Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk. 
N Min Max Mean Std D
Lottery [\,-150] Expected Value 43 -200 -100 -153.60 21.69
Lottery [^,-150] Expected Value 43 -175 -100 -146.51 17.30
Lottery [/,-150] Expected Value 43 -200 -100 -140.23 23.70
Lottery [\,-200] Expected Value 43 -250 -100 -200.00 30.55
Lottery [^,-200] Expected Value 43 -275 -100 -193.02 28.97
Lottery [/,-200] Expected Value 43 -230 -150 -188.37 23.75
Lottery [\,-150] Riskiness 43 16 81 51.21 17.83
Lottery [^,-150] Riskiness 43 0 90 47.84 18.50
Lottery [/,-150] Riskiness 43 26 86 51.53 18.11
Lottery [\,-200] Riskiness 43 11 86 51.47 20.55
Lottery [^,-200] Riskiness 43 17 96 52.12 16.06
Lottery [/,-200] Riskiness 43 0 90 47.09 21.53
ev
 
continuous outcome.  Results from models treating expected valence as categorical (to 
help account for ceiling and floor effects) were also run, but not reported, and 
conclusions were not substantively different.   
Prediction of expected arousal from the subjective risk responses were similarly 
weak.  In these models, support for the common predictors were not as strong, with 
significant improvement for the gamble-specific models indicated in the adjusted Chi-  
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Table 31. Female Positive Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk.  
N Min Max Mean Std Dev
Lottery [\,150] Expected Value 55 100 200 129.45 28.16
Lottery [^,150] Expected Value 55 50 200 146.91 23.28
Lottery [/,150] Expected Value 55 50 200 161.58 34.53
Lottery [\,200] Expected Value 55 150 300 183.00 32.75
Lottery [^,200] Expected Value 55 100 250 195.55 24.32
Lottery [/,200] Expected Value 55 100 250 213.73 36.38
Lottery [\,150] Riskiness 55 9 91 51.75 20.56
Lottery [^,150] Riskiness 55 0 91 47.62 19.28
Lottery [/,150] Riskiness 55 0 85 48.85 20.44
Lottery [\,200] Riskiness 55 10 84 52.85 18.93
Lottery [^,200] Riskiness 55 0 92 54.18 20.51
Lottery [/,200] Riskiness 55 2 92 48.87 20.42  
Table 32. Female Negative Gamble Responses to Subjective Expected Value and Risk. 
N Min Max Mean Std D
Lottery [\,-150] Expected Value 55 -200 -50 -163.73 36.92
Lottery [^,-150] Expected Value 55 -180 -50 -145.82 26.87
Lottery [/,-150] Expected Value 55 -250 -100 -130.09 31.63
Lottery [\,-200] Expected Value 55 -250 -100 -209.73 36.56
Lottery [^,-200] Expected Value 55 -225 -100 -194.82 27.57
Lottery [/,-200] Expected Value 55 -300 -150 -180.36 32.17
Lottery [\,-150] Riskiness 55 10 100 57.98 19.71
Lottery [^,-150] Riskiness 55 0 90 50.80 19.32
Lottery [/,-150] Riskiness 55 18 100 54.44 18.26
Lottery [\,-200] Riskiness 55 19 94 54.45 20.32
Lottery [^,-200] Riskiness 55 10 90 50.71 18.04
Lottery [/,-200] Riskiness 55 3 90 53.33 19.54
ev
 
square statistics for all positive outcomes and male negative best outcome responses.  
Yet, the AIC and BIC statistics slightly favored the common predictor model in 12 of 
16 comparisons.  Since neither model appears to dominant the other in fit, the results 
reported favor the parsimony of the common predictor estimates which are shown in the 
bottom left corner of Tables 35 and 36.  None of these common effects reach levels of 
significance.   
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Table 33. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Valence for Best Outcomes from Subjective Expected Value Responses. 
Outcome Model LL #Free Parms S-B Chisq p-value AIC BIC
Male Pos Alt -2098.47 33 4262.95 4321.07
Null -2104.56 28 17.02 0.00 4265.12 4314.44
Female Pos Alt -2772.86 33 5611.72 5677.96
Null -2776.63 28 10.98 0.05 5609.26 5665.46
Male Neg Alt -2172.98 33 4411.97 4470.09
Null -2174.17 28 3.64 0.60 4404.33 4453.64
Female Neg Alt -2900.40 33 5866.80 5933.05
Null -2902.82 28 1.85 0.87 5861.64 5917.85
Outcome
Common 
Est. SE p-val
Male Pos 0.02 0.02 0.36
Female Pos 0.00 0.02 0.93
Male Neg 0.05 0.03 0.12
Female Neg -0.01 0.02 0.56  
Note. Alt = Gamble-Specific; Null = Common. 
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Table 34. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Valence for Worst Outcomes from Subjective Expected Value Responses. 
Outcome Model LL #Free Parms S-B Chisq p-value AIC BIC
Male Pos Alt -2174.23 33.00 4414.46 4472.58
Null -2179.65 28.00 14.81 0.01 4415.30 4464.62
Female Pos Alt -2822.57 33.00 5711.14 5777.38
Null -2823.94 28.00 4.15 0.53 5703.88 5760.08
Male Neg Alt -2090.99 33.00 4247.97 4306.09
Null -2093.78 28.00 5.01 0.41 4243.56 4292.88
Female Neg Alt -2775.33 33.00 5616.66 5682.90
Null -2776.74 28.00 1.22 0.94 5609.49 5665.69
Outcome
Common 
Est. SE p-val
Male Pos 0.06 0.02 0.01
Female Pos 0.03 0.02 0.15
Male Neg 0.05 0.02 0.02
Female Neg 0.01 0.01 0.67  
Note. Alt = Gamble-Specific; Null = Common. 
Table 35. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Arousal for Best Outcomes from Subjective Risk Responses. 
Outcome Model LL #Free Parms S-B Chisq p-value AIC BIC
Male Pos Alt -2154.65 33.00 4375.30 4433.42
Null -2160.33 28.00 15.32 0.01 4376.66 4425.97
Female Pos Alt -2745.69 33.00 5557.37 5623.62
Null -2749.86 28.00 15.26 0.01 5555.72 5611.93
Male Neg Alt -2153.81 33.00 4373.63 4431.75
Null -2161.33 28.00 14.10 0.02 4378.65 4427.97
Female Neg Alt -2776.88 33.00 5619.77 5686.01
Null -2778.27 28.00 2.03 0.85 5612.55 5668.75
Outcome
Common 
Est. SE p-val
Male Pos 0.04 0.04 0.25
Female Pos -0.04 0.04 0.41
Male Neg -0.01 0.05 0.79
Female Neg 0.03 0.04 0.51  
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Note. Alt = Gamble-Specific; Null = Common. 
Table 36. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of Expected 
Arousal for Worst Outcomes from Subjective Risk Responses. 
Outcome Model LL #Free Parms S-B Chisq p-value AIC BIC
Male Pos Alt -2180.21 33.00 4426.41 4484.53
Null -2189.40 28.00 24.66 0.00 4434.80 4484.11
Female Pos Alt -2863.01 33.00 5792.03 5858.27
Null -2866.65 28.00 12.12 0.03 5789.31 5845.51
Male Neg Alt -2192.31 33.00 4450.62 4508.74
Null -2193.00 28.00 2.37 0.80 4442.00 4491.31
Female Neg Alt -2858.43 33.00 5782.86 5849.11
Null -2864.78 28.00 5.29 0.38 5785.55 5841.76
Outcome
Common 
Est. SE p-val
Male Pos -0.06 0.04 0.10
Female Pos -0.01 0.06 0.92
Male Neg -0.02 0.06 0.73
Female Neg -0.11 0.07 0.14  
Note. Alt = Gamble-Specific; Null = Common. 
The same caveats expressed in the summary to Hypothesis 3 carry over into 
these prediction exercises, particularly the lack of a gold-standard weighting system for 
combining the two types of expected affect (best and worst) and the missing expected 
affect for non-extreme payoffs/losses.  Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that these 
perceived characteristics (expected value and risk) of the gamble structure do not seem 
to share much variance with expected reactions to potential gamble outcomes.  Given 
the weak relationships demonstrated in Hypothesis 3 between expected affect and the 
CE responses, one might wonder how much better these subjective measures perform.   
 107
   
 When comparing common and differential predictor models for the regression of 
CE on subjective EV and risk, again support for the necessity of gamble-specific 
prediction was lacking.  In line with earlier supposed relations between these 
perceptions of gamble structure and expected affect, the common prediction model was 
estimated with subjective EV and risk main effects and higher order effects for an EV 
by risk interaction and a quadratic risk term.  Model fit statistics for common and 
gamble-specific prediction and results are shown in Table 37 below.  Adopting the 
reduction criteria from earlier exercises, EV and risk terms remained in only the female 
negative gamble model due to a small EV by risk interaction that was marginally 
significant.  Combined, however, the inclusion of these three terms accounted for no 
more than 1% of the total variance in any of the CE responses.   
Table 37. Model Comparison of Gamble-Specific and Common Prediction of CE. 
Outcomes from Subjective Expected Value and Risk Responses 
Outcome Model LL #Free Parms S-B Chisq p-value AIC BIC
Male Pos Alt No Convrg 51 --- ---
Null -7010.023 31 --- --- 14082.05 14136.64
Female Pos Alt -9174.973 51 18451.95 18554.32
Null -9183.938 31 21.72 0.36 18429.88 18492.10
Male Neg Alt -6969.089 51 14040.18 14130.00
Null -6979.624 31 25.29 0.19 14021.25 14075.85
Female Neg Alt -9325.025 51 18752.05 18854.42
Null -9339.734 31 19.10 0.52 18741.47 18803.70
Outcome Predictor
Common 
Est. SE p-val
Female Neg EV -0.165 0.096 0.09
Risk -0.026 0.064 0.68
EV by Risk -0.002 0.001 0.05
Note. Alt = Gamble-Specific; Null = Common; NoCnvrg = Model failed to converge.   
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Summary of Hypothesis 4 Results 
 Subjective reports of each gambles’ expected value and perceived risk did not 
appear to account for meaningful amounts of variation in either expected affect 
outcomes or CE responses.  Moreover, as demonstrated in the mediation models under 
Hypothesis 3, the size of the direct effects present in the Hypothesis 4 models 
(accounting for no more than 2% of any CE response variable) would not be sufficient 
to explain substantial mediation of subjective risk and expected value on the 
relationship between incidental affect and CE outcomes.  The finding that these 
measures are not related is puzzling, however, and prompts some proverbial back-to-
drawing-board discussion, both theoretical and methodological, in the sections that 
follow.   
 
Chapter IV: Discussion 
 The current study explored the connection between three parallel but somewhat 
independent decision science research programs.  The unifying theme among each 
rested on the shoulders of affect, hypothesizing emotional influences on the cognitive 
evaluation of gambles.  The study marks one of the first attempts to empirically test a 
causal model of the intervening mechanistic components of evaluations that possibly 
underlie the recent body of evidence supporting background mood influences on risky 
choice (Eisenberg et al., 1996; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Raghunathan & Pham, 
1999; Raghunathan et al., 2006).  More specifically, the study investigated the 
influences of incidental affect on two sets of evaluated gamble components previously 
theorized and empirically validated to predict choice outcomes: (1) perceived structural 
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features of the gambles (riskiness and expected monetary value) and (2) global 
assessments of potential hedonic value (expectations of future affect- anticipated 
affect).  Overall, little support was found for consistent mechanistic influences at any 
stage of the causal model, summarized by weak and often isolated (context-specific) 
influences of incidental affect and evaluation components (risk, expected value, and 
expected affect) on choice outcomes.  These findings are highlighted below and 
followed by an examination of the limiting study factors possibly responsible for the 
poor predictive performance of the proposed model.   
Incidental Affective Influences on Risky Choice 
The first hypothesis tested the impact of immediate affect on elicited certainty 
equivalency measures (CE) of gamble preference.  Using the Pleasure-Arousal 
Hypothesis (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978) to guide prediction, a 2-dimensional measure 
of incidental affect, tapping valence and arousal, never accounted for more than 12% of 
variance in any of the individual CE responses.  The affective effects identified for 
males and for positive gamble responses (those with only gain outcomes) of females 
most often influenced all types of gamble structures presented (i.e., overall effects).  
Responses of females to the negative gambles (only loss outcomes), on the other hand, 
were diverse across the three types of probability structures presented (i.e., \, ^, and /).  
Finally, relative to arousal influences, valence seemed to be a less valuable predictor in 
all positive gambles, excepting the female $150 gambles.  For the negative gambles, 
both valence and arousal contributed to prediction. 
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Incidental Affective Influences on Anticipated Affect  
 Again adopting the Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis (Russell & Mehrabian, 1978), 
2-dimensional incidental affect was allowed to predict 2-dimensional anticipated affect 
responses to receipt of the best and worst outcomes from every gamble.  The anticipated 
affect responses were elicited as relative expectations conditional on hypothetical  
scenarios where each gamble was selected over a certain payoff or loss equal in amount 
to the played gamble’s expected value.  Much like the effects on CE, the incidental 
affect predictions of anticipated affect were largely overall effects for males and more 
often structure-dependent effects for females.  Male models were typically defined by 
the inclusion of linear and quadratic arousal terms, while for females, complex 
interactive relationships involving both incidental arousal and valence were more 
commonly left in the final models.  Finally, very few affect effects were found in the 
expected valence models, compared to those of expected arousal, a finding possibly 
related to strong ceiling and floor effects evident in the expected valence responses and 
methodologically adjusted for in the modeling exercise.   
Expected Affect as a Mediator of the Relationship between Incidental Affect and CE   
 Treating composite estimates of expected valence and arousal as continuous 
predictors of CE responses, the model reduction procedure utilized left only expected 
arousal influences in the positive-gamble female model and both the positive and 
negative male models.  No effects remained in the negative gamble female model 
estimation.  The effects identified were all small in magnitude and did not appear to 
account for any of the direct incidental affect effects on CE.  Conclusions from this 
particular investigation are complicated by the fact that only anticipated affect for 
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extreme outcomes was elicited in the participant interviews.  In the event that unique 
predictions from outcomes falling in between these extremes exist, these effects of 
expected affect on CE are underrepresented.  There is also some concern about how to 
incorporate the distinct measures of anticipated affect (affect anticipated to be 
experienced from a defined outcome scenario) into a global measure of expected affect.  
The current study documented a technique for combining individual anticipated affect 
measures into main effect and higher order terms at the expected affect level by creating 
a composite weighted by the probability of associated extreme outcomes within the 
actual mediation model.  Yet, in the event that participants subjectively value 
probabilities nonlinearly (as is often assumed in GEU models; see Figure 4), these 
composites may reflect substantial bias and error in measurement.  Although not 
reported, other composite estimates were also explored as was a model allowing linear 
effects from each individual measure of anticipated valence and arousal to predict CE.  
Results from these exploratory models did not reveal substantially different conclusions 
(small direct influences and no mediation) from those presented.  Yet, for the reasons 
identified here and those in the section Summary of Hypothesis 3 Results, the results and 
conclusions from the full mediation model and prediction of CE from expected affect 
are presented with caution.    
Structural Features of Gambles Influence Expected Affect and CE 
Both objective and subjective measures of structural features were assessed for 
predictive influence in this study.  Objectively, Hypotheses 1 and 2 estimated main 
effects and interactions of the two manipulated structural features, probability 
distribution (objective risk) and expected value (objective value), on CE and anticipated 
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affect responses.  Not surprisingly, in contrast to the previously noted effects of 
incidental and anticipatory affect, these influences tended to be quite large.  The largest 
objective structural effects were observed for changes in expected value (EV) in the CE 
outcome models, where consistently an absolute value difference of $42 to $48 was 
detected.  Given the actual absolute value difference in expected values within positive 
and negative domains was $50, these EV findings are suggestive of risk aversion for 
gambles of losses and gambles of gains.  This global aversion is somewhat inconsistent 
with the know reflection effect of Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where risk-aversion 
for gains and risk-seeking for comparable losses frequently describes the utility curves.  
A possible explanation for this inconsistency involves the actual display of negative 
gambles.  In most, if not all, gambling tasks of this sort (at least to this author’s 
knowledge), negative gamble counterparts to positive gambles are usually displayed 
with outcomes ordered least to greatest in absolute value.  In this study, order of 
outcomes was simply least to greatest, resulting in a reversal of absolute value order in 
negative and positive domains.  If true, such an explanation would identify an important 
boundary condition on the reflection effect, but more evidence is needed before drawing 
any firm conclusions.   
Systematic differences in CE responses were also found within sets of gambles 
with a common EV.  These probability distribution effects lend support to the risk-value 
model contention that both value of the outcome and perceived risk play a role in 
determining preference.  Generally speaking, the preference order within each EV was \ 
≥ ^ ≥ / (see Figure 3 for symbolic notation) in both positive and negative gambles (again 
counter to the reflection effect).  Effects contrasting the referent \ distribution to the ^ 
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and / distributions revealed significant difference between \ and / only for all but the -
$150 male gambles.  Because of the limited number of probability distributions 
investigated, it is hard to draw any precise generalizations from this finding.  The 
finding could suggest either a preference for distributions whose right tail extends 
farther and incorporates more desired outcomes with low probabilities and/or a distaste 
for distributions with left tails that include more less-desired outcomes at low 
probabilities.  To the extent that the latter plays a part, the Security-Potential/Aspiration 
theory of Lopes and colleagues (1987, 1995;  Lopes & Oden, 1999) may find favor, 
given its emphasis on the decision criterion for avoidance of the worst possible 
outcomes.  In the generalized disappointment model (GDM) version of a risk-value 
GEU (and its relatives, e.g., Brandstätter et al., 2002; Lopes, 1987, 1995; Lopes & 
Oden, 1999; Mellers et al., 1997, 1999), this could also be further support for the 
overweighting of the disappointment coefficient (weighting outcomes below the mean) 
relative to the elation coefficient (weighting outcome above the mean).   
Objective structural differences in the anticipated affect responses were also 
observed, but these were largely attributable to changes in probability distributions and 
not EV.  Responses of anticipated valence and arousal were similar in the best and 
worst outcome conditions.  For best outcomes, the \ and ^ distributed gambles produced 
similar responses, while in the worst outcome scenario, it was the anticipated affect for 
the ^ and / distributed gambles that clustered together.  These effects were not 
surprising given the actual probability values and expected values associated with each 
of the presented best and worst outcomes.  For best outcomes, the probability of receipt 
among the \, ^, and / distributions were 0.10, 0.05, and 0.40, respectively, and for 
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negative outcomes these were 0.40, 0.05, and 0.10, respectively.  These probability 
differences are closely confounded with the expected value differences of μ+$100, 
μ+$100, and μ+$50, respectively, for best outcomes and μ-$50, μ-$100, and μ-$100, for 
worst outcomes.  Future investigations that do not confound these structural features are 
necessary for determining which components are more strongly related to each type of 
anticipated affect.   
Oddly, the subjective measures of risk and expected value for each gamble did 
not seem to correspond well at all to the anticipated affect or CE outcomes.  This seems 
strangely peculiar, particularly given the strong influences just reviewed from the 
objective measures.  However, it is important to point out that the modeling approach 
taken only allowed for prediction of individual differences within each anticipated 
affect and CE gamble response outcome (i.e., intercept terms for each outcome were 
estimated to handle fixed structural changes across the EV by probability within-subject 
factorial11).  In other words, this subjective prediction can be viewed as a method for 
determining how far individuals deviate from the objective measure effects (i.e., the 
means, or rather intercepts, of each outcome).  Still, this seems to be the most surprising 
result of all.  If perceived risk and EV do not map well onto the individual variation 
present in anticipated affect and CE judgments, one has to strongly question the 
mechanism that generates variability in the first place.  One can certainly rely on the 
measurement error arguments to be discussed in the section that follows, but invariably, 
even were all these limitations active simultaneously, it is hard to imagine that no 
                                                 
11 Yet, inspection of descriptive Tables 29-32 reveals that even had these variables been used to detect 
fixed changes across gambles, only the EV trend appears to match the observed differences found in CE 
responses among both genders and outcome-sign gambles.  Importantly, the descriptive patterns of 
perceived riskiness do not seem to pick up the observed differences between CE \ and / preferences found 
in the objective tests, but again this went un-modeled and was not statistically assessed.   
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meaningful variation was extracted and that no relationship existed between meaningful 
variation across measures of CE and subjective structural features.  To some extent this 
may call for a substantial editing to the theoretical model presented in Figure 1.    
Limitations 
Many caveats accompany the analyses and results provided above.  The vast 
majority of these involve measurement concerns.  For starters, unlike most of the 
economic studies in this area, where measurement of anticipated affect and preference 
revolve around actual choice responses, this particular study utilized both economic 
measures of choice (the CE estimates) and psychological measurement of anticipated 
affect.  Following the completion of the data collection for this study, Connolly and 
Butler (2006) published work that used a similar measurement approach.  They sought 
to test the correspondence between self-reported emotion on gambling tasks and the 
emotion-laden descriptors placed on many of the choice-derived parameters of GEU 
models like the GDM.  Their results indicated little correspondence between the GEU 
defined measures of happiness, sadness, rejoicing, regret, elation, and disappointment 
and self-reported measures, at least as discrete, prototypical emotions.  There was 
support for correspondence between predictions from the regret/rejoicing mechanism 
and an aggregate 2-dimensional measure of affect.  The same was not true when this 2-
dimensional measure was used to predict effects of disappointment/elation.  Connolly 
and Butler also found the measures of self-reported affect to be internally reliable 
(substantially high test-retest correlations and high Cronbach alphas for dimensional 
scales), monotonically related to payoffs, and uniquely predictive of preference.  
Moreover, Decision Affect Theory (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Mellers, 
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Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999) and post-choice valuation models (Inman, Dyer, & Jia, 1997) 
also used self-reported measures of affect to successful model choice outcomes.  So, 
despite its infrequent use in economic gambling tasks, psychological measurement 
appears to have some interesting viability in choice modeling.   
Measurement concerns do not end with self-reporting procedures, however.  As 
detailed earlier, many investigators have attempted to measure and use dimensions of 
affect to predict risky decisions, yet, rarely has agreement been reached on what 
dimensions to study.  Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001), for example, argue that 
emotions of the same valence and arousal can often differ in their impact on decision-
making because of their differences in other dimensions (appraisals in their work, like 
control and certainty).  Interestingly, Mehrabian (1995) has recently extended the 
Pleasure-Arousal Hypothesis to include dimensional influences of dominance.  Other 
researchers have opted to avoid the use of dimensional affect in favor of prototypical, 
discrete measures of emotions like depression and anxiety (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1996; 
Raghunathan & Pham, 1999; Raghunathan et al., 2006).  The current methodology used 
the Russell and Mehrabian (1974) measure of affect, which greatly limits any attempts 
to extract these types of prototypical emotions.  Future work in this area could avoid 
this limitation with either multiple measures of affect or scales designed to tap both 
types of affect (e.g., Vastfjall, Friman, Garling, & Kleiner, 2002).  
 As alluded to repeatedly above, the self-reported measurement of anticipated 
affect was particularly difficult.  Not only does this type of elicitation require a 
considerable amount of time on behalf of the participant, but once measured, 
determining how to combine the various pieces of this affect (best, worst, and all those 
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in between) remains a challenge, theoretically and methodologically, for future research 
(especially for gambles with more than two outcomes).  This particular study only 
assessed expected affect for extreme outcomes and did so with only single-item 
measures.  Guided by the aspiration level theories in rank-dependent GEU, it was 
believed that this may be sufficient to assess the major impact of expected affect on CE 
responses.  The results presented above imply that either this presumption was untrue, 
single-item indicators are not reliable enough, or that perhaps, in this particular context, 
the relationship between these measures is not as strong as predicted.  As evident in 
Hypothesis 2 analysis, one major improvement in future measurement will concern the 
avoidance of floor and ceiling effects.  Given the nature of the task, it seems reasonable 
that a scale can be developed to detect real differences along the anticipated affect 
dimensions across such large differences in expected outcomes (e.g., EV differences of 
$150 and $200).  Perhaps better coaching methods, instructions, or response anchors 
can be used with these affect self-report measures so that respondents are more likely to 
use responses that do not lie on the extreme boundaries.   
 Measurement concerns envelope the choice outcomes as well.  The current 
method of CE elicitation deviates from previous methods (e.g., PEST procedure; Luce, 
2000) in that each gamble’s CE was estimated within consecutive iterations (i.e., 
consecutive choices between the sure-thing amounts and gambles used the same gamble 
until a CE was established).  Much like the limitations on measurement of anticipated 
affect, this can also be a methodological Catch-22.  On the one hand, you would like to 
design an elicitation procedure that limits the burden on the respondent and in turn any 
effects of fatigue, while on the other hand, there is genuine concern with biased 
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reporting of CEs once the internal iteration procedure has been learned.  Moreover, 
simply using certainty amounts has also been shown to produce bias (Luce, 2000) when 
compared to comparable judgments of actual choice (all pair-wise preference 
comparisons of gambles).  The degree to which these biases affected results in this 
study are hard to determine.  Future research with alternative elicitation procedures are 
a necessary progression.   
 Finally, as with any gambling study, the results are not easily generalized 
beyond the domain of the task.  Moreover, generalizing within other gambling scenarios 
may even be difficult due to the very limited number of investigated gamble structures.  
In some situations (e.g., the elicitation of best and worst anticipated affect), the selected 
gambles suffered from unnecessary confounding of structural features (see Summary of 
Hypothesis 2 Results).  Also, the study did not attempt to assess mixed gambles, where 
both losses and gains are possible.  As the previous literature attests, even small changes 
to the current gambling task are likely to produce dramatically different results.  Again 
future research is needed to expand these manipulated features.   
Future Research 
 Aside from the measurement improvements highlighted in the previous section, 
much work remains to be done in the theoretical development of these affective 
influence models.  A second follow-up study by this investigator is underway to explore 
the coloring effects of integral affect on risky choice (in fact data for this study were 
collected concurrently with the data reported in this dissertation).  This second study 
will present work on how positive and negative feedback on gamble performance 
impacts current emotions (integral affect), and in turn how well these emotions predict 
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future gambling performance.  Similar studies are starting to trickle into the literature.  
Heyman, Meller, Tishcenko, and Schwartz (2004) recently explored the influence of 
immediate feedback to that of previous performance using time series analysis and an 
extended Decision Affect Theory model.  Results indicated that while background 
performance did have an impact, immediate feedback was disproportionately weighted 
more heavily for future decisions.  The findings suggested that whereas trends of 
outcomes over time were important, it was a person’s most immediate experience that 
had a greater impact on the path they chose next.  This speaks directly to the power of 
visceral influences as reviewed by Loewenstein (1996).  Extending this work into 
contexts outside of gambling tasks seems a promising and valuable contribution to the 
literature.   
Finally, although not particularly effective in this study, the close relationships 
between the risk perception and attitude literature with the affective decision-making 
theories seems to call for more attempts at unification.  In the Weber and Milliman 
(1997) work reviewed earlier and a Mellers, Schwartz, and Weber (1997) study strong 
support emerged for consistent, trait-like measurement of risk perceptions.  In both 
studies, choices based on preference and on risk (choosing the option believed to be 
riskier) closely matched one another, but for a large group this was a positive 
relationship, and, yet, for another substantial group of people these choices were 
negatively related.  These findings suggest that individual differences on choice tasks 
may be a reflection of individual differences in personal tastes for risk-taking.  
Importantly, risk needed to be subjectively measured in these studies for these effects to 
emerge.  So, although risk attitudes (i.e., how risky is this gamble) may differ from task 
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to task and situation to situation, preference for risk may be stable.  Future research in 
this area may benefit greatly from a comparison of stable prototypical affect like 
depression and anxiety and these trait-like measures of risk-perception.  If these types of 
measures cluster in any manner, evidence for mediating mechanisms like that proposed 
in Hypothesis 4 could provide mechanistic explanations for previously identified 
incidental affect effects.  This may be especially true for studies using self-report 
measures that tap, not only state, but also traces of trait affect (a situation 
unapologetically welcomed in Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001).   Assessing the viability 
of these relationships in a variety of contexts, to include both in laboratory gambling 
tasks and more real-world based decisions (e.g., sexual decision-making), may prove to 
be an exciting extension of both these research programs.   
 121
   
References 
 
Adler, N. E., & Tschann, J. M.  (1993).  Conscious and preconscious motivation 
for pregnancy among female adolescents. In A. Lawson, & D. L. Rhode (Eds.), Politics 
of pregnancy: Adolescent sexuality and public policy (pp. 144-158).  New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
Aiken, L. S., & West, S. G. (1991). Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting  
interactions. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.  
Allison, P. D. (1995).  The impact of random predictors on comparisons of 
coefficients between models: Comment on Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou.  American 
Journal of Sociology, 100, 1294-1305. 
Anderson, T.W., & Rubin, H. (1956).  Statistical inference in factor analysis. In 
Proceedings of the Third Berkeley Symposium, Volume V. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Aroian, L. A. (1944). The probability function of the product of two normally 
distributed variables. Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 18, 265-271.  
Asparouhov, T. (2005). Sampling weights in latent variable modeling. 
Structural Equation Modeling, 12, 411-434. 
Asparouhov, T. (2006). General multi-level modeling with sampling weights.  
Communications in Statistics: Theory and Methods, 35, 439-460. 
Asparouhov, T. & Muthén, B. (2005). Multivariate statistical modeling with 
survey data.  Proceedings of the FCMS 2005 Research Conference. 
 122
   
Baron, G., & Erev, I.  (2003).  Small feedback-based decisions and their limited 
correspondence to description-based decisions.  Journal of Behavioral Decision 
Making, 16, 215-233. 
Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable 
distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical 
considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 1173–1182. 
Bell, D. E. (1985).  Disappointment in decision making under uncertainty.  
Operations Research, 33, 1-27. 
Berkowitz, L., Jaffee, S., Jo, E., & Troccoli, B. T.  (2000).  On the correction of 
feeling-induced judgmental biases.  In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: The role 
of affect in social cognition (pp. 131-152).  New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Bless, H.  (2000).  The interplay of affect and cognition: The mediating role of 
general knowledge structures.  In j. P. Forgas (Ed.), Feeling and thinking: Affective 
influences on social cognition (pp.  201-222).  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Bless, H., & Schwarz, N.  (1999).  Sufficient and necessary conditions in dual 
process models: The case of mood and information processing.  In S. Chaiken & Y. 
Tope (Eds.), Dual process theories in social psychology (pp.  423-440).  New York: 
Guilford.   
Boyer, C. B., Tschann, J. M., &  Schafer, M. A. (1999).  Predictors of risk for 
sexually transmitted diseases in ninth grade urban high school students.  Journal of 
Adolescent Research, 14, 448-465. 
Boyer, T. W. (2006).  The development of risk-taking: A multi-perspective 
review.  Developmental Review, 26, 291-345. 
 123
   
Brandstätter, E., Kuhberger, A., & Schneider, F.  (2002).  A cognitive-emotional 
account of the shape of the probability weighting function.  Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 15, 79-100. 
Browne, M.W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing fit. In K.A. 
Allen & J.S. Long (Eds.), Testing structural equation models (pp. 136-162). Newbury 
Park, CA: Sage. 
Butler, J. C., Dyer, J. S., & Jia, J.  (2005).  An empirical investigation of the 
assumptions of risk-value models.  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 30, 133 - 156. 
CDC. Tracking the hidden epidemics: Trends in STDs in the United States. 
Atlanta, GA: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000. 
Ciarrochi, J. V., & Forgas, J. P.  (1999).  On being tense yet tolerant: The 
paradoxical effects of trait anxiety and aversive mood on intergroup judgments.  Group 
Dynamics: Theory, Research and Practice, 3, 227-238.   
Clore, G. L., & Parrott, W. G.  (1994).  Cognitive feelings and metacognitive 
judgments.  European Journal of Social Psychology, 24, 101-115. 
Clore, G. L., Schwarz, N., & Conway, M.  (1994).  Affective causes and 
consequences of social information processing,.  In R. S. Wyer, & T. K. Srull (Eds.), 
Handbook of social cognition (2nd ed.), (Vol. 1, pp. 323-418).  Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.   
Clore, G. L., & Tamir, M.  (2002). Affect as embodied information.  
Psychological Inquiry, 13, 29-45.   
Connolly, T., & Butler, D. (2006).  Regret in economic and psychological 
theories of choice.  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 19, 139-154. 
 124
   
Damasio, A. R.  (1994).  Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human 
brain.  New York: Avon. 
Diamantopoulos, A., & Siguaw, J. A. (2006).  Formative versus reflective 
indicators in organizational measure development: A comparison and empirical 
illustration.  British Journal of Management, 17, 263-282.  
Edwards, J. R., & Lambert, L. S. (2007).  Methods for integrating moderation 
and mediation: A general analytical framework using moderated path analysis.  
Psychological Methods, 12, 1-22. 
Eisenberg, A. E., Baron, J., & Seligman, M. E. P.  (1996).  Individual 
differences in risk aversion and anxiety.  Unpublished manuscript. 
Epstein, S.  (1994).  Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic 
unconscious.  American Psychologist, 49, 709-724. 
Fennema, & van Assen, (1999).  Measuring the utility of losses by means of the 
tradeoff method.  Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 17, 277-295. 
Fiedler, K.  (1991).  On the task, the measures and the mood in research on 
affect and social cognition.  In J. P. Forgas (Ed.), Emotion and social judgments (pp.  
83-104).  Oxford: Pergamon Press. 
Fiedler, K.  (2001).  Affective influences on social information processing.  In J. 
P. Forgas (Ed.), The handbook of affect and social cognition (pp. 163-185).  Mahwah, 
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Fiedler, K.  (2002).  Mood-dependent processing strategies from a meta-
theoretical perspective.  Psychological Inquiry, 13, 49-54.   
 125
   
Fishburn, (1988).  Normative theories of decision making under risk and under 
uncertainty.  In D. E. Bell & H. Raiffa (Eds.), Decision making: Descriptive, normative, 
and prescriptive interactions (pp.  78-98).  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Fishburn, P. C. (1989).  Foundations of decision analysis: Along the way.  
Management Science, 35, 387-405.   
Forgas, J. P.  (1995).  Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model (AIM).  
Psychological Bulletin, 117, 1-28.   
Forgas, J. P.  (2000).  Feeling and thinking: the role of affect in social cognition.  
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Forgas, J. P.  (2001).  The affect infusion model (AIM): An integrative theory of 
mood effects on cognition and judgments.  In L. L. Martin & G. L. Clore (Eds.), 
Theories of mood and cognition: A users guidebook (Vol. 8, pp. 99-134).  Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Forgas, J. P.  (2003).  Affective influences on attitudes and judgments.  In R. J. 
Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective sciences (pp. 
596-618).  London: Oxford University Press.   
Forgas, J. P., & Ciarrochi, J. V.  (2002).  On managing moods: Evidence for the 
role of homeostatic cognitive strategies in affect regulation.  Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 28, 336-345.   
Forgas, J. P., Ciarrochi, J. V., & Moylan, S. J.  (2000).  Subjective experience 
and mood regulation: The role of information processing strategies.  In H. Bless & J. P. 
Forgas (Eds.), The message within: The role of subjective experience in social 
cognition.  Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. 
 126
   
Forgas, J. P., East, R.  (2003).  Affective influences on social judgments and 
decisions: Implicit and explicit processes.  In J. P. Forgas & K. D. Williams (Eds.), 
Social judgments: Implicit and explicit processes (pp. 198-226).  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Forgas, J. P., & Fiedler, K.  (1996).  Us and them: Mood effects on intergroup 
discrimination.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70, 36-52. 
Forgas, J. P., Johnson, R., & Ciarrochi, J. V.  (1998).  Mood management: The 
role of processing strategies in affect control and affect infusion.  In M. Kofta & G. 
Weary (Eds.), Personal control in action: Cognitive and motivational mechanisms (pp. 
155-195).  New York: Plenum Press. 
Garg, N., Inman, J. J., & Mittal, V.  (2005).  Incidental and task-related affect: A 
re-inquiry and extension of the influence of affect on choice. Journal of Consumer 
Research, 32, 154-159. 
 Gonzalez, R., &Wu, G. (1999). On the shape of the probability weighting 
function. Cognitive Psychology, 38, 129–166. 
 Green, V., Johnson, S., & Kaplan, D.  (1992).  Predictors of adolescent female 
decision making regarding contraceptive usage.  Adolescence, 27, 613-632. 
Haidt, J.  (2002).  Dialogue between my head and my heart: Affective influences 
on moral judgment. Psychological Inquiry, 13, 54-56.   
Heyman, J. Mellers, B. A., Tishcenko, S., & Schwartz, A.  (2004).  I was 
pleased a moment ago: How pleasure varies with background and foreground reference 
points.  Motivation and Emotion, 28, 65-83. 
 127
   
Holtgrave, D. R., & Weber, E. U.  (1993).  Dimensions of risk perception for 
financial and health risks.  Risk Analysis, 13, 553-558. 
Hu, L., & Bentler, P.M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for fit indices in covariance structure 
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modeling, 6, 1-55. 
 Inman, J. J., Dyer, J. S., & Jia, J.  (1997).  A generalized utility model of 
disappointment and regret effects on post-choice valuation.  Marketing Science, 16, 97-
111. 
 Isen, A. M.  (1984).  Toward understanding the role o faffect in cognition.  In R. 
Wyer & T. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (pp. 179-236).  Hillsdale, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
 Isen, A. M.  (1985).  Asymmetry of happiness and sadness in effects on memory 
in normal college students.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 114, 388-
391. 
 Isen, A. M.  (1987).  Positive affect, cognitive processes and social behavior.  In 
L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (pp. 203-253).  New 
York: Academic. 
 Isen, A. M.  (1993).  Positive affect and decision making.  In M. Lewis & J. 
Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotion (pp.  261-277).  New York: Guilford. 
 Isen, A. M.  (2002).  Missing in action in the AIM: Positive affect’s facilitation 
of cognitive flexibility, innovation, and problem solving.  Psychological Inquiry, 13, 
57-65. 
 128
   
 Isen, A. M., & Geva, N.  (1987).  The influence of positive affect on acceptable 
level of risk: The persona with a large canoe has a large worry.  Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 39, 145-154. 
 Isen, A. M., Johnson, M. M. S., Mertz, E., & Robinson, G. F.  (1985).  The 
influence of positive affect on the unusualness of word associations.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 1413-1426. 
 Isen, A. M., & Patrick, R.  (1983).  The influence of positive feelings on risk 
taking: When the chips are down.  Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 31, 194-202. 
 Jia, J., Dyer, J. S., & Bulter, J. C.  (2001).  Generalized disappointment models.  
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 22, 59-78.   
 Johnson, S., & Green, V.  (1993).  Female adolescent contraceptive decision 
making and risk taking.  Adolescence, 28, 81-96. 
 Jöreskog, K. G. (1971).  Statistical analysis of sests of congeneric tests.  
Psychometrika, 36,109-133. 
Jöreskog, K. G. (2000).  Latent variable scores.  Available at 
http://www.ssicentral.com/lisrel/advancedtopics.html. 
Jöreskog, K. G., & Sörbom, D. (2004). LISREL 8.7: User's reference guide. 
Chicago: Scientific Software, Inc. 
Judd, C. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1981). Process analysis: Estimating mediation in 
treatment evaluation. Evaluation Review, 5, 602–619. 
 Kahn, B. E., & Isen, A. M.  (1993).  The influence of positive affect on variety 
seeking among safe, enjoyable products.  Journal of Consumer Research, 20, 257-270. 
 129
   
 Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision 
under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–291. 
 Keltner, D., Anderson, C., & Gonzaga, G. C.  (2002).  Culture, emotion, and the 
good life in the study of affect and judgment.  Psychological Inquiry, 13, 65-67. 
Klein, A., & Moosbrugger, H. (2000). Maximum likelihood estimation of latent 
interaction effects with the LMS method. Psychometrika, 65, 457-474. 
 Le Doux, J.  (1996).  The emotional brain.  New York: Simon & Schuster.   
 Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D.  (2000).  Beyond valence: Toward a model of 
emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice.  Cognition and Emotion, 14, 473-
493.   
 Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D.  (2001).  Fear, anger, and risk.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 146-159. 
 Lewinsohn, S., & Mano, H.  (1993).  Multi-attribute choice and affect: The 
influence of naturally occurring and manipulated moods on choice processes.  Journal 
of Behavioral Decision Making, 6, 33-51. 
 Loewenstein, G.  (1987).  Anticipation and evaluation of delayed consumption.  
Economic Journal, 97, 666-684. 
 Loewenstein, G.  (1996).  Out of control: visceral influences on behavior.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 272-292. 
 Loewenstein, G., & Furstenberg, F.  (1991).  Is teenage sexual behavior 
rational?  Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 21, 957-986. 
 130
   
 Loewenstein, G., & Lerner, J. S.  (2003).  The role of affect in decision making. 
In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of affective 
sciences (pp. 619-642).  London: Oxford University Press.   
 Loewenstein, G., Nagin, D., & Paternoster, R.  (1997).  The effect of sexual 
arousal on expectations of sexual forcefulness.  Journal of Research in Crime and 
Delinquency, 34, 443-473. 
 Loewenstein, G., Prelec, D., & Shatto, C. (1996). Hot/cold empathy 
intrapersonal gaps and the prediction of curiosity. Unpublished manuscript, Carnegie 
Mellon University. 
 Loewenstein, G., & Schkade, D.  (1999).  Wouldn't it be nice? Predicting future 
feelings.  In D. Kahneman & E. Diener (Eds.), Well-being: The foundations of hedonic 
psychology (pp.  85-105).  New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 Loewenstein, G., Weber, E. U., Hsee, C. K., & Welch, N.  (2001).  Risk as 
feelings.  Psychological Bulletin, 127, 267-286. 
 Loomes, G., & Sugden, R.  (1982).  Regret theory: An alternative theory of 
rational choice under uncertainty.  Economic Journal, 92, 805-824. 
Loomes, G., & Sugden, R.  (1986).  Disappointment and dynamic consistency in 
choice under uncertainty,’’ Review of Economic Studies, 53, 271-282. 
 Lopes, L. L.  (1987).  Between hope and fear: The psychology of risk.  Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 255-295. 
 Lopes, L. L.  (1994).  Psychology and economics: Perspectives on risk, 
cooperation, and the marketplace.  Annual Review of Psychology, 45, 197-227. 
 131
   
 Lopes, L. L.  (1995).  Algebra and process in the modeling of risky choice.  The 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 32, 177- 220. 
 Lopes, L. L., & Oden, G. C.  (1999).  The role of aspiration level in risky 
choice: A comparison of cumulative prospect theory and SP/A theory.  Journal of 
Mathematical Psychology, 43, 286-313.   
 Luce, M. F.  (1998).  Choosing to avoid: Coping with negatively emotion-laden 
consumer decision.  Journal of Consumer Research, 24, 409-433. 
 Luce, R. D.  (2000).  Utility of gains and losses: Measurement-theoretical and 
experimental approaches.  Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Elrbaum Associates. 
 MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., Hoffman, J. M., West, S. G., & Sheets, V.  
(2002).  A comparison of methods to test mediation and other intervening variable 
effects.  Psychological Methods, 7, 83-104. 
MacKinnon, D. P., Lockwood, C. M., & Williams, J. (2004). Confidence limits for  
the indirect effect: Distribution of the product and resampling methods. Multivariate 
Behavioral Research, 39, 99-128.  
 Mano, H.  (1990).  Emotinoal states and decision making.  In M. Goldberg, G. 
Gorn, & R. Pollay (Eds.), Advances in consumer research (Vol. 17, pp.  577-584. 
 Mano, H.  (1992).  Judgments under distress: Assessing the role of 
ujpleasantness and arousal in judgment formation.  Organizational Behavior and 
Human Decision Processes, 52, 216-245. 
 Mano, H. (1994).  Risk taking, framing effects, and affect.  Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 57, 38-58. 
 132
   
 Manstead, A. S. R., & van der Pligt, J.  (2002).  The what, when and how of 
affective influences on interpersonal behavior.  Psychological Inquiry, 13, 71-73. 
 Martin, L. L., Harlow, T. F., & Strack, F.  (1992).  The role of bodily sensations 
in the evaluation of social events.  Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 18, 412-
419. 
 MacCallum, R. C., & Browne, M. W. (1993).  The use of causal indicators in 
covariance structure models: Some practical isssues.  Psychological Bulletin, 114, 533-
541. 
MacKinnon, D.P., Lockwood, C.M., & Williams, J. (2004). Confidence limits 
for the indirect effect: Distribution of the product and resampling methods. Multivariate 
Behavioral Research, 39, 99-128.  
Mehta, P. D., Neale, M. C., & Flay B. R. (2004).  Squeezing interval change 
from ordinal panel data: latent growth curves with ordinal outcomes. Psychological 
Methods, 9, 301–333. 
Mellers, B. A.  (2000).  Choice and the relative pleasure of consequences.  
Psychological Bulletin, 126, 910-924. 
 Mellers, B. A., & McGraw, A. P.  (2001).  Anticipated emotions as guides to 
choice.  Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 210-214. 
 Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., Ho, K., & Ritov, I.  (1997).  Decision Affect 
Theory: Emotional reactions to the outcomes of risky options.  Psychological Science, 
6, 423-429. 
 Mellers, B. A., Schwartz, A., & Ritov, I.  (1999).  Emotion-based choice.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 332-345. 
 133
   
Mellers, B.A., Schwartz, A., & Weber, E.U. (1997). Do risk attitudes reflect in 
the ‘eye of the beholder’? In A.A.J. Marley (Ed.), Choice, decision, and measurement: 
Essays in honor of R. Duncan Luce (pp. 59–73). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. 
Mehrabian, A. (1995). Framework for a comprehensive description and 
measurement of emotional states. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology 
Monographs, 121, 339-361.  
Mehrbian, A., & Russell, J. A.  (1974).  An approach to environment 
psychology.  Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
 Miller, W. B.  (1974).  Relationships between the intendedness of conception 
and the wantedness of pregnancy.  Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 159, 396-
406. 
 Miller, W. B., & Pasta, D. J.  (2000).  Early family environment, reproductive 
strategy, and contraceptive behavior: Testing a genetic hypothesis.  In J. L. Rodgers, D. 
C. Rowe, & Miller, W. B. (Eds.), Genetic influences on human fertility and sexuality: 
Theoretical and empirical contributions from the biological and behavioral sciences.  
Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.   
 Miller, W. B., & Pasta, D. J.  (2002).  The motivational substrate of unintended 
and unwanted pregnancy.  Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research, 7, 1-29. 
Muthén, B.O. (1998-2004). Mplus technical appendices.  Los Angeles, CA: 
Muthén & Muthén. 
Muthén, B. O. (2005, December 20).  Class selection [Msg 5].  Message posted 
to   http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/13/ 917.html#POST7012.   
 134
   
Muthén, B. and Asparouhov, T. (2003). Modeling interactions between latent 
and observed continuous variables using maximum-likelihood estimation in Mplus.  
Retrieved January 12, 2007, from the Mplus Web site: http://www.statmodel.com/ 
download/webnotes/webnote10.pdf 
Muthen, B. O., & Satorra, A. (1995). Complex sample data in structural 
equation modeling. Sociological methodology, 25, 267-316. 
Muthén, L. K.  (1999, November 19).  Intraclass correlations [Msg 4].  Message 
posted to http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/12/ 18.html#POST56.   
Muthén, L. K. (2006, March 29).  Large and varied design effects [Msg 2].  
Message posted to  http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/12/1183.html 
#POST8048.    
 Muthén, L. K., & Muthén, B.O. (1998-2006). Mplus user’s guide, 4th Edition. 
Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén 
 
Neilson, W., & Stowe, J.  (2002).  A further examination of cumulative prospect 
theory parameterizations.  The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 24, 31-46. 
Preacher, K. J., Rucker, D. D., & Hayes, A. F. (in press).  Addressing moderated 
mediation hypotheses: Theory, methods, and prescriptions.  Multivariate Behavioral 
ResearchI. 
 Prelec, D. (1998). The probability weighting function. Econometrica, 66, 497–
527. 
 135
   
 Rhagunathan, R., & Pham, M. T.  (1999).  All negative moods are not equal: 
Motivation al influences of anxiety and sadness on decision making.  Organizational 
Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79, 56-77. 
Rhagunathan, R., Pham, M. T., & Corfman, K. P. (2006).  Informational 
properties of anxiety and sadness, and displaced coping.  Journal of consumer 
Research, 32, 596-601.   
 Richard, R., van der Pligt, J., & de Vries, N.  (1996).  Anticipated regret and 
time perspective: Changing sexual risk-taking behavior.  Journal of Behavioral 
Decision Making, 9, 185-199. 
Rindskopf, D. (1984). Using phantom and imaginary latent variables to 
parameterize constraints in linear structural models. Psychometrika, 49, 37-47. 
 Roth, W. T., Breivik, G., Jorgensen, P. E., & Hofman, S.  (1996).  Activation in 
novice and expert parachutists while jumping.  Psychophysiology, 33, 63-72. 
 Rottenstreich, Y., & Hsee, C. K. (2001). Money, kisses, and electric shocks: On 
the affective psychology of risk. Psychological Science, 12, 185–190. 
 Russell, J. A.  (1980).  A circumplex model of affect.  Journal of Personality & 
Social Psychology, 39, 1161-1178. 
 Russell, J. A.  (1991).  Culture and the categorization of emotions.  
Psychological Bulletin, 110, 426-450. 
 Russell, J. A., & Barrett, L. F.  (1999).  Core affect, prototypical emotional 
episodes, and other things called emotion: Dissecting the elephant.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 76, 805-819. 
 136
   
 Russell, J. A., & Mehrabian, A.  (1978).  Approach-avoidance and affiliation as 
functions of the emotion-eliciting quality of an environment.  Environment and 
Behavior, 10, 355-386. 
 Sanderson, W. C., Rapee, R. M., & Barlow, D. H.  (1988).  Panic induction via 
inhalation of 5.5% CO-sub-2 enriched air: A single subject analysis of psychological 
and physiological effects.  Behaviour Research & Therapy, 26, 333-335. 
Satorra A., & Bentler, P. M. (1994). Corrections to test statistics and standard 
errors in covariance structure analysis. In A. von Eye, & C. C. Clogg (Eds.), Latent 
variables analysis: Applications for developmental research (pp. 399-419). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Seligman, M. E., & Maier, S. F.  (1967).  Failure to escape traumatic shock.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 74, 1-9. 
 Schiffenbauer, A.  (1977).  Effects of observers’ emotional state on judgments 
of the emotional state of others.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 31-
36.  
 Schultheiss, O. C. (2001). An information processing account of implicit motive 
arousal. In M. L. Maehr & P. Pintrich (Eds.), Advances in motivation and achievement: 
New directions in measures and methods (Vol. 12, pp. 1-41). Greenwich, CT: JAI 
Press. 
 Schwarz, N.  (1990).  Feelings as information: Informational and motivational 
function sof affective states.  In E. T. Higgins & R. Sorrentino (Eds.), Handbook of 
motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior (Vol. 2, pp. 527-561).  New 
York: Guilford Press. 
 137
   
 Schwarz, N.  (2000).  Emotion, cognition, and decision making.  Cognition and 
Emotion, 14, 433-440. 
 Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L.  (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of 
well-being: Informative and directive function of affective states.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 513-523. 
 Schwarz, N., Strack, F., Kommer, D., & Wagner, D.  (1987).  Soccer, rooms, 
and the quality of your life: Mood effects on judgments of satisfaction with life in 
general and with specific life-domains.  European Journal of Social Psychology, 17, 69-
79. 
 Shapiro, S., MacInnis, D. J., & Park, W. P.  (2002).  Understanding program-
induced mood effects: Decoupling arousal from valence.  Journal of Advertising, 31, 
15-26. 
 Slovic, P.  (2004).  Risk as analysis and risk as feelings: Some thoughts about 
affect, reason, risk and rationality.  Risk Analysis, 24, 311-322. 
 Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C.  (2003).  Patterns of cognitive appraisal in 
emotion.  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 813-838. 
 Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in 
structural equation models. In S. Leinhardt (Ed.), Sociological methodology (pp. 290-
312). Washington DC: American Sociological Association. 
 Speier, P. L., Mélèse-D'Hospital, I. A., & Tschann, J. M.  (1997).  Predicting 
contraceptive vigilance in adolescent females: A projective method for assessing ego 
development.  Journal of Adolescent Health, 20, 14-19. 
 138
   
Steers, R. M., & Braunstein, D. N. (1976). A behaviorally based measure of 
manifest needs in work settings. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 9, 251 -266. 
Steiger, J.H., & Lind, J.C. (1980). Statistically-based tests for the number of common 
factors.  Paper presented at the annual Spring Meeting of the Psychometric 
Society in Iowa City. May 30, 1980. 
 Tiedens, L. Z., & Linton, S.  (2001).  Judgment under emotional certainty and 
uncertainty: The effects of specific emotions on information processing.  Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 973-988. 
 Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992). Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative 
representation of uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297–323. 
 Vastfjall, D., Friman, M., Garling, T., & Kleiner, M.  (2002).  The measurement 
of core affect: A Swedish self-report measure derived from the affect circumplex.  
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 43, 19-31.   
 Vastfjall, D., & Garling, T.  (2002).  The dimensionality of anticipated affective 
reactions to risky and certain decision outcomes.  Experimental Psychology, 49, 228-
238. 
 Vastfjall, D., Garling, T., & Kleiner, M.  (2004).  Preference for current mood, 
anticipated emotional reaction, and experienced emotional reaction.  Scandinavian 
Journal of Psychology, 45, 27-36. 
 von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O.  (1947).  Theory of games and economic 
behavior (2nd ed.).  Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 Weber, E. U., & Bottom, W. P.  (1989).  Axiomatic measures of perceived risk: 
Some tests and extensions.  Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 2, 113-131. 
 139
   
 Weber, E. U., & Bottom, W. P.  (1990).  An empirical evaluation of the 
transitivity, monotonicity, accounting, and conjoint axioms for perceived risk.  
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 45, 253-275. 
 Weber, E. U., & Milliman, R. A.  (1997).  Perceived risk attitudes: Relating risk 
perception to risky choice.  Management Science, 43, 123-144. 
 Yu, C.-Y. (2002). Evaluating cutoff criteria of model fit indices for latent 
variable models with binary and continuous outcomes.  Dissertation Abstracts 
International, 63(10), 3527A.  (UMI No. 3066425).   
 Zajonc, R. B.  (1980).  Feeling and thnking: Preferences need no inferences.  
American Psychologist, 35, 151-175. 
 
 
 140
